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This multiple case study (Yin, 2014) applied Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams 
approach (MSA) to the examination of how politics in Texas shapes state financial aid 
policymaking.  I analyzed three bills considered by the Texas Legislature between 2011 
and 2015, each affecting a different type of student aid: a need-based grant, forgivable 
loan, and tuition exemption.  The bills that comprise my cases each sought to alter or 
eliminate one of these programs.  I conducted 50 stakeholder interviews, collected 135 
documentary sources, and used pattern matching (Yin, 2014) and constant comparison 
(Merriam, 2009) data analysis techniques.  The purpose of my study was to understand 
how politics shaped the development and outcome of each bill, and consequently the 
financial assistance available to help Texas students afford higher education.  Findings 
revealed ambiguity and political opportunism surrounding the issue of college 
affordability; the influence of conservative political culture, partisanship, electoral 
politics, leadership changes, and policy entrepreneurs; and the use and misuse of data to 
shape policy.  In conclusion, I offer implications for policy and practice and present an 
adapted multiple streams model of college affordability policymaking.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
College is more expensive and comprises a greater share of median household 
income than at any point in the last 40 years (Delaney, 2014).  Rising costs and growing 
student debt levels have attracted increasing political attention to higher education (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2012).  These trends have tangible implications for students 
and families: as scholar Jennifer Delaney commented, “affordability as measured by 
tuition is not just an abstract concept but one that directly shapes an individual’s 
likelihood of enrolling in college” (p. 63).  
Data show that the enrollment and persistence rates of minority and low-income 
students are particularly sensitive to tuition and aid changes (Chen & St. John, 2011; 
Heller, 1997, 1999).  While escalating tuition costs can limit postsecondary participation 
(Heller, 1997, 1999; Leslie & Brinkman, 1987), financial aid has the ability to counteract 
this effect by lowering the cost to students and families (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013; 
Long, 2004).  However, national trends in student financial aid show an increase in merit 
aid – grants and scholarships awarded based on academic achievement – that primarily 
benefits more affluent white students (Dynarski, 2000; Ness, 2010), and growing reliance 
on student loans to finance college (Chen & St. John, 2011).  These changes over the past 
several decades underscore the need for states to balance declining appropriations and 
tuition increases with need-based financial aid for middle- and low-income students 
(Flores & Shepherd, 2014; Heller, 1997, 1999; Long & Riley, 2007). 
The complex dynamics surrounding college affordability are heavily shaped by 
state-level political and policy contexts.  According to Gittell and Kleiman (2000), state 
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political context consists of “political history and lasting social factors and state values” 
(p. 1059).  Such a combination of factors makes Texas a unique setting for the study of 
politics and policy: a strongly Republican political history; the influence of the business 
community; changing state demographics, and the interaction of multiple public 
university systems and a statewide coordinating agency (Gittell & Kleiman, 2000; Perna 
& Finney, 2014).  The presence of key political figures who have influenced higher 
education, such as Texas Senators Judith Zaffirini and Kel Seliger (Hamilton, 2012; 
Taliaferro, 2011), also suggests the utility of applying Kingdon’s (1984) concept of 
“policy entrepreneurs” – “advocates for proposals or for the prominence of an idea” (p. 
122) whose political acumen enables them to draw attention and inertia to issues they 
support.  These individuals play a powerful role in the political environment and in 
shaping the policy agenda, making their interests and strategies valuable to understand. 
The Governor and Texas legislators increasingly view higher education as a 
critical state priority (Hamilton, 2014).  Improving college affordability and degree 
productivity is crucial for Texas’s economic prosperity and for the quality of life of Texas 
residents: Texas lags behind the national average on college completion and outranks 
nearly all states on the percentage of students in poverty (Creusere et al., 2015).  
However, research indicates that the Legislature’s 2003 decision to deregulate public 
university tuition may have compounded this problem by limiting access to public four-
year institutions among low-income and nonwhite students – a growing majority of the 
educational pipeline (Flores & Park, 2013; Flores & Shepherd, 2014).  These findings 
reveal the potential for unintended policy consequences that hinder rather than help state 
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efforts to increase college attainment, as well as the importance of examining the broader 
social, political, and economic context surrounding higher education policy decisions.  
Without doubt, politics matter in higher education policymaking.  Scholars have 
established that political context, culture, and governance structure influence 
appropriations, tuition, and aid (Hearn & Griswold, 1995; Hearn, Griswold, & Marine, 
1996; Perna & Finney, 2014; Richardson & Martinez, 2009).  Political leadership and 
political dynamics often contribute to the design and success or failure of policy efforts 
(McLendon, Deaton, & Hearn, 2007; McLendon & Ness, 2003).  Interest groups and 
political competition also affect policy outcomes for higher education (Tandberg, 2010; 
Tandberg & Ness, 2011).  McLendon (2003a) described the nuanced political processes 
surrounding higher education governance reform in three states; Ness and Mistreta 
(2009) showed the role of politics in shaping state decisions about financial aid.  These 
studies underscore the need for continued investigation of how politics contributes to 
policy decisions – particularly decisions affecting college affordability. 
While student financial aid can offer clear benefits to students and support states’ 
economic interest in college degree attainment, political factors can also interfere with 
the design and availability of programs designed to make college more affordable.  
Scholars (see McLendon & Perna, 2014; Perna & Finney, 2014) have established the 
critical role of state context in shaping policies that increase college access, affordability, 
and attainment in the U.S.  Researchers and analysts have also shown that qualitative 
research and case study methods can be invaluable tools for examining the influence of 
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contextual factors on policy development (Perna & Finney, 2014; Richardson & 
Martinez, 2009).   
This study employed the multiple case study method (Yin, 2014) and applied 
Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams approach (MSA) to the examination of how politics in 
Texas shape state financial aid policy.  I analyze three bills considered by the Texas 
Legislature since 2011, each affecting a different type of student aid and state program: 
TEXAS Grants (need-based grant aid established by the 76th Legislature through HB 713 
in 1999); B-On-Time Loan (forgivable loans established by the 78th Legislature through 
SB 4 in 2003), and the Hazlewood Tuition Benefit (financial subsidy for veterans 
established by the 38th Legislature with HB 182 in 1923, renamed by the 38th Legislature 
through SB 81 in 1943).  I focused on legislation within the last five years in order to 
increase the accessibility of firsthand testimony from those directly involved with these 
policies.  The bills – SB 28 (2011), SB 1775 (2015), and HB 700 (2015) – that comprised 
my case studies each sought to alter or eliminate one of these programs.  Two were 
passed into law.  The purpose of my study was to understand how politics shaped the 
development and outcome of each bill, and consequently the financial assistance 
available to help Texas students afford higher education. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I provide contextual background on the issue of 
college affordability; offer an overview of student financial aid in the U.S. and in Texas; 
introduce the aid programs and bills that form the cases for my study, and provide an 
overview of my research design, the significance of my study, and key terms. 
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Policy Context/Background 
Defining College Affordability 
As this study examined how politics shapes policies related to college 
affordability, it is important first to acknowledge the difficulty of defining “affordability” 
in higher education.  The term lacks a clear definition and is subjective by nature, as 
institutions and students vary widely (Baum & Schwartz, 2012).  Delaney (2014) stated 
that affordability broadly means “the share of income required to pay the net price of 
college” (p. 57).  Institutions commonly refer to a student’s amount of unmet need, or 
how much more the student has to pay beyond what he or she can realistically afford.  
But as Baum and Ma (2014) noted, this approach relies on the student’s Estimated 
Family Contribution (EFC) – an imperfect number based on just one year of family 
income.1  The Lumina Foundation has suggested the Rule of 10: at most, students should 
pay no more than the equivalent of saving 10% of discretionary income for 10 years, and 
the earnings from working 10 hours per week while in school (Lumina Foundation, 
2015).  Rather than claiming to define what constitutes an appropriate amount for 
students and families to contribute, for this study I rely on Delaney’s broad concept of 
affordability as the share of income required to pay for college. 
 
                                                 
1 Beginning in 2016, an executive action by the Obama Administration permitted families to complete the 
Free Application for Student Financial Aid (FASFA) using prior-prior year (two fiscal years preceding the 
application date) tax data, rather than prior year (the most recent fiscal year).  This change may improve 
financial planning for college by allowing families to apply earlier for financial aid and to receive aid 
packages at the time of an admissions decision (National Association for College Admission Counseling, 
2015; National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators, 2015). 
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College Affordability in Texas 
The issue of college affordability has become particularly contentious in Texas 
over the last decade, as seen in the state’s higher education policy environment.  The 78th 
Texas Legislature deregulated tuition with House Bill 3015 (2003), which shifted tuition-
setting authority from the Legislature to institutional governing boards (Flores & 
Shepherd, 2014).  HB 3015 also allowed institutions to set differential tuition rates across 
programs.  Along with decentralized tuition authority, the Legislature required 
institutions to set aside 15% of their total amount of resident undergraduate tuition 
revenue in excess of $46 per credit hour, and to use those set-asides for student financial 
aid (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2010).  
This study is situated within a policy context heavily influenced by the 
deregulation of Texas public university tuition in 2003.  While the impetus, process, and 
dynamics of that policy change are not the focus of my work, the results of deregulation 
play an important role in the legislation I will examine; because deregulation allowed 
institutions the authority to set their own tuition rates, I argue that it has heightened 
public interest in and concern for college affordability.   
The effects of tuition deregulation have received significant attention from 
researchers, higher education leaders, and legislators.  Flores and Shepherd (2014) 
examined the effects of the policy change and demonstrated that tuition and fees 
increased more rapidly per student after deregulation.  Their analysis revealed that rising 
tuition corresponded with declining enrollment, particularly among minority and low-
income students.  Republican Texas Senator Charles Schwertner has adopted a vocal 
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position against deregulation, arguing that it creates “a perverse incentive to increase 
tuition and fees as the simple means of expanding their own operating budgets” 
(Schwertner, 2014).  Democratic Texas Senator Rodney Ellis also argued that tuition 
deregulation has caused excessive tuition increases and enabled state underinvestment in 
higher education (Ellis, 2015).  Both current and former Republican Lieutenant 
Governors Dan Patrick and David Dewhirst criticized tuition increases following 
deregulation, citing interest among legislators in regaining control of college prices 
(Hamilton, 2012; Root, 2009; Price, 2015).   
State public policy organizations have issued their own statements regarding 
deregulation.  A report from the Texas Public Policy Foundation, an organization 
committed to conservative values such as free enterprise and individual responsibility 
(Texas Public Policy Foundation, 2016), concluded that deregulation has reduced 
incentives for institutions to control spending and shifted costs from taxpayers to students 
(Young, 2010).  Alternatively, the Texas Conservative Coalition Research Institute 
argued that enrollment growth has continued at the same rate as before deregulation and 
corresponded with increasing support for financial aid, warranting continued institutional 
authority over tuition rates (Texas Conservative Coalition Research Institute, 2008).  The 
Center for Public Policy Priorities, an organization focused on progressive ideals such as 
opportunity and equity (Center for Public Policy Priorities, 2016), argued that 
deregulation has enabled tuition increases and contributed to declining college 
affordability for middle- and low-income students, particularly in light of state 
disinvestment in higher education (Helmcamp, 2012; Strayer & Helmcamp, 2012).  
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These statements from legislators and policy analysts reveal that while conservative 
leadership in the Legislature may most loudly, perspectives on tuition authority do not 
necessarily follow partisan lines: deregulation has inspired both concern and support 
from liberals and conservatives alike.    
While tuition doubled in the 10 years after deregulation, many Texas higher 
education leaders disagree that deregulation caused these increases.  Senior 
administrators at the University of Texas at Austin and the University of Houston, for 
example, have argued that tuition increases in Texas are part of a national trend and 
exacerbated by declines in state appropriations (Cardona, 2012; Kever, 2008).  University 
officials point to data showing that tuition and fees for most schools across the state have 
increased less rapidly after deregulation than before (McCrimmon & Blanchard, 2015; 
Wermund, 2015b).  Ultimately, perspectives on tuition authority and cost trends clearly 
vary by stakeholder group: legislators prioritize institutional accountability to the state, 
while institutions seek to preserve their autonomy and tuition flexibility, particularly 
amidst growing enrollment and lower appropriations per student (Delaney, 2014).  To 
provide context, it is worth noting that the average cost of tuition at a public university in 
Texas has traditionally fallen below the national average; in 2013-2014, one year of 
tuition and fees at a four-year public university in Texas cost $7,660, compared to $8,516 
nationally.  Texas two-year institutions also cost less than the national average – two full-
time semesters at a Texas community college cost $3,310 in 2013-2014, compared to 
$3,701 nationally (Creusere et al., 2015).   
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The policy debate surrounding tuition deregulation has profoundly shaped the 
political environment around college affordability and financial aid in Texas.  In allowing 
institutions greater control over price, the Legislature has also increased its scrutiny of 
those prices and of the expenditures that some view as driving cost increases (see 
Helmcamp, 2012; Young, 2010).  With less direct authority over tuition but continued 
interest in degree production and workforce development, the Legislature’s influence 
over college affordability shifts toward governance of state financial aid programs that 
help students and families pay rising tuition prices.  I argue that deregulation has not only 
increased political scrutiny of higher education institutions, but also increased the state’s 
emphasis on financial aid programs to offset increasing tuition costs.  The following 
section will further examine the state of student financial aid and need in Texas. 
Financial Aid in Texas 
Regardless of whether deregulation has contributed to tuition increases, the need 
to support financial aid and college completion in Texas is increasingly important.  U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics data show that college graduates earn more over the course of 
their career and are more likely to be employed than high school graduates (Creusere et 
al., 2015).  However, the bachelor’s degree completion rate in Texas falls below the U.S. 
average – 29% of Texans 25 or older, compared to 32% nationally.  Texas has the 11th 
highest poverty rate in the nation, including over 25% of Texas children.  Approximately 
120,000 students applied for but did not receive financial aid in 2013; 50% of these 
students’ families earned less than $40,000 per year (Texas Higher Education 
Coordinating Board, 2014b).  Finally, population trends show that the state’s nonwhite 
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population, particularly the Hispanic population, is increasing more rapidly than its white 
population.  Based on demographic forecasts, the state’s economic future depends on the 
success of nonwhite students who have traditionally demonstrated more financial need 
and been underrepresented and underserved by higher education (Creusere et al., 2015).  
Compared to students in other states, Texans have less access to state financial aid 
and are more heavily dependent on federal aid (Creusere et al., 2015).  Nationally, 73% 
of financial aid comes from the federal government.  In Texas, this amount is 85% 
(however, it is worth noting that this percentage may also result from the lower net price 
of Texas higher education in relation to other states, which allows federal student aid to 
meet a larger proportion of student costs).  Texas institutions also provide less than half 
as much aid as institutions in other states – 10%, compared to 22%.  In addition, students 
in Texas borrow more than the national average: Texas direct aid is comprised of 60% 
loans, 40% grants, and 1% work study.  Nationally, 50% of direct aid comes from loans, 
49% from grants, and 1% from work-study.  Overall, Texas students rely more on federal 
aid and loans to finance college than those in other states, and research shows loans can 
negatively impact students’ long-term financial stability (Creusere et al., 2015; Klepfer, 
2015).  These statistics underscore the need to examine Texas financial aid policies and 
consider ways in which students might benefit from the availability of additional need-
based grant support (Creusere et al., 2015).  
The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board administers seven primary 
financial aid programs across the state.  These include the need-based TEXAS Grant 
program, College Access Loan Program, Tuition Equalization Grant Program for private 
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institutions, Texas B-On-Time Loan program and Top 10% Scholarship Program, both 
funding only renewing students following their discontinuation during the 84th 
Legislative Session, the Texas Educational Opportunity Grant for two-year institutions, 
and the Texas College Work-Study Program (Texas Higher Education Coordinating 
Board, 2014b).  Table 1 presents these state programs with a brief description.  Table 2 
provides state appropriations and recipients for each program in fiscal years 2010 through 
2014, the timeframe including the case bills considered in this study. 
TEXAS Grants comprises approximately half of all state financial aid 
expenditures.  From 2009-2013, TEXAS Grants served 77,268 students with an average 
award amount of $3,786 and total expenditures of over $292 million.  In fiscal year 2013, 
average financial aid per recipient at a public university was approximately $12,000 per 
year, and average unmet need per recipient at public universities was approximately 
$5,000 (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2014b).  As the student population 
grows, meeting statewide need becomes increasingly important – and increasingly 
difficult (Long & Riley, 2007; Perna & Titus, 2004; Titus, 2006).  
Table 1 
 
Texas Student Financial Aid Programs 
Program Description 
TEXAS Grant Program Need-based grant (public 4-year) 
College Access Loan (CAL) Need-based loan 
Tuition Equalization Grant Program (TEG) Need-based grant (private)  
B-On-Time Loan Program Need-based forgivable loan 
Top 10% Scholarship Program Merit-based scholarship 
Texas Education Opportunity Grant (TEOG) Need-based grant (public 2-year) 
Texas Work-Study Program Work study assignment 
 
Note: Data from Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (2014b). 
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Table 2 
 
State of Texas Financial Aid Appropriations, Dollars and Recipients, Fiscal Years 2010-2014 
 FY 2014 FY 2013 FY 2012 FY 2011 FY 2010 
TEXAS Grants  $349,426,724 
(87,341) 
$292,547,705 
(77,268) 
$286,381,606 
(75,966) 
$338,099,297 
(71,726) 
$274,147,885 
(68,119)  
CAL $98,929,074 
(7,493) 
$100,598,999 
(8,063) 
$97,461,277 
(8,626) 
$87,564,863 
(8,354) 
$90,761,895 
(9,318) 
TEG $89,422,566 
(27,089) 
$84,197,706 
(24,906) 
$84,301,494 
(25,474) 
$102,106,482 
(27,736) 
$103,687,898 
(27,998) 
B-On-Time  $47,724,215 
(7,651) 
$52,733,274 
(8,130) 
$54,606,635 
(9,291) 
$57,566,462 
(10,216) 
$41,870,684 
(8,163) 
Top 10%  $25,814,617 
(15,633) 
$38,176,497 
(18,239) 
$32,571,124 
(15,916) 
$25,602,052 
(12,778) 
$20,286,449 
(10,191) 
TEOG $13,701,911 
(7,842) 
$11,554,030 
(6,563) 
$9,198,531 
(5,801) 
$11,300,090 
(6,826) 
$11,880,118 
(7,489) 
Work-Study  $7,975,527 
(4,763) 
$5,926,922 
(3,970) 
$7,096,453 
(4,645) 
$9,348,999 
(5,624) 
$6,365,572 
(4,458) 
Total $632,994,634 
(157,812) 
$585,735,133 
(147,139) 
$571,617,120 
(145,719) 
$631,588,245 
(143,260) 
$549,000,501 
(135,736) 
 
Note: Data from Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (2015b; 2014b; 2013; 2012a; 2011). 
 
Student Loan Debt in Texas 
Student loan debt poses a serious concern for Texas policymakers.  Loans 
comprise over half of average financial aid packages for Texans (Creusere et al., 2015; 
Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2014b).  When grant aid is limited, first-
generation and low-income students are disproportionately likely to rely on loans.  These 
students are more likely to default, resulting in damaged credit history and loss of federal 
aid eligibility, among other consequences (Klepfer, 2015).  In response to these 
challenges, the state’s new 2015 strategic plan for higher education, 60x30TX, sets a new 
goal around affordability: by 2030, undergraduate student loan debt will not exceed 60% 
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of first-year wages for graduates of Texas public institutions (Texas Higher Education 
Coordinating Board, 2015a).   
Lowering loan debt is difficult with tuition on the rise.  Not long after release of 
the plan, the Texas A&M University System Board approved a 2.2% tuition increase for 
2015-2016, and the University of Texas at Austin proposed a 3.1% increase for 2016-
2017 (Chahalan, 2015; Watkins, 2015).  Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick strongly 
condemned these initiatives, stating “If universities across Texas continue to ignore the 
increasing financial burden on students and families, and do not look for ways to reduce 
costs and pass those savings on to students, I have no doubt the Legislature will” (Price, 
2015).  The environment surrounding affordability is clearly complex, as policymakers 
expect higher education institutions to do more with less, or pay a political price 
(Blankenberger & Phillips, 2014; Dar, 2012; McLendon & Perna, 2014).  
The Politics of Affordability in Texas 
Patrick’s response to tuition increases reveals a belief that higher education 
institutions are responsible for ensuring affordability.  Patrick implies that the Legislature 
will intervene if institutions neglect this responsibility.  His official statement continued: 
“I believe the Legislature, in a bi-partisan effort, will take a serious look at re-regulating 
tuition” (Price, 2015).  These statements followed the 84th Session, which saw stronger 
bipartisan support for tuition re-regulation than at any time since deregulation occurred in 
2003.  The Houston Chronicle quoted Dr. Mark Jones, a Rice University political 
scientist who nimbly explained the political dynamics of tuition regulation: “It marries 
   
14 
together Democrats, who want to make higher education more affordable, and Tea Party 
conservatives who are inherently suspicious of higher education” (Wermund, 2015a).  
This political pressure around affordability and minimizing loan debt places 
Texas colleges and universities in a difficult bind.  State appropriations to higher 
education have dramatically declined: in 2014, UT-Austin received 12% of its budget 
from the state, compared to 47% in 1984 (McCrimmon & Blanchard, 2015).  Without 
additional state support for financial aid or recovery of lost appropriations revenue, 
institutions’ capacity to maintain low tuition amidst increasing enrollment is limited.  To 
support its student debt goal, 60x30TX calls on institutions to reduce expenses, the state 
to provide adequate funding for institutions and state grant programs, and for students to 
make informed loan decisions (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2015).  
These strategies highlight the importance of financial aid programs in supporting state 
goals, and therefore the value of understanding the politics shaping state aid policies. 
As higher education increasingly becomes politicized (Doyle, 2007; Sabloff, 
1997), scholars (see McLendon, 2003b; McLeondon & Perna, 2014; Tandberg, 2010) 
have called for further research on the politics of higher education – particularly work 
that considers the nuance and complexity of individual state contexts.  In response, this 
study examined the role of politics in shaping financial aid policy in Texas.  I applied 
Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams approach (MSA) to the analysis of three bills related 
to financial aid policy considered by the Texas Legislature since 2011.  I selected 
Kingdon’s theory because of its ability to illustrate the ambiguous, dynamic, and complex 
nature of the policy environment (Zahariadis, 2014).  Other scholars (see McLendon, 
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2003a; Ness, 2010) have also established a precedent for applying MSA to the study of 
higher education policy.  Through a multiple case study (Yin, 2014), I investigated the 
interaction between politics, problems, and policies – Kingdon’s three streams – in Texas 
and the ways in which politics shapes the financial aid policies that affect college 
opportunity across the state. 
Areas of Study 
My study examined three areas of Texas financial aid policy.  Each case study bill 
addressed a unique type of student aid in Texas: a need-based grant, forgivable loan, and 
veteran tuition benefit.  This section introduces each program and the related bill. 
TEXAS Grants.  Established by the 76th Legislature through HB 713 (1999), 
need-based TEXAS Grants provide tuition assistance to students with demonstrated 
financial need based on the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) or the 
state’s corresponding Texas Application for Student Financial Aid (TASFA).  Eligible 
students have an Estimated Family Contribution (EFC) of $5,088 or less (Texas Higher 
Education Coordinating Board, 2016b).  Students must graduate from a Texas public or 
private high school and complete the state’s Recommended High School Program or 
higher, and they must enter public higher education in Texas within 15 months after high 
school graduation.  Grants do not require repayment, therefore helping to alleviate the 
financial burden of student debt for students and families.  To earn grant renewal, 
students must maintain a 2.5 grade point average, complete 24 credit hours per year, and 
complete at least 75% of the credit hours they attempt (Texas Higher Education 
Coordinating Board, 2012d; Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2016b).   
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TEXAS Grants is the state’s largest financial aid program and provides 
widespread support to increase college access among lower-income students.  Without 
aid, these students might lack the financial means to enroll in college and would 
ultimately contribute less to the state’s economy and tax base (Berger & Fisher, 2013).  
Grants must be used toward Texas public higher education, and the grant amount may not 
exceed the statewide average for tuition and fees.  The state increased funding for the 
program in 2009, resulting in awards for approximately 75% of eligible students; in 2011, 
a decrease in state funding resulted in only 33% of eligible students to receive grants in 
2012 and 2013.  With less overall to award, the Coordinating Board recommended 
institutions award smaller grants in order to serve the most students (Texas Higher 
Education Coordinating Board, 2012d). 
SB 28.  Democratic Senator Judith Zaffirini authored SB 28 during the 82nd 
Legislature in 2011.  Also known as the TEXAS Grant College Readiness Reform Act 
(2011), this bill established new criteria for the Coordinating Board’s distribution of 
TEXAS Grants.  Since TEXAS Grants’ creation by the 76th Legislature (HB 713, 1999), 
the Coordinating Board and higher education institutions were required to award grants 
based on level of financial need.  SB 28 created a new merit-based priority model for the 
awards, requiring TEXAS Grants first be awarded to students who: 1) demonstrated the 
greatest financial need; 2) graduated from a public or accredited private school in Texas 
on or after May 1, 2013; 3) completed the state’s recommended high school program, and 
4) demonstrated academic excellence through test scores, class rank, grade point average, 
and dual college credits earned in high school.  After students meeting these criteria 
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received grants, remaining funds could be awarded to other applicants.  SB 28 passed 
both houses and became law in September 2011 (House Research Organization, 2011). 
B-On-Time Loans.  Repealed during the 84th Legislature in 2015 (Cobler, 2015), 
this program also sought to address the state’s interest in postsecondary degree 
completion.  B-On-Time was designed to increase state return on investment in financial 
aid: at the program’s inception, less than 50% of Texas students graduated within six 
years of entering college (Shook, 2012).  Created by Democratic Senator Judith Zaffirini 
through SB 4 (2003) during the 78th Legislature, B-On-Time offered zero-interest loans 
eligible for full forgiveness if students graduated in four years with a B average.  Eligible 
students demonstrated financial need based on the FASFA or TASFA, completed at least 
the Recommended High School Program and graduated from high school in or after the 
2002-2003, or earned an associate’s degree from a Texas institution in 2005 or later.  To 
maintain eligibility, participating students met their institution’s satisfactory academic 
progress requirements, maintained an overall 2.5 grade point average, and completed at 
least 75% of attempted hours each academic year (Shook, 2012).   
Determined by the Coordinating Board each year, the amount of a B-On-Time 
loan was equal to the average amount of tuition and fees for a resident full-time student.  
For 2014-2015, the final year for new loans, this amount was $8,000 per year for four-
year public and private institutions (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2016a).  
B-On-Time’s funding structure relied on tuition set-asides from institutions across the 
state.  When Texas deregulated tuition with HB 3015 (2003), the Legislature also 
required public colleges and universities to set aside a portion of their tuition revenue for 
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institutional financial aid.  That session, SB 4 (2003) created B-On-Time and required 
institutions to return 5% of tuition revenue to the Coordinating Board to fund the B-On-
Time program (Texas Legislature Online, 2016).  Finally, despite data showing the four-
year graduation rate among BOT borrowers more than doubled that of non-borrowers, the 
program remained underutilized: in 2011, 36% of available funds went unawarded, and 
just five of 36 institutions fully disbursed their allocations (Shook, 2012). 
 HB 700.  Democratic Representative Helen Giddings authored HB 700 (2015) 
during the 84th Legislature.  HB 700 discontinued the B-On-Time program and permitted 
the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board to award loans only to students who 
participated in the program prior to 2015-2016.  The bill phased out the “underutilized, 
inequitable, and ineffective” (House Research Organization, 2015a, p. 3) B-On-Time 
program over five years, eliminating the loan account in 2020.  Any balance in the 
account would be fairly distributed to institutions where the program had previously been 
underutilized.  HB 700 also abolished the requirement that institutions set-aside a portion 
of their tuition revenue to fund the program.  HB 700 passed both chambers and became 
law in September 2015 (House Research Organization, 2015a).  
 Hazlewood Exemption. The Hazlewood tuition exemption requires higher 
education institutions to absorb the cost of tuition and fees for eligible veterans and their 
dependents up to a certain number of credit hours.  This commitment to veterans is long 
established: Texas has exempted honorably discharged veterans who are Texas citizens 
from educational fees since the passage of HB 182 (1923) during the 38th Legislature.  
During the 48th Legislature, Senator Grady Hazlewood passed SB 81 (1943), which 
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extended benefits to children of veterans killed in military service.  The veteran tuition 
benefit has since been known by Hazlewood’s name (Legislative Budget Board, 2014).   
The state has considered various amendments to the Hazlewood program over the 
subsequent seven decades.  In 1953, the state restricted benefits to veterans who were 
legal residents of Texas when they entered the service and excluded those already 
receiving any federal benefits.  In 1993, Hazlewood benefits were expanded to children 
of veterans missing in action or who died related to their service.  A financial need 
requirement was added, but removed shortly after and replaced with a maximum of 150 
credit hours exempted through the benefit.  Hazlewood was extended to dependents of 
disabled veterans and surviving spouses of veterans missing in action, disabled, or killed 
in service.  In 2009, the Hazlewood Legacy Act permitted veterans to designate a 
dependent under 26 years old to use some or all of their tuition benefit; this age limit was 
later removed, as were restrictions on simultaneous use of federal and state benefits.  
Also notable is a lawsuit filed in 2014 against the University of Houston, challenging the 
Texas residency requirement at the time of enrollment; a verdict overruling the residency 
requirement would require Hazlewood to serve a wider population of veterans.  In sum, 
the breadth of the Hazlewood Exemption has significantly expanded over time, and this 
growth is projected to continue if left unchecked (Legislative Budget Board, 2014).   
The state provides minimal financial support for the program, and higher 
education institutions are required to absorb the cost of veteran tuition and fees.  The 
program has grown most dramatically since the implementation of legacy benefits 
following the 2009 Hazlewood Legacy Act.  Program growth increased from a 
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percentage change of 11.2% from 2008-2009, to 39% from 2009-2010 and 109.7% from 
2011-2012.  Legacy students now also comprise a greater share of beneficiaries than 
veterans themselves: in 2010, 94.1% were veterans, 3.8% were legacy, and 2.1% were 
dependent/spouse.  In 2014, these statistics were 44.4% veterans, 5% dependent/spouse, 
and 50.6% legacy.  Higher education institutions waived nearly $170 million in tuition 
and fees for 38,946 awards during fiscal year 2014, with more than half supporting 
legacy students (Legislative Budget Board, 2014).  
SB 1735.  Republican Senator Brian Birdwell authored SB 1735 (2015) during 
the 84th Legislative Session.  To help institutions control the rising cost of subsidizing 
veteran students and their dependents, SB 1735 proposed to narrow eligibility for 
Hazlewood benefits by requiring that (1) recipients live in Texas for at least one year 
before the academic term enrolled in Texas higher education; (2) recipients be Texas 
natives or residents for eight consecutive years before use of the exemption; (3) veterans 
have served on active military duty for at least six years; (4) no more than 60 unused 
credit hours transfer to dependents; and (5) children receiving a parent’s benefit maintain 
a minimum course load, cumulative GPA, and be 25 years of age or less at first use of the 
benefit.  This bill died in conference committee and did not pass, leaving the Hazlewood 
program unaltered after extensive debate (House Research Organization, 2015b). 
Problem Statement 
 As each of these programs illustrates, Texas faces a variety of challenges related 
to supporting postsecondary attainment across the state.  Through TEXAS Grants, the 
state strives to provide low-income students with financial assistance in order to advance 
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economic prosperity: college graduates make more and contribute more to the state’s tax 
base (Berger & Fisher, 2013).  With B-On-Time, the state sought a stronger return on 
investment for its financial aid funds; incentivizing completion could move more students 
through higher education, more efficiently.  Finally, with Hazlewood, Texas maintains its 
longstanding commitment to veterans and enables them to find new pathways toward 
contributing to the state’s economy.  Fundamentally, the objective of each program is to 
support the economy through educational attainment and workforce development.  
 The goals of each bill also reveal that these programs faced challenges related to 
the state context.  TEXAS Grants became unable to meet the needs of a growing 
statewide population.  B-On-Time encountered difficulties in its design and 
administration, and funds intended to support students remained unused.  Hazlewood 
continued to expand its breadth and eligibility, becoming financially unsustainable for 
higher education institutions and for the state.  SB 28 (2011), HB 700 (2015), and SB 
1735 (2015) sought to address each of these challenges by adapting TEXAS Grants 
eligibility criteria; discontinuing the B-On-Time program; and amending Hazlewood 
eligibility.  Yet Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams framework suggests that policy 
decisions are driven by interaction among not only problems and policies, but politics as 
well.  As McLendon, Tandberg, and Hillman (2014) acknowledged, “state decisions 
regarding the financing of public higher education are not made in a vacuum… these 
decisions are inherently political ones” (p. 159).   
This study examined the ways in which these three bills were, as McLendon and 
colleagues suggested, “inherently political” (p. 159).  I sought to uncover the politics 
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behind a priority model that valued some students over others, a bill discontinuing a 
program aligned with state interest in degree completion and fiscal responsibility, and a 
failed effort to prevent the state and its higher education institutions from an 
unsustainable commitment to subsidizing children of veterans.  As the policy outcome of 
each bill would affect college access and affordability across the state, the political 
dynamics shaping these bills have profound consequences. 
Overview of Study 
As noted, the purpose of my study was to understand the ways in which politics in 
Texas shaped the development and outcomes of three bills related to college 
affordability, and consequently the financial assistance available to Texas students.  
Using a multiple case study design (Yin, 2014), I examined three bills considered by the 
Texas Legislature between 2011 and 2015 that sought, both successfully and 
unsuccessfully, to alter existing student aid programs.  I focused on this five-year period 
in order to maximize my access to stakeholders with direct involvement, and also to 
illustrate the most recent political dynamics affecting college affordability in Texas and 
shaping state policymaking moving forward.  I addressed three research questions:  
1. How have policy stakeholders defined the problem of college affordability in 
Texas within the last five years?  
2. Why did SB 28 (2011), HB 700 (2015), and SB 1735 (2015) emerge as policy 
solutions to the problem of college affordability in Texas during this time? 
3. How did politics in Texas affect the development and outcomes of these bills? 
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My data sources included participant and stakeholder interviews, as well as archival data 
from state higher education agency reports, legislative records, and committee 
recordings.  As my data collection encompassed only three bills and spans only the last 
five years, this study was not designed to be generalizable across all financial aid policies 
or all years.  Case study emphasizes depth rather than breadth (Merriam, 2009), and  
I have focused on how these three bills illustrate the role of politics in shaping Texas 
higher education policymaking for financial aid.   
I drew upon Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams approach (MSA) to frame my 
research.  MSA identifies three distinct but interactive streams flowing through the policy 
system – problems, policies, and politics – and argues that policy decisions result from 
the interaction between and among these streams.  MSA depicts a nonlinear policy 
process in which politics may trump substance.  Its emphasis on the ambiguity and 
dynamism of the policy environment aligned with my interest in understanding how 
political context affects policymaking.  I provide further background and rationale for my 
use of this framework in Chapter Two. 
Significance of the Study 
While many environmental factors may influence higher education policymaking 
related to access and attainment, politics is particularly important to understand because it 
can be “altered and influenced by interest groups and policymakers” (Tandberg, 2008, p. 
3).  Consequently, studying the influence of politics on policy decisions can provide 
valuable practical implications for higher education advocates looking to increase 
funding and support for students (Tandberg, 2008).  
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This work aimed to inform both theory and policy in an era of growing emphasis 
on college cost and completion for states, institutions, and students.  Researchers (see 
McLendon, 2003b; Perna, Klein, & McLendon, 2014; Tandberg, 2008, 2010b) have 
called for continued investigation of the political forces shaping higher education policy.  
Existing literature primarily examines the factors that affect funding, tuition, and the 
adoption of new policies; I aimed to expand conceptual and practical understanding of 
how politics contributes to changes in existing policies.  Situated within a broader context 
of increasing college costs and declining affordability for students and families (Delaney, 
2014), my work sought a deeper contextual understanding of the political dynamics 
influencing legislation related to student financial assistance for college.   
I anticipated that my findings would reinforce the explanatory power of Kingdon’s 
(1984) multiple streams approach – particularly the presence and influence of key policy 
entrepreneurs within the higher education policy arena.  I also anticipated an underlying 
tension between Texas’s conservative, individualistic political ideology and the economic 
imperative of increasing degree attainment among a growing low-income population.   
While I specifically examined a Texas context and do not claim to offer findings 
applicable to other states, I do believe this research can provide valuable insight into 
questions and patterns to examine elsewhere.  This study was intended not only to 
advance academic literature and theory, but also to provide higher education institutions, 
policymakers, and organizations with greater insight into the contextual factors that 
influence state financial aid policies and their implications for college affordability. 
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Definition of Key Terms 
Kingdon’s (1984) framework provided three definitions critical to my study.  
First, MSA describes “politics” as “electoral, partisan, or pressure group 
factors…politicians’ attention to voter reactions, their skewering of members of the 
opposite political party, and their efforts to obtain the support of important interest group 
leaders” (p. 145).  Second, a “problem” is a “change in an indicator” (p. 97) that becomes 
a problem when triggers such as focusing events or evaluative feedback cause 
policymakers to believe it must be addressed.  Third, MSA describes a stream of 
“policies” that ebb and flow within communities of policy experts, rising and falling 
through a natural selection process.  Policies develop within a fragmented system of 
“policy primeval soup” that often produces slow, unstable policy change. 
Lastly, when using the phrase “college affordability,” I chose not to adopt a 
specific definition of the exact price at which higher education may be considered 
affordable.  I relied instead on Delaney’s (2014) broad definition of affordability as “the 
share of income required to pay the net price of college” (p. 57).  My use of the term 
“affordability” is intended to refer to the accessibility of college for all students, 
regardless of financial background.  
In the following chapter, I provide a comprehensive literature review covering the 
history and role of financial aid, followed by a more extensive synthesis of research on 
politics in higher education policymaking.  I conclude Chapter Two with a discussion of 
my theoretical framework, then address my research methodology in Chapter Three. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review  
To provide the foundation for this study, the objectives of this literature review 
are threefold.  I first offer background and prior research on student financial aid and its 
role in college access and completion.  I then proceed to review literature on the 
relationship between state politics and higher education policymaking.  I conclude with 
an overview of Kingdon’s (1984) theory and address the ways in which my work 
applying this theory contributes to existing higher education policy literature. 
Why Financial Aid Matters 
Trends in College Affordability 
College affordability and state appropriations per student have declined markedly 
over the last four decades (Delaney, 2014; Doyle & Zumeta, 2014).  As tuition costs and 
debt burdens rise, these trends have generated increasing national political attention and 
public concern (U.S. Department of Education, 2012; Camera, 2015).  Delaney observed 
that college is more expensive and comprises a greater share of median household 
income than at any other point in the last 40 years.  While enrollment has increased, state 
funding has declined; as appropriations fall, institutions replace lost subsidies with higher 
tuition, shifting an increasing cost burden onto students and families.  Researchers and 
analysts (see Delaney & Doyle, 2011; Hovey, 1999) have indicated that higher education 
provides a “balance wheel” for state budgets because of its ability to generate self-
supporting revenue.  As a result, higher education may be more susceptible than other 
areas to budget cuts in times of economic downturn.  Resulting appropriation declines 
and subsequent tuition increases have real implications for students and families.  As 
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Delaney commented, “affordability as measured by tuition is not just an abstract concept 
but one that directly shapes an individual’s likelihood of enrolling in college” (p. 63). 
Students may receive several categories of government financial assistance for 
college.  “Gift aid” generally describes all grants and scholarships, allocated based on 
financial need and/or academic merit.  Students may also receive loans or work-study 
packages that require repayment or employment (Hossler et al., 2009).  States have 
doubled gift aid grant expenditures over the preceding three decades, but these increases 
have failed to keep pace with tuition, inflation, and enrollment (Delaney, 2014; Dynarski 
& Clayton, 2013).  Long and Riley (2007) observed growing unmet need among U.S. 
college students; at the time of their study, 60% of all undergraduates had unmet financial 
need after accounting for all sources of aid.  This figure was particularly staggering 
among low-income students – 79% of whom still had unmet need.  For high-income 
students more likely to attend higher-price institutions, 13% of students still had unmet 
need.  Dynarski and Scott-Clayton noted that most students receive some form of grant 
aid, even though the purchasing power of such grants has declined relative to tuition.  
The issue of college affordability is particularly salient in Texas.  In 2003, Texas 
deregulated tuition with House Bill 3505, allowing institutions to set their own tuition 
rates rather than reserving that authority for the Legislature.  Flores and Shepherd (2014) 
examined the effects of this policy change and found that tuition and fees increased 13% 
with the implementation of deregulation in 2004 – $604 per student more than anticipated 
based on previous trends.  Their analysis showed that rising tuition corresponded with 
declining enrollment, particularly among minority and low-income students.  Flores and 
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Shepherd suggested that additional need-based aid should accompany tuition increases in 
order to counter these disproportionate negative effects. 
Other scholars have studied student price response in higher education and 
produced similar results.  Leslie and Brinkman (1987) authored an influential literature 
review on the relationship between price and enrollment in higher education.  Their meta-
analysis showed that a $100 increase in tuition price is associated with a .6% decline in 
participation among 18-24 year olds, and a 1.8% decline in total enrollment.  They noted 
that student price sensitivity should be greatest in the lowest cost and least selective 
institutions, which disproportionately enroll lower-income and more cost-sensitive 
students.  To improve access, Leslie and Brinkman argued that state policies should focus 
on targeted, need-based financial aid.  In an article updating Leslie and Brinkman’s 
findings, Heller (1997) conducted a meta-analysis and found similar results: a .5-1% 
enrollment decline with every $100 tuition increase.  Again, the magnitude of this effect 
increased for low-income and minority students and less selective institutions.  Noting 
that most studies examined data from the 1980s and earlier, Heller concluded that the 
trend of increasing higher education costs would likely make students’ price sensitivity 
more dramatic as tuition grew.  Heller (1999) again showed that the demand curve for 
public higher education slopes downward: enrollment responds negatively to higher 
prices, and minority and low-income students are particularly sensitive to changes in cost.  
Perna and Titus (2004) demonstrated that enrollment at in-state public institutions 
is related to both state appropriations for higher education and state support for need-
based aid.  Their analysis showed that a larger gap between tuition at private and public 
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institutions in the same state increases the likelihood that a student will attend a public in-
state institution.  Similarly, a greater difference between public two-year and four-year 
tuition costs increases the likelihood that low-income students will enroll in two-year 
institutions.  Long (2004) also found that students are enticed by lower prices; her 
analysis showed that state appropriations strongly encourage students to attend public, 
rather than private institutions.  She suggested that without state subsidization of public 
higher education, enrollment in public institutions would fall 24%.  State subsidies and 
financial aid increase enrollment in more selective, four-year institutions. 
The design of state financial aid programs affects enrollment patterns.  Dynarski 
(2000) demonstrated that the Georgia HOPE Scholarship – the first and best-known state 
merit-aid program in the US – increased traditional college-aged enrollment from 30% to 
37.8%.  For each $1,000 of merit aid, the college attendance rate of 18-19-year-olds 
increased by 3.7-4.2%.  However, Dynarski’s analysis revealed notable differences by 
race and income; increases were heavily concentrated among upper class White students, 
widening the gap in attendance between Black and White students and between low- and 
high-income families.  HOPE has primarily benefited students already likely to attend 
college, encouraging them to stay in Georgia to receive free tuition at public institutions. 
While financial support may be available to abate some of the increasing cost of 
tuition, students and families who lack access to this information may instead view 
college as increasingly inaccessible (Perna & Steele, 2011).  Perna and Steele showed 
that cost and aid availability influence where students choose to attend and how well they 
prepare academically.  They found that high school students were more likely to view 
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college as affordable if they were aware of financial aid programs, and they invested 
more effort in high school if they knew merit aid was available.  Similarly, Long and 
Riley (2007) discovered that students who believe college is affordable are more likely to 
perform at higher academic levels in high school.  
The findings discussed here offer important implications for my study.  First, 
students respond negatively to increases in tuition and positively to increases in financial 
aid (Dynarski, 2000; Heller, 1997).  Second, financial aid has not kept pace with 
increases in tuition, widening the gap between the cost of higher education and what 
students and families are able to pay (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013; Long & Riley, 
2007).  These trends in college affordability underscore the importance of state policies 
that narrow the gap between tuition costs and what families can afford.  As Flores and 
Shepherd (2014) showed, the effects of tuition deregulation in Texas make support for 
financial aid particularly critical.   
History of Financial Aid in the U.S. 
 Financial aid is an expansive topic and the subject of an immense and growing 
body of higher education literature.  To provide context for my study, this section will 
focus on the history and research most relevant to politics and financial aid policy.  
As Goldrick-Rab, Harris, and Trostel (2009) noted, human capital theory predicts 
that financial aid will increase college participation and completion.  Numerous studies 
offer evidence to confirm these theorized effects (see Heller, 1987; Leslie & Brinkman, 
1987).  To expand participation and completion, the federal and state governments 
operate a variety of large and complex programs that support postsecondary students 
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(Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013).  These programs are generally categorized as grants, 
loans, or work-study (Hossler et al., 2009).  The federal government maintains the Pell 
grant and Perkins, Stafford, and PLUS loan programs, the Federal Work Study Program, 
and offers other incentives such as the Hope and Lifetime Learning Tax Credits for 
families of college students (Long & Riley, 2007).  In most states, state aid offers about 
half of the amount provided by federal sources (Delaney, 2014).  As higher education 
enrollment has increased, state aid expenditures have grown significantly: state grant 
programs tripled from 1990-2010 (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton).  
McLendon, Tandberg, and Hillman (2014) outlined three primary strategies by 
which states finance higher education.  Through direct appropriations to public 
institutions of higher education, states offset the cost of attendance for all students.  
Second, need-based financial aid increases access for low-income students.  Finally, 
merit-based aid recognizes academic achievement and encourages talented students to 
attend in-state institutions.  Some evidence indicates that spending in each of these areas 
may influence the others.  Analyzing state spending on appropriations, need, and merit 
aid from 1990-2010, McLendon, Tandberg, and Hillman discovered an inverse 
relationship between spending on aid based on merit and need.  In an earlier study, Nora 
and Horvath (1989) also demonstrated that policy cycles alternate between concerns for 
quality and concerns for access, with an emphasis on quality often accompanied by a 
reduction in need-based aid.  However, a study by Doyle (2010) found no significant 
effect of merit-based aid on the availability of need-based aid. 
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Federal and state financial aid priorities have shifted over time.  For most of the 
20th century, public aid for higher education was primarily comprised of need-based grant 
aid for lower-income students (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013).  Historically, states 
maintained low-tuition policies through government subsidies that offset the cost to 
students.  In the later 20th century, need-based aid developed as a way to equalize 
opportunity across income groups.  The Higher Education Act of 1965 created the federal 
subsidized loan program, and the 1972 Education Amendments created the Basic 
Education Opportunity Program, renamed the Pell Grant in 1980 Act (Dowd, 2004).  In 
1978, the Middle Income Student Assistance Act increased the income threshold for 
these grants.  This change resulted in more funding for middle-class students, and less aid 
available for those from poor families (Chen & St. John, 2011).  In the 1980s and after, 
the U.S. continued an ideological shift away from equity and toward individual financial 
responsibility.  Subsidized loans increased in prevalence, and declining state 
appropriations to institutions have resulted in students and families paying for a greater 
portion of higher education costs (Chen & St. John, 2011; Heller, 1999). 
Beginning in the 1990s, states shifted emphasis from need-based to merit-based 
aid (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013; Ness, 2010).  Most states still allocate more to 
need-based aid, but increases in merit aid have outpaced need-based aid (Long & Riley, 
2007; Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013).  At the same time, data show increased demand 
for need-based aid: from 1999-2000 to 2011-2012, the share of four-year public 
university students receiving Pell grants grew from 24 to 38%, and the average grant 
amount increased from $2,000 to $3,8000 (NCES, 2015).  Scholars (see Flores & 
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Shepherd, 2014; Long & Riley, 2007) have argued that states need more aid targeted to 
low-income students.  This is particularly salient in light of Heller’s (1997) argument that 
the increasing political popularity of merit aid and availability of loans relative to grants 
exerts a disproportionately negative impact on low-income and minority students.  
Yet as state appropriations decline and institutions recover costs by raising prices, 
tuition is increasingly beyond the reach of middle-income students as well.  The Obama 
Administration has outlined national efforts to ensure college affordability for the middle 
class (see White House, 2010).  Family income level aside, most students now receive 
some form of financial aid for college (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013), and the middle 
class in particular faces a growing student debt burden (Miller, 2012).  As Dynarski and 
Scott-Clayton observed, “student aid is no longer just for poor students” (p. 84). 
History of Financial Aid in Texas 
 With state-subsidized public higher education and low tuition, state financial aid 
in Texas remained largely absent until the later 20th century.  In the 1950s, in-state tuition 
at Texas public colleges and universities was $4 per semester credit hour.  The 
Legislature increased this amount to $12 in 1987, and tuition increased $2 annually until 
1997.  The Legislature then capped tuition at $32 per credit hour for undergraduates, but 
allowed professional and graduate programs to charge higher rates (Cardozier, 2010).   
The Legislature established the Texas Commission on Higher Education in 1955 
to coordinate the state’s growing higher education system, but this entity initially lacked 
regulatory authority and had little impact.  In 1965, Governor John Connally took office 
and successfully recommended that the Legislature establish a stronger regulatory body.  
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The Texas Legislature created the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB) 
in 1965 (originally as the Coordinating Board, Texas College and University System, 
renamed in 1987) to provide leadership and coordination of higher education.  THECB 
continues to serve an advocacy and regulatory role, and its responsibilities include 
managing the state’s financial aid programs to ensure all Texans can access quality 
higher education.  THECB makes biennial recommendations to the Legislature for the 
formula funding of state public higher education institutions and for the allocation of 
funds to student financial aid programs.  The Board also administers these aid programs, 
supporting both student aid recipients and institutional financial aid officers (Ashworth, 
2010; Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2014a).  
Financial aid programs in Texas developed following the surge in postwar 
enrollment and creation of the Coordinating Board.  The Legislature established the 
Tuition Equalization Program in 1973 to provide need-based grants for Texas students 
attending in-state private institutions (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 
2012f).  The Texas Public Educational Grant program followed in 1975, providing need-
based aid to students funded through designated set-asides from institutional tuition 
revenue (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2012e).  In 1989, the Legislature 
established the Texas College Work-Study Program, creating state-funded part-time jobs 
for students with financial need enrolled at Texas public and private institutions (Texas 
Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2012b).  In 1999, the Legislature established 
TEXAS Grants (Towards Excellence, Access, and Success) to provide need-based aid for 
students in public higher education (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 
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2012d).  Texas also administers student loans under the Hinson-Hazlewood College 
Student Loan Program, the largest of which is the College Access Loan program (Texas 
Financial Aid Coordinating Board, 2014b).   
Several new programs arose in the early 2000s.  In 2001, the state established the 
Texas Educational Opportunity Grant program to support the growing number of students 
in public two-year institutions (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2012c).  
The B-On-Time Loan Program was established in 2003 and offered forgivable loans 
contingent on graduating in four years; however, this program was discontinued in 2015 
(Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2016a; Watkins & McCullough, 2015).  In 
2007, the Legislature created the Top 10% Scholarship to encourage Texas high school 
students graduating within the top 10% of their class to enroll in Texas higher education 
(Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2016c).  After declines in funding led to 
small scholarships of just $500 per student, the Legislature voted to phase out this 
program beginning in 2015 (Watkins & McCullough, 2015).   
Lastly, Texas has demonstrated a significant commitment to supporting veteran 
students through tuition and fee exemptions for Texas residents honorably discharged 
from the military.  While not explicitly a student financial aid program, the Hazlewood 
Act allows veterans, spouses, and dependents 150 credit hours exempt from tuition and 
most fees at in-state public higher education institutions (Texas Veterans Commission, 
2016).  In 2013, Texas four-year public institutions exempted over 384,000 semester 
credit hours from tuition through the Hazlewood Act, and approximately 44,000 students 
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were projected to utilize these benefits in 2015 for a total cost to institutions of over $200 
million (Legislative Budget Board, 2014). 
Few studies specifically investigate student financial aid policy in Texas.  Nora 
(1990) studied the role of institutional aid in supporting retention among Hispanic 
students in Texas community colleges.  Nora found that students with higher financial aid 
earned higher grade point averages and enrolled in and completed more hours, leading to 
higher likelihood of earning their degree.  Andrews, Ranchhod, and Sathy (2010) studied 
patterns of student applications to Texas universities and found that Texas students in the 
top 10% of their high school classes were significantly more likely to apply to the 
University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M University if they knew they would 
receive scholarship aid through one of the schools’ targeted recruitment programs for top-
ranked high school students, the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship or the Century 
Scholarship.  These two Texas-specific studies demonstrate the role financial aid can play 
in promoting college participation and completion. 
Dougherty, Nienhusser, and Vega (2010) studied the passage of Texas HB 1403 
in 2001, which established Texas as the first state to authorize in-state tuition rates for 
undocumented students.  Dougherty et al. (2010) discovered that the bill achieved near-
unanimous support, driven primarily by minority caucuses in the Legislature, the 
business community, Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, and higher education 
institutions – all of whom shared a vested interest in college opportunity and an educated 
workforce.  Examining the effects of tuition deregulation in 2003, Flores and Shepherd 
(2014) concluded that deregulation has exerted a differential impact on public four-year 
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university enrollment by racial group: Hispanic students are less likely to enroll in these 
institutions following deregulation of tuition, with mixed results for black students and no 
effect on white students.  They asserted that Hispanic students became more likely to 
attend lower-cost two-year institutions or to forego higher education altogether.  As these 
two studies show, tuition politics and policy have an impact on college affordability and 
access for Texas students – particularly Hispanic students.  These scholars studied Texas 
in part because of the state’s ability to provide a unique and interesting context due to its 
diverse population, its tuition policies, and its conservative politics.  The same forces 
make Texas an ideal context for the study of how politics shapes financial aid.    
Aid and Enrollment  
Studies have shown that aid availability and aid levels influence enrollment.  
Heller (1997) demonstrated that enrollment responded negatively to declines in financial 
aid, with differing effects by aid type: enrollment was more sensitive to changes in grant 
amounts than in loans or work-study availability.  Heller (1999) showed that 
postsecondary enrollment grew when states increased grant aid.  Alternatively, decreases 
in state grant spending corresponded with enrollment declines.  As with tuition, minority 
students were more sensitive to aid increases than white students.  Similarly, Perna and 
Titus (2004) demonstrated that students were more likely to enroll in public higher 
education in states with greater need-based aid.  Long (2004) showed that higher state in-
kind tuition subsidies through appropriations were associated with a higher percentage of 
students enrolled in public higher education.  Alon (2011) found that aid increased the 
likelihood of college attendance for students from the poorest families.  
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Perna and Steele (2011) discovered that awareness of merit-based aid in Florida, 
Georgia, and Maryland increased students’ academic efforts in high school.  Students 
who knew such aid programs existed were more likely to make college plans.  Those 
from middle- and low-resourced schools, however, were less likely to understand aid 
availability and therefore less likely to view college as affordable.  Also studying merit 
aid, Dynarski (2000) examined the enrollment effects of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship 
and found that while enrollment increased following the policy’s implementation in 1993, 
growth occurred primarily among white and high-income families.  College enrollment 
by white students increased 12.7% more in Georgia than in other states, with no 
significant change for Black students.  Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2013) conducted an 
extensive literature review and concluded that aid increases enrollment, but type of aid 
matters: grants appear most effective, while the benefit of loans remains unclear. These 
studies demonstrate the positive effects of financial aid availability on enrollment and 
underscore the importance of state policies supporting such programs – particularly need-
based grants and scholarships, and particularly for low-income and minority students. 
Aid and Persistence 
Research offers evidence that aid supports student progress through college.  
Cabrera, Nora, and Castaneda (1992) demonstrated that financial aid increased student 
engagement and integration by reducing the need to work.  Perna (1998) found that 
students who completed degrees within five years were more likely to have higher 
amounts of aid than those who did not persist.  Aid packages favoring grants were 
associated with the highest persistence rates, while rates were lower for students with 
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loan-heavy packages.  DesJardins, Ahlburg, and McCall (2002) also showed that aid 
reduced stop-out over time.  In their study, scholarships produced the largest positive 
impact on retention, followed by work-study, then loans.  Bettinger (2004) found that 
need-based aid increased persistence from first to second year, with stronger effects for 
larger aid amounts.  Increases in financial aid after enrollment also decreased a student’s 
likelihood of withdrawing – a $1,000 increase in Pell award correlated with an 8.6% 
decrease in odds of stop-out.  Chen and DesJardins (2008) established that receipt of Pell 
grants narrowed the persistence gap between low- and middle-income students, and that 
both loans and work-study were associated with lower stop-out risk.  
Hossler et al. (2009) reviewed studies on aid and persistence and noted that all 
forms of grants showed modest positive effects.  Loans were negatively associated with 
persistence for low-income students, but had no effect on the persistence of middle- and 
high-income students.  Chen and St. John (2011) found that students were more likely to 
persist through college in states that provided more aid (need-based and non-need-based).  
Decreases in aid corresponded with declining persistence; again, minority students were 
more sensitive to aid changes than white students.  Similarly, Alon’s (2011) analysis 
demonstrated that an increase in need-based grants in a student’s first year increased odds 
of persistence, with the greatest effects for students in the lower-middle income quartile.  
Alon suggested that while aid might prevent low-income students from dropping out, 
middle-class students on the margin of need-based aid eligibility could be more sensitive 
to increases in aid.  As these studies demonstrate, financial aid can promote not only 
participation in higher education, but progress to degree as well. 
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Aid and Completion 
In addition to documenting positive effects on enrollment and persistence, a 
growing body of research examines the influence of aid on student graduation.  Titus 
(2006) argued that financial aid is increasingly critical to both college access and degree 
completion.  His analysis showed that a student’s probability of completing college was 
negatively related to unmet financial need and with working more than 10 hours per 
week.  Alternatively, completion was positively associated with state funding of financial 
aid as a percentage of total spending for higher education, and with need-based grant 
dollars per resident aged 18-24.  Financial aid mattered more for student outcomes than 
state general support for higher education; however, completion was unrelated to state 
general appropriations to institutions.  
Alon (2007) discovered that financial aid helped equalize differences in 
completion by race and income.  He suggested that aid might mediate any negative 
impact of students’ socioeconomic or educational backgrounds on their likelihood of 
graduation.  In their literature review on financial aid effects, Goldrick-Rab, Harris, and 
Trostel (2009) affirmed that more aid increased both enrollment and completion.  
Similarly, Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2013) observed that lowering college costs 
through financial aid improve both access and completion.  The positive effects 
demonstrated by these studies underscore the value of financial aid to state and national 
college completion efforts (McLendon & Perna, 2014; The White House, 2011). 
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Summary 
Taken together, the evidence discussed in this section on the role of financial aid 
shows that while escalating tuition costs may limit postsecondary participation (Heller, 
1997, 1999; Leslie & Brinkman, 1987), financial aid can counteract this effect and 
increase enrollment, persistence, and completion by lowering the cost to students and 
families (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013; Long, 2004).  Data show that minority and 
low-income students are particularly sensitive to tuition and aid changes (Chen & St. 
John, 2011; Heller, 1997, 1999).  These findings are particularly relevant for Texas, 
where institutions have the authority to set their own tuition rates that may deter low-
income and minority students (Flores & Shepherd, 2014).  In addition, trends in student 
financial aid show an increase in merit aid that primarily benefits more affluent white 
students (Dynarski, 2000), and growing reliance on student loans to finance college 
(Chen & St. John, 2011).  These changes over the past several decades underscore the 
need for states to balance declining appropriations and tuition increases with need-based 
financial aid for middle- and low-income students (Flores & Shepherd, 2014; Heller, 
1997, 1999; Long & Riley, 2007).  This need for greater need-based aid makes 
understanding the forces shaping the development and outcome of financial aid policies 
particularly salient.  Environmental and other factors inevitably influence policy 
decisions, but are outside human control; alternatively, examining the role of politics in 
shaping these policies can provide valuable insight for higher education leaders and 
advocates looking for effective strategies and policy levers (Tandberg, 2008). 
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State Politics and Higher Education Policymaking 
Borrowing from political science literature and theory, a small but growing body 
of work examines how and why states make policy decisions about higher education.  
Much of this research focuses on the factors influencing state higher education 
appropriations and tuition; relatively few studies examine the factors shaping financial 
aid policy.  To provide a comprehensive foundation for my study, I discuss the broader 
body of research on political factors shaping all areas of higher education policy.  I also 
include significant related studies from K-12 education policy and political science 
literature, as these areas have influenced the more nascent study of higher education 
policy (McLendon, 2003b; McLendon & Perna, 2014). 
State Political Context 
 Research indicates that state political context influences higher education policy.  
This section examines the role of political culture, governance structure, economy and 
demography, and political dynamics in shaping state higher education efforts. 
Political culture.  Elazar (1966) identified three political cultures in the United 
States: individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic.  Individualistic cultures emphasize 
the marketplace; moralistic cultures prioritize the commonwealth; and traditionalistic 
cultures combine the former two into a system characterized by a paternalistic and 
hierarchical approach to government.  Both political science and education researchers 
have applied Elazar’s political cultures to the study of policymaking.  Garland and 
Martorana (1988) studied the relationship between state political culture and legislation 
affecting community colleges.  They found that traditionalistic and individualistic states 
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responded positively to community college legislation, while moralistic cultures were 
relatively less supportive of two-year college issues.  In a study of state expenditures, 
Miller (1991) discovered that individualistic states invested more on local issues and less 
at the state level, while moralistic states invested less locally and more statewide.  In 
traditionalistic states, political systems tended to maintain the status quo and keep state 
expenditures low.  According to Miller, Texas reflected a combination of traditionalistic 
and individualistic culture – indicating that the state was more likely to invest in local 
issues, keep overall state expenditures low, and resist major changes to the status quo. 
Hearn, Griswold, and Marine (1996) determined that regional differences affected 
state tuition and aid policies.  Tuition levels were lowest in the Southwest, while the 
Northeast and Midwest maintained high tuition, high aid policies.  Hearn et al. found a 
smaller difference between two- and four-year institutions’ pricing in the Midwest and in 
more highly educated states.  They saw the greatest difference in pricing by sector in 
states with higher income levels, decentralized governance, and a weaker private higher 
education sector.  The authors concluded that state financing of higher education was 
driven in part by factors outside state control, such as the pricing of regional peer 
institutions and the broader state environment.   
Gittell and Kleiman (2000) examined the political cultures of Texas, California, 
and North Carolina with regard to higher education and developed the concept of a 
“higher education regime” – key state legislators, the governor, and higher education 
officials who comprised the inner circle for higher education.  These regimes mirrored 
the states’ political cultures: individualism in Texas contributed to its decentralized 
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higher education system, while populist tradition shaped the universal access to higher 
education in California’s master plan.  North Carolina’s segmented system of higher 
education reflected its divided political culture.  In Texas, a lack of unifying political 
interests afforded the business community more influence over the state agenda.  Texas 
legislators saw higher education institutions in their districts as a source of local wealth, 
and they fiercely protected those institutions’ interests at the Capitol.  In another study 
based on Elazar’s framework, Koven and Mausolff (2002) found that states in the South 
and Southwest – Texas included – were most likely to be categorized as traditionalistic.  
These states emphasized functions that maintained order, such as corrections or police, 
over redistributive functions, such as education and welfare.  Koven and Mausolff 
concluded that public expenditures were based not only on political and economic 
factors, but also on culture. 
Through case studies of five states – New Mexico, California, South Dakota, New 
York, and New Jersey – Richardson and Martinez (2009) illuminated the underlying 
“rules in use” that governed state decisions regarding higher education.  Individual states’ 
rules varied, but all related to the state’s basic beliefs about six areas: system design, state 
leadership, information, access and achievement, fiscal policies, and research and 
development.  Richardson and Martinez found that states’ cultures and rules in use 
shaped their policy decisions and, therefore, their educational performance and outcomes. 
Ness and Mistretta (2009b) applied Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams analysis to 
their study of North Carolina and Tennessee’s decisions regarding lottery-funded merit 
aid.  Kingdon’s framework views policy outcomes as the result of three independent but 
   
45 
interconnected streams: politics, problem, and solutions.  Ness and Mistretta concluded 
that the two states’ constitutions contributed to distinctive political cultures and 
approaches to higher education.  The states’ views of lottery programs and concern over 
student departure to out-of-state schools differed, creating unique policy contexts.  
Similarly, Bastedo (2009) studied higher education governance in Massachusetts and 
noted that the state’s rationalist ideology played a critical role in shaping state policy.  He 
concluded that examining both institutional behavior and state culture allowed a richer 
understanding of the policy change process.  Tandberg (2010b) studied the relationship 
between political variables and state appropriations; he found that moralistic or 
traditionalistic states spent more on higher education relative to other areas, while states 
with a more liberal political ideology appropriated more to higher education. 
Dougherty et al. (2013) studied the development of state performance funding 
policies and found that state political culture affected policy adoption.  In particular, 
California and Nevada’s emphasis on autonomy and immunity for their higher education 
sectors contributed to those states’ decisions not to adopt performance funding.  Heck, 
Lam, and Thomas (2014) studied relationships between state political culture, higher 
education spending, and educational outcomes; they found that individualist states had 
lower average appropriations than traditionalist or moralistic states.  Traditionalist states 
had higher appropriations, and families in traditionalist states carried a smaller share of 
higher education costs than in moralist states.  Moralist states had the highest graduation 
levels; individualist states had the lowest, and their outcomes saw the smallest 
improvement over time.  Heck et al. concluded that differences in political culture 
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mediated the relationship between the state economic context and higher education 
appropriations.  Policy choices resulted from a complex mix of societal values, individual 
value preferences, and a dynamic policy environment. 
Perna and Finney (2014) conducted a major study of state policies promoting 
postsecondary degree completion in Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Texas, and Washington.  
Their study emphasized the role of social and cultural context in shaping governmental 
policies, as well as the critical importance of considering state-specific context when 
developing such policies.  Based on their findings, the authors developed a conceptual 
model for understanding the role of public policy in improving state higher education 
performance.  The first tenet of their model holds that the relationship between policy and 
performance must consider local context, “as defined by a state’s historical, demographic, 
economic, political, and other state-specific characteristics” (p. 203).  Their model also 
assumes the centrality of state policy leadership; the use of various policies to promote 
both the demand for and supply of higher education; the emphasis on promoting equity as 
well as attainment; and the need for regular progress assessment and policy adjustment.  
Perna and Finney’s work emphasized the interdependent nature of policy and context in 
higher education.  Taken together, the studies discussed here reveal the influence of 
political culture, values, and traditions on state higher education policy.  
Governance structure.  The ways in which states structure their systems of 
higher education can also influence policy decisions.  Hearn and Griswold (1994) studied 
the relationship between state higher education governance arrangements and policy 
innovations.  Applying Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams approach, they viewed 
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governance as one of multiple intersecting streams that might shape state decisions.  They 
discovered that states with strong higher education coordinating boards were slightly 
more likely to adopt policies new to their state, while states with planning agencies or 
weak coordinating boards were less likely to do so.  Governance did not affect all 
policies, however: Hearn and Griswold discovered that structure influenced policies 
related to teaching and research, but not finance policies.  
McGuinnes (1997) developed an influential typology of state governance for 
higher education based on six categories: consolidated governing boards, coordinating 
boards, planning/service agencies, multicampus institutions and systems, and community 
college and vocational/technical institution governance.  His model acknowledges that 
differences in state structure are “related directly to differences in state policy, culture, 
and tradition” (McGuinnes, p. 18).  This framework has influenced many studies of 
governance and politics.  For example, Lowry (2001) studied the relationship between 
public university pricing and spending and selection of board trustees.  Net revenue was 
lower at universities in states with statewide coordinating boards, lower in states with 
fewer governing boards, and lowest at universities governed by trustees selected by 
government officials or voters.  He concluded that trustees appeared to prefer lower 
spending overall.  Lowry found lower prices and cost in states with more political control 
over institutions and where nonacademic stakeholders selected trustees. 
  Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003) also studied the relationship between 
governance structure and policy.  They demonstrated that states with coordinating boards 
had lower costs for higher education delivery and lower tuition costs; appropriations and 
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financial aid were not related to structure, however.  In states with consolidated 
governing boards, greater legislative professionalism – the extent to which a state 
legislature resembled Congress – correlated with lower tuition.  The opposite was true for 
states with coordinating boards: greater legislative professionalism correlated with higher 
tuition.  States whose chief higher education officer was a cabinet member had higher 
costs per student, higher tuition, and lower appropriations, as did states granting legal 
authority to higher education boards by statute.  These states also had significantly higher 
financial aid allocations.  States with elected boards were associated with lower tuition 
per student and lower state appropriations.  Nicholson-Crotty and Meier concluded that 
the relationships between structure and politics were complex and varied; politics 
affected higher education differently across varying structural contexts.    
McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher (2009) studied variations in state funding for 
higher education from 1984 to 2004 and found no relationship between governance 
structure and appropriations.  However, Tandberg (2010a, 2010b) discovered that more 
centralized governance structures correlated with less funding.  McLendon et al. showed 
a significant positive relationship between legislative professionalism and appropriations, 
as well as between legislative term limits and appropriations.  Tandberg (2008; 2010a; 
2010b) demonstrated that legislative professionalism predicted stronger funding.  Doyle 
(2012) discovered that financial aid was higher in states with more professionalized 
legislatures.  Studying factors leading to the development of performance funding, 
Dougherty et al. (2013) revealed that state coordinating boards played a major role in 
advocating for the policy as a way to secure new funding for higher education.  The 
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studies discussed here indicated that characteristics of state governance – particularly 
higher education oversight, governing board composition, and legislative professionalism 
– influence appropriations, tuition, and aid policies.  
Economy and demography.  Numerous studies show that state financial 
landscape and population characteristics influence higher education policy.  Peterson 
(1976) argued that socioeconomic, environmental, and political variables affected public 
higher education, and current research provides ongoing evidence that state 
demographics and economic conditions are relevant.  Lowry (2001) demonstrated that 
public university outputs and revenues depended on both political and economic factors.  
Higher education appropriations were positively related to tax revenue and postsecondary 
public enrollment, and appropriations were lower in states with larger elderly populations 
and higher private institution enrollment.  Doyle (2006) determined that state educational 
context produced a stronger effect on adoption of merit aid policies than state politics.  In 
his study, states with more high school graduates and higher median family income were 
more likely to implement merit aid.  
Doyle (2007b) studied the relationship between state-level income inequality and 
state tax appropriations for higher education.  He found that state subsidies for higher 
education were higher when inequality was lower – results that contradict the prevailing 
view of support for higher education as a redistributive subsidy.  By implication, a 
smaller, wealthier middle class could result in lower appropriations, despite greater need 
among a larger, lower income population.  McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher (2009) 
showed that unemployment correlated with lower appropriations, as did higher 
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proportions of college-aged and elderly residents.  Testing Hovey’s (1999) theory of 
higher education as a “balance wheel” for state budgets, Delaney and Doyle (2011) 
analyzed state appropriations over time and concluded that during and after recessions, 
states were more likely to cut higher education than any other major spending category in 
order to balance investment in other priorities.  Doyle (2012) showed that the economy 
influenced appropriations more strongly than politics; Dar (2012) also noted that higher 
education’s ability to compete for state resources shifted in response to the economy.  
Building on previous work by Doyle (2006), McLendon, Tandberg, and Hillman 
(2014) studied predictors of state funding for financial aid and found that state wealth 
was positively associated with spending on merit aid, but not need-based aid.  
Educational attainment levels were negatively correlated with higher education funding 
overall, but high school enrollment was positively related to investment in financial aid.  
Greater funding for merit aid meant less available funding for need-based aid, producing 
a “crowding out” effect.  The authors concluded that policy decisions were made within a 
unique and complex state context, and “these decisions are inherently political ones” (p. 
159).  These studies emphasized the role economic factors and population characteristics 
may play in shaping higher education policies. 
Political dynamics.  Studies show that intangible factors related to power and 
political capital, the broader political environment, and competing stakeholder interests 
can shape higher education policy.  Olivas (1984) studied the development of the Ohio 
Board of Regents and found that the Board’s creation was influenced by media 
dramatization of challenges related to the state’s growing postsecondary population.  At 
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the K-12 level, Firestone (1989) studied education policy concerning teacher pay and 
professional development in Arizona.  He found that the policy process resembled a 
theory of games: the state legislative game, state government administration game, school 
administration games, and teaching game.  These simultaneous, loosely linked political 
games undermined centralized rationality.  Decisions and outcomes reflected political, 
public interest, and administrative factors more than educational needs.  
Hannah (1996) studied the Higher Education Act of 1992 and found that national 
attention on the federal deficit, the election cycle, and declining public confidence in 
higher education undermined the impact of HEA ’92.  Hannah concluded that political 
power was “limited by the ‘crosscurrents and constraints’ of the environment…history, 
public ideas, and the economic and social environment help shape issues and limit the 
options [these] actors can select” (p. 523).  Sabloff (1997) argued that national political 
trends affected higher education.  Since the 1960s, the growing influence of state 
legislators in relation to governors has made higher education increasingly politicized, as 
legislators trade favors to gain support.  Similarly, Griswold (1999) found that the 
National Commission on Student Financial Assistance was heavily affected by the 
changing political dynamics at the time – primarily the Reagan election and subsequent 
new appointees to the Commission.  The Commission reflected broader political power 
struggles that influenced its goals, personnel, and resources.  Griswold concluded that the 
Commission’s reports became political rhetoric rather than effective vehicles for change. 
Studying state higher education governance reform, McLendon and Ness (2003) 
found that higher enrollment and strong political sponsorship catalyzed policy change.  
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McLendon (2003a) examined the process by which decentralization of public higher 
education reached the legislative agenda in Arkansas, Hawaii, and Illinois and found that 
the agenda-setting process most resembled the irrational, loosely-coupled dynamics of 
Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams approach: a stream of state political forces, unrelated 
problems, and decentralization solutions.  In his analysis of the debate surrounding 
affirmative action at the University of California, Pusser (2004) argued that the decision 
to end the policy was driven by the interests of stakeholders within and outside the public 
university system.  His conceptualization of the dynamic and complex interaction 
between the university and state political environment reinforced the role of political 
dynamics in shaping higher education policy outcomes.  
McLendon, Deaton, and Hearn (2007) studied governance reform and noted that 
fluctuations in the political landscape were the primary drivers of legislation to reform 
higher education.  Changes in political leadership were significant predictors of reform 
legislation, while state economies, tuition, and enrollment were not.  They argued that 
political institutions played a key role by structuring social choices, and changes in the 
leadership of political institutions shifted those choices.  Leslie and Berdahl (2008) 
studied decentralization of public higher education in Virginia; they, too, argued that 
local conditions and political dynamics were likely catalysts of policy change.  Like 
McLendon (2003a), Leslie and Berdahl (2008) concluded that restructuring occurred 
through an irrational, dynamic process affected by various competing interests.  They, 
too, found the policy process reflective of Kingdon’s theory. 
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Studying the politics of higher education appropriations, Tandberg (2008) 
determined that political dynamics were highly relevant to funding outcomes.  He noted 
that economics, demography, and competition for resources affected the budget process 
by way of the political process – contextual and political factors were intertwined.  Ness 
and Mistreta (2009a) also demonstrated the significance of political dynamics in their 
study of North Carolina’s decision not to fund a merit aid program with state lottery 
proceeds.  They showed that North Carolina’s bipartisan political environment – a 
conservative political culture, with Democratic control of government – contributed to 
the state’s decision to allocate lottery proceeds to need-based financial aid and K-12 
education, rather than merit scholarships.  McLendon, Mokher, and Flores (2011) 
discovered that political representation influenced policy decisions: in their study, the 
number of female legislators and size of the immigrant population predicted adoption of 
in-state resident tuition policies for immigrant students.  
Doyle (2012) examined the effects of state policymakers’ preferences on tuition 
levels and financial aid and concluded that tuition levels were not set based on traditional 
economic models.  Rather, these policy decisions were the result of a political process 
that reflected policymaker interests.  Blankenberger and Philips (2014) studied the 
adoption of performance funding for higher education in Illinois and found that the state 
and national political environment contributed to consideration of the policy.  
Performance funding was a response to changing demographics, the national college 
completion agenda, declining state funding, and state interest in accountability.  As a 
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whole, these studies showed the dynamic, and complex political factors that may 
contribute to higher education policy development and decisions. 
Political Leadership 
Leadership and political capital can shape higher education policy outcomes.  In 
particular, scholars have examined how policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1984) may 
influence the legislative process by advocating for specific initiatives and identifying 
opportunities for action (Doyle, 2006; Ness, 2010; Zahariadis, 2014). 
Policy entrepreneurs.  Rooted in Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams approach, 
policy entrepreneurs are individuals or groups who attempt to combine the framework’s 
three activity streams: problems, politics, and solutions.  These actors skillfully capitalize 
on moments in which the three streams intersect, using the resulting opportunity windows 
to advance their agendas (Kingdon, 1984; Zahariadis, 2014).  
At the secondary school level, Mazzoni (1991) studied school restructuring in 
Minnesota and found that influential policy entrepreneurs served as effective idea 
champions.  In a national study of school choice legislation, Mintrom (1997) showed 
evidence of policy entrepreneurship in 26 states; the presence of these advocates 
significantly increased the likelihood the legislature would consider and approve school 
choice.  He concluded that policy entrepreneurs warranted further investigation as part of 
the policy process, but recognized that the political environment may also affect their 
ability to produce a policy outcome.  In his study of decentralization of public higher 
education in Arkansas, Hawaii, and Illinois, McLendon (2003a) described two kinds of 
opportunity windows for policy entrepreneurs: political windows in response to crisis, 
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and problem windows resulting from political interpretation of a condition warranting 
remedy.  He argued that these situations provided opportunities for policy entrepreneurs 
to attach their solutions to attach to problems, moving them onto the political agenda. 
Doyle (2006) offered evidence that governors act as policy entrepreneurs: his 
study of merit aid found that states were more likely to adopt merit programs in the first 
year after electing a new governor.  Using Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams, Mintrom 
and Norman (2009) identified four essential attributes of policy entrepreneurs.  They 
argued that these leaders showed social acuity, defined problems, built teams, and led by 
example.  Policy entrepreneurs demonstrated deep understanding of their local context 
and skillfully used coalitions, networks, and information to drive change.  Ness (2010) 
studied the process of developing merit aid criteria in Tennessee, New Mexico, and West 
Virginia, also applying MSA.  He found policy entrepreneurs influential in all three states 
in the form of senators in New Mexico and Tennessee, and the governor of New Mexico.  
These elected leaders skillfully combined problems, policies, and politics within the 
opportunities provided by open policy windows.  Ness concluded that policy windows 
offered non-elected issue experts greater influence, attracted state interest to an issue, and 
allowed elected officials to move policies forward.  
Tandberg and Anderson (2012) studied governance reform in Massachusetts and 
found that policy entrepreneurs helped create the impetus for restructuring the higher 
education system.  Dougherty et al. (2013) discovered that policy entrepreneurs such as 
Governors, legislators, and higher education leaders played a major role in the 
development of performance funding. They offered the absence of policy entrepreneurs 
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as a primary reason why performance funding failed to develop in other states.  In sum, 
these studies showed the influence of individual advocates on the policy conversation.  
Elected officials.  In addition to acting as policy entrepreneurs, elected officials 
may impede or facilitate higher education in other ways.  Mazzoni (1991) examined 
school restructuring in Minnesota and found that policy subsystems were unable to drive 
policy changes on their own; they needed the support of organized elites and elected 
officials.  Similarly, Fowler (1994) studied public education reform in Ohio and 
concluded that disunity among members of the reform commission caused the issue to 
rise to the state level, where state, federal, and business leaders influenced the 
conversation.  Echoing Mazzoni (1991), she argued that conceptualizations of leadership 
should broaden to include business leaders and national actors, not just education leaders, 
commission appointees, and local or state officials.  
In their study of Texas, North Carolina, and California, Gittell and Kleiman 
(2000) found that elected leaders exerted greater influence on policy outcomes than 
education leaders.  Leslie and Novak (2003) studied higher education governance reform 
in Minnesota, Kentucky, New Jersey, Maryland, and Florida and offered evidence of 
governors as policy entrepreneurs; they conclude that researchers must consider politics, 
not just policy content, when examining the policy process.  McLendon, Deaton, and 
Hearn (2007) examined state efforts to centralize higher education governance and 
showed that reform was more likely after a change in state leadership.  In particular, 
newer governors were more likely to initiate structural reforms than incumbents.  
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Tandberg and Ness (2011) noted that states with stronger gubernatorial budget authority 
were more likely to have lower capital expenditures for higher education.  
Christakis (2009) discovered wide variation in governors’ influence over public 
higher education.  Using indices of formal authority and informal influence, he identified 
four power quadrants: prescribed powers, minimal powers, entrepreneurial powers, and 
maximum-power governors.  Christakis categorized the governor of Texas within the 
entrepreneurial quadrant, with limited statutory authority but substantial informal 
influence over the budget, appointments, and policy issues.  Governors with less formal 
or statutory authority, Christakis noted, compensated by extending informal influence by 
way of appointments to boards and commissions – contributing to the increasing 
politicization of higher education governance.  McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher (2009) 
revealed that states with stronger gubernatorial power funded higher education at higher 
levels.  Tandberg and Anderson (2012) studied higher education governance restructuring 
in Massachusetts and concluded that the governor acted as an issue opportunist and 
catalyzed the policy change.  These studies showed the positive and negative impact 
elected officials – particularly governors – can have on higher education policy. 
Interest groups.  Beyond the individual influence of policy entrepreneurs and 
elected officials, collective advocacy efforts may also help or hinder higher education 
efforts.  Tandberg (2010a) observed that the relative strength of the higher education 
lobby could predict greater funding.  As the number of higher education interest groups 
increased relative to the number of all state interest groups, state support for public higher 
education relative to the available tax base increased.  Tandberg concluded that 
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appropriations were more likely to increase when multiple institutions lobbied 
independently, as opposed to one unified lobby.  Tandberg (2010b) also found that the 
density of a state’s non-higher education interest groups produced a negative effect on 
appropriations; a more active lobby outside of higher education made it more difficult for 
higher education to gain traction.  Similarly, Tandberg and Ness (2011) showed that 
states with a stronger higher education lobby were more likely to fund increased capital 
expenditures.  These studies by Tandberg and colleagues demonstrated that interest 
groups, not just individual leaders, influence the higher education policy agenda.  
Partisanship 
Though historically considered an apolitical issue, a growing number of studies 
illuminate the partisan dynamics of higher education policy (McLendon & Hearn, 2003).  
In particular, studies have shown that political party may influence state appropriations, 
accountability policies, tuition levels, and views toward college opportunity and access. 
Political party.  More liberal governments tend to fund higher education more 
generously, and conservative governments are more likely to favor performance 
standards for institutions and students.  Doyle (2006) showed that liberal governments 
were less likely to adopt merit aid, while liberal legislatures were more likely.  
McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton (2006) discovered that states with more conservative 
legislatures were more likely to adopt policies funding institutions based on performance.  
Relatedly, McLendon, Deaton, and Hearn (2007) concluded that Republican legislatures 
were more likely to reform higher education.  
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Doyle (2007a) examined whether higher education policy preferences differed by 
political party.  He found no clear distinction between Republicans and Democrats on 
views toward efficiency in higher education and the cost of tuition.  However, he 
discovered that Democrats and Republicans held different views of higher education 
opportunity.  Democrats were less likely than Republicans to believe the vast majority of 
people in their state had access to college, and Republicans were more likely than 
Democrats to believe low-income students had the same college opportunity as other 
students.  Doyle (2007a) suggested that higher education was becoming increasingly 
politicized, particularly regarding questions of access. 
Tandberg (2008, 2010a, 2010b) revealed a positive relationship between 
government liberalism and appropriations.  His studies established that Democratic 
governors and legislatures resulted in more funding for public higher education relative to 
other areas, while a uniparty legislature predicted lower funding for higher education in 
relation to K-12.  McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher (2009) showed that funding correlated 
negatively with the number of Republican legislators.  Party may not affect all policies, 
however: McLendon, Mokher, and Flores (2011) later found no effect of partisanship on 
states’ consideration of in-state resident tuition bills.  Unlike McLendon, Hearn, and 
Mokher (2009), Doyle (2012) observed no significant relationship between political 
characteristics and appropriations; funding was driven more by economic conditions than 
politics.  However, Doyle (2012) noted that tuition prices were related to government 
liberalism: tuition was more likely to decrease as government became more liberal.  
These studies revealed that while liberals generally support more generous funding for 
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higher education institutions and programs, political preferences may affect some policies 
more than others; environmental factors also may mediate the relationship between party 
identity and position on higher education policies. 
Electoral politics.  Four decades ago, Fenton and Chamberlayne (1969) illumined 
the longstanding debate over whether politics or economics exert greater influence on 
policy outcomes.  They acknowledged that while economic and environmental conditions 
clearly affect policies, interparty competition shapes policy decisions as well.  Research 
in and outside education has continued to document the role of politics in shaping policy.  
For example, Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1989) studied the effects of electoral politics 
on state policy outcomes and found that regardless of party, elected officials responded to 
state opinion in ways most likely to preserve their positions – indicating that state 
political context influences policy. 
Evidence of the role of electoral politics in education policy is mixed, however.  
At the secondary school level, Wong and Shen (2002) studied whether electoral 
dynamics affected public education reform.  They found no statistically significant 
relationship between state electoral dynamics and the adoption of charter school 
legislation or implementation of school district takeover.  Specifically examining higher 
education, McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher (2009) saw no evidence that citizens’ political 
ideology affected state appropriations.  McLendon, Mokher, and Flores (2011) studied 
the factors influencing the legislative emergence of in-state resident tuition bills.  They, 
too, determined there was no effect of electoral competition, partisanship, or ideology on 
whether such legislation reached the policy agenda.  
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Some research offers contrasting results.  Studying states’ adoption of prepaid 
tuition and college savings plans between 1986 and 1999, Doyle, McLendon, and Hearn 
(2010) discovered that states with more competitive elections were less likely to adopt 
either policy.  However, the authors found no support for their hypothesis that these 
policies were associated with a conservative movement toward individual responsibility.  
They concluded that prepaid tuition and savings plans simply represented low-cost efforts 
to assuage college cost issues, rather than a partisan political response. 
Political consensus and competition influence policy decisions.  Tandberg and 
Ness (2011) studied the relationship between political factors and state higher education 
expenditures on capital projects from 1988 to 2004.  They discovered that states with 
more competitive elections had higher capital expenditures.  As political consensus 
decreased, capital expenditures increased.  They concluded that competition and trading 
of political factors were more influential in policymaking than political ideology.  
State culture and context may affect trends in party preferences.  Studying how 
political preferences shape higher education policy decisions in California, Dar (2012) 
discovered that higher education’s share of the budget diminished as Democratic 
representation in the legislature increased – contradicting work by Tandberg (2008; 
2010a; 2010b) and McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher (2009).  Dar showed that as 
California politicians became more polarized, higher education appropriations declined.  
She concluded that despite liberals’ tendency to fund higher education more generously 
than conservatives, Democrats in California preferred to invest in welfare and low-
income constituents over higher education.  California’s economic and political 
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environment mediated the expected influence of party preferences.  Examining national 
data, Dar and Lee (2014) revealed that Democratic Party strength was positively and 
significantly associated with appropriations per $1000 of personal income – indicating 
that the California environment diverged from national trends.  Dar and Lee (2014) found 
this effect disappeared with increased political polarization or employment, reiterating 
the role of competition and context.   
These mixed findings regarding the role of state electoral politics reinforce the 
importance of considering local context and the need to better understand how politics 
shapes policy decisions.  As each state’s culture and values are unique, the relationship 
between politics and higher education policy outcomes is likely to vary as well.  
Networks 
Political science literature suggests that interstate competition and emulation lead 
states to adopt certain policies in response to their neighbors (Walker, 1969).  Research 
on policy diffusion in higher education is mixed, and findings vary based on the policy 
under consideration.  In her study of education reform in Ohio, Fowler (1994) found 
national leaders and the national reform agenda influential in shaping state policy, 
indicating that state policymakers may respond, in part, to factors outside their own 
borders.  Mintrom (1997) concluded that policy entrepreneurs facilitated the diffusion of 
school choice policies.  Similarly, Wong and Shen (2002) showed that states responded 
to a broader national effort in their adoption of charter school legislation.  
Studying state decisions to decentralize higher education in Arkansas, Hawaii, 
and Illinois, McLendon (2003a) discovered that policies enter the state agenda through 
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three avenues: they are imported from another state, borrowed from another policy arena, 
or developed within the higher education community.  McLendon, Heller, and Young 
(2005) saw a strong diffusion effect in their study of policy innovation: states with 
innovative neighbors were more likely to innovate, and the effect was stronger for 
financing innovations than for accountability.  
Doyle (2006) found no diffusion effect on the adoption of merit aid programs; he 
concluded that states responded more to internal conditions than to the external 
environment.  McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton (2006) identified no diffusion effect in their 
study of performance funding policies, and McLendon, Deaton, and Hearn (2007) found 
no evidence for the effect of interstate policy diffusion on state reform of higher 
education governance.  In their MSA study of North Carolina’s decision not to fund merit 
aid with lottery proceeds, Ness and Mistretta (2009a) determined that internal political 
factors and the economic context outweighed any influence of regional policy diffusion.   
Doyle, McLendon, and Hearn (2010) saw a small diffusion effect on state 
adoption of prepaid college savings plans, but McLendon, Mokher, and Flores (2011) 
found no diffusion effect on the adoption of in-state resident tuition policies.  In their 
study of performance funding policies, however, Dougherty et al. (2013) found that 
policy entrepreneurs drew on policy networks and policy learning from other states in 
order to move their initiatives forward.  In sum, while findings on the role of diffusion 
and policy networks in higher education policy are mixed, the potential influence of these 
factors is important to consider – particularly as states seek new approaches to increasing 
college access and attainment (Perna & Finney, 2014). 
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The studies discussed in this section demonstrate the many ways politics may 
influence higher education policymaking.  Scholars have shown that political context, 
culture, governance structure, leadership, interest group activity, and political 
competition can all affect policy decisions related to state appropriations, tuition prices, 
and financial aid (Hearn & Griswold, 1995; Hearn, Griswold, & Marine, 1996; 
McLendon, 2003a; McLendon, Deaton, & Hearn, 2007; McLendon & Ness, 2003; Ness 
& Mistretta, 2009; Perna & Finney, 2014; Richardson & Martinez, 2009).  These findings 
reinforce the importance of continuing to examine how politics affects policymaking in 
higher education – particularly when those policies may influence the extent to which 
students and families can afford postsecondary education. 
Theoretical Framework 
 Higher education policy scholars (see Perna, Klein, & McLendon, 2014) have 
suggested that frameworks from political science can offer valuable insight into state 
policy development related to college attainment.  While other theories may also 
illuminate Texas financial aid policymaking, I applied Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams 
approach (MSA) because of its emphasis on the ambiguity and dynamism of the political 
environment.  A political scientist, Kingdon based his framework on 23 case studies of 
U.S. federal public policymaking in health and transportation during the 1970s.  Of 
particular interest to Kingdon was the concept of agenda setting, or how issues “[come] 
to be issues in the first place” (p. 2).  Kingdon sought to understand the development of 
public policy over time – and in particular, “why some subjects become prominent on the 
policy agenda and others do not, and why some alternatives for choice are seriously 
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considered while others are neglected” (p. 3).  He developed MSA as a theoretical answer 
to these questions, and the framework’s focus on the “how” and “why” of policymaking 
aligns well with my goals for this study.  
Kingdon based his approach on Cohen, March, and Olsen’s (1972) garbage can 
model of organizational choice.  Cohen et al. described decisionmaking in an 
organizational context; Kingdon adapted their garbage can to describe public 
policymaking in the U.S. government.  Like their stream of problems, solutions, 
participants, and choice opportunities, MSA identifies three distinct but interactive 
streams flowing through the policy system: problems, policies, and politics.  When the 
streams come together, policies and agendas are more likely to change.  Such coupling of 
the streams occurs in response to two key forces: policy entrepreneurs and policy 
windows.  Policy entrepreneurs – “advocates for proposals or for the prominence of an 
idea” (p. 129) can manipulate the three streams to couple policies with problems and 
bring their ideas to fruition.  While policy entrepreneurs may vary in role or position, 
Kingdon identifies several key attributes that make them successful: expertise, authority, 
political connections, negotiating skill, and persistence.  Finally, opportunities for policy 
or agenda change may also arise through a policy window, or a “brief opportunity for 
action on a particular issue” (p. 176).  Windows open because of a shift in the political 
stream, such as a change of administration, or because focusing events in the 
environment draw attention to a problem.  Policy entrepreneurs are particularly adept at 
identifying and leveraging these windows (Kingdon, 1984; Zahariadis, 2014).   
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 It is important to describe briefly the ways in which Kingdon conceptualized his 
three streams of problems, policies, and politics.  First, a problem is “a change in an 
indicator” that represents a part of a system that needs addressing (p. 97).  Indicators rise 
to the surface through focusing events, such as crises or disasters; through symbols and 
movements that gain widespread attention; and through feedback evaluating the operation 
of public programs.  These indicators only become problems “when we come to believe 
that we should do something about them” (p. 115).  Second, MSA describes a 
simultaneous stream of policies.  These policies are ideas floating around in “policy 
primeval soup” within policy communities of specialists in certain areas (p. 123).  Policy 
ideas evolve through a natural selection process of generating alternatives and proposals.  
The policy stream is characterized by fragmentation: “the left hand knows not what the 
right hand is doing, with the result that the left hand sometimes does something that 
profoundly affects the right hand, without anyone ever seeing the implications” (p. 125).  
This fragmentation produces instability and slows policy change. 
 Finally, Kingdon’s (1984) concept of the “political” is narrower than its broad 
theoretical definition in political science, which refers more to the allocation of values, 
costs, and benefits.  Kingdon relied instead on what he called a “practitioner” definition: 
“politicians’ attention to voter reactions, their skewering of members of the opposite 
political party, and their efforts to obtain the support of important interest group leaders” 
(p. 153).  The political stream therefore includes “such things as public mood, pressure 
group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and 
changes of administration” (p. 152).  The national mood shapes the policy agenda as 
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legislators seek to reflect the interests of their constituents.  Organized political forces 
such as interest groups influence the agenda through lobbying efforts, and through 
legislators who seek to earn their favor.  New leadership promotes new priorities and 
ideas.  Kingdon argued that perception and calculation are central to the political stream – 
participants constantly assess consensus and conflict as they further their own interests. 
Influential scholars and studies (see McLendon, 2003a; Ness, 2010) have applied 
MSA to the investigation of higher education policy development, finding the theory a 
valuable tool for illuminating the multifaceted, rapidly shifting, and sometimes irrational 
policy process. Kingdon’s (1984) approach was ideal for my study because it addresses 
the “how” and “why” of political problem definition and policy outcomes.  MSA 
emphasizes the complex and dynamic nature of public policymaking, highlights the role 
of key policy actors, and illustrates how a stream of political perception and calculation 
interacts with problems and policy ideas.  These theoretical components grounded my 
study of financial aid policymaking in Texas. 
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Chapter Three: Methods  
In response to the importance of understanding politics and the need for additional 
policy research that examines state context (Perna & Finney, 2014; Perna, Klein, & 
McLendon, 2014), this study investigated how politics in Texas has influenced state 
policymaking related to college affordability.  I applied Kingdon’s (1984) multiple 
streams approach to a multiple case study (Yin, 2014) of three financial aid bills 
considered by the Texas Legislature since 2011.  I addressed three research questions:  
1. How have policy stakeholders defined the problem of college affordability in 
Texas within the last five years?  
2. Why did SB 28 (2011), HB 700 (2015), and SB 1735 (2015) emerge as policy 
solutions to the problem of college affordability in Texas during this time? 
3. How did politics in Texas affect the development and outcomes of these bills? 
As previously stated, I relied on Kingdon (1984) to define several key terms.  Politics 
refers to “electoral, partisan, or pressure group factors… politicians’ attention to voter 
reactions, their skewering of members of the opposite political party, and their efforts to 
obtain the support of important interest group leaders” (p. 145).  A problem is a “change 
in an indicator” (Kingdon, 1984, p. 97) that policymakers decide requires action.  
Policies are potential solutions that evolve within policy communities through the 
continuous generation of proposals and alternatives.  I intentionally aligned my lines of 
inquiry with Kingdon’s three streams in order to integrate my framework with my 
research design.  MSA highlights ambiguity, power, and political opportunism, making it 
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an ideal lens through which to examine the complex and dynamic policy environment 
surrounding college affordability and financial aid in Texas. 
Research Design 
Yin (2014) holds that case study allows researchers to ask explanatory “how” and 
“why” questions, particularly when the phenomenon of interest is closely entwined with 
its unique context.  An instrumental, multiple case study (Merriam, 2009) allowed me to 
explore my phenomenon of interest – the role of politics in state policymaking related to 
college affordability – through in-depth analysis of three specific bills considered by the 
Texas Legislature within the last five years.  In instrumental case study, researchers 
examine a distinct case, or cases, as a means of illuminating a larger phenomenon.  As 
such, I studied three financial aid bills in order to illustrate the broader phenomenon of 
political influence on state financial aid policymaking in Texas.  Replicating across 
multiple cases strengthened the analytic generalization of my findings and allowed me to 
better illustrate the phenomenon of interest (Yin, 2014). 
Scholars (see McLendon, 2003b; Perna & Finney, 2014; Richardson & Martinez, 
2009) have shown that case study can offer a rich avenue for the in-depth examination of 
state political contexts surrounding higher education.  A number of notable studies 
discussed in chapter two utilized case study as a means of examining the influence of 
context, leadership, and political dynamics, particularly at the state level; several of these 
studies (see Leslie & Berdahl, 2008; McLendon, 2003a; Ness, 2010; Ness & Mistretta, 
2009a, 2009b) also applied Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams approach.  
 Case study involves in-depth description and analysis within a bounded system 
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(Merriam, 2009).  For the purpose of this study, the state of Texas served as the bounded 
system; within its parameters, three bills – SB 28, HB 700, and SB 1735 – provided 
individual cases for study.  These bills were my units of analysis, with each relating to a 
distinct type of financial aid to support students: TEXAS Grants, a need-based grant; B-
On-Time, a forgivable loan; and the Hazlewood Act, a tuition exemption benefit for 
veterans and their families.  I selected each of these bills for the purpose of exploring the 
influence of politics across different types of tuition assistance policies. 
Data Sources 
Interviews are often the primary data collection tool in case study research, 
supplemented by archival documents used to corroborate interview testimony (Yin, 
2014).  When conducting case studies of higher education policymaking, scholars (see for 
example McLendon, 2003a; Ness, 2010) have relied primarily on interview testimony 
from stakeholders involved in the policy, process, or event of interest, triangulated with 
document review of primary and secondary sources such as legislation, government 
reports, and media.  Gittell and Kleiman (2000) utilized primary and secondary 
documentary sources, as well as over 100 interviews of state higher education officials.  
McLendon (2003a) relied on interviews, documents, and archival data.  Leslie and Novak 
(2003) used included interviews with state leaders and review of state documents; Leslie 
and Berdahl (2008) interviewed 15 influential state leaders and reviewed legislation and 
related documents.  Bastedo (2009) interviewed board members, staff, campus presidents, 
and faculty and triangulated their responses with documents, memos, media, and 
editorials.  Ness and Mistretta (2009a, 2009b) interviewed policy actors, legislators and 
   
71 
aides, governor’s office senior staff, higher education leaders, and researchers; they 
triangulated this interview testimony with archival documents such as bills, committee 
minutes, government reports, and newspaper coverage.  Ness (2010) conducted 
interviews with 56 key policy actors and reviewed archival documents.  Tandberg and 
Anderson (2010) conducted 10 interviews with higher education leaders and analyzed 
documents, reports, and news articles.   
 Following precedent established by prior case studies of higher education 
policymaking (see McLendon, 2003a; Ness, 2010), my data sources included archival 
records and 50 stakeholder interviews.  I provide more detail in the subsequent section.  
Archival Records 
Following the precedent of prior case studies in higher education policy research 
(see Gittell & Kleiman, 2000; McLendon, 2003a; Ness, 2010) I conducted extensive 
document analysis of bill text, state agency reports, Texas higher education strategic 
plans, and other sources related to my case bills.  I also collected and reviewed legislative 
archival data in the form of Senate and House Higher Education Committee audio and 
video recordings, agendas, and minutes from debate on these three bills.  These archival 
sources were part of public record and openly available through the Texas Higher 
Education Coordinating Board and Texas Legislative Library.  I identified legislative 
documents, records, state agency reports, and policy organization reports primarily 
through the Texas Legislature Online digital records, review of the Texas Higher 
Education Coordinating Board’s Office of External Relations and Financial Aid 
Programs webpages, and by web search for press releases and reports by Texas higher 
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education institutions, systems, and policy organizations. 
News articles provided additional insight into the environment surrounding each 
bill and the program it addressed.  To collect news articles, I searched library databases 
for the Austin-American Statesman, Houston Chronicle, and Dallas Morning News, and 
used the Texas Tribune’s web search feature and online archives to search for higher 
education coverage.  I expanded the time period for these searches beyond the five-year 
parameters of my study, capturing material from the early 2000s surrounding tuition 
deregulation in 2003, in order to include resources that might improve my understanding 
of the history and context surrounding college affordability discourse in Texas.  My news 
search generated over 100 articles to include as documentary sources.   
Archival analysis provided me with a comprehensive understanding of the context 
surrounding college affordability in Texas and the details of each policy case.  This 
process also prepared me to interview influential stakeholders with extensive knowledge 
of these issues over time.  Review of documentary sources enabled me to identify key 
stakeholders involved with each policy initiative, informed my selection of interview 
participants, and contributed to the development of my interview protocol.  Interview 
participants frequently suggested or shared specific material with me, and I added those 
sources to my database if they were not yet included.  In total, I consulted 135 
documentary sources: 106 news articles and 29 government, state agency, and policy 
organization reports.  I organized these sources by type and referred back to this database 
throughout my stakeholder interviews, analysis, and writing.  
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Stakeholder Interviews 
My preliminary interview target was 25 policy actors and stakeholders.  This 
number was consistent with the average number of participants across the studies  
I reviewed, which involved a range of participants: from 10 (Tandberg & Anderson, 
2012) to 100 (Gittell & Kleiman, 2000).  However, I increased my sample size due to 
strong positive response from the prospective participants I contacted and successful 
snowball sampling as I began to conduct interviews and ask for recommendations.  As I 
listened to the narratives emerging from these interviews, I also wanted to ensure I 
captured the perspectives of all stakeholder groups in order to strengthen the 
trustworthiness of my findings.  I ultimately doubled my target and reached a total of 50.   
Participants included legislative aides, legislators, policy and advocacy 
organization staff, state agency staff, financial aid officers at higher education 
institutions, news reporters, and others with special insight into these policies and their 
development.  These roles all represented policy actors or stakeholders that others have 
identified as key informants in similar case study analyses (see McLendon, 2003a; Ness, 
2010; Ness & Mistretta, 2009a, 2009b).  To obtain a balanced view of the politics 
surrounding college affordability, I sought to interview both internal higher education 
stakeholders – those working within higher education institutions, systems, and for the 
Higher Education Coordinating Board – and external stakeholders, such as legislators, 
their staff, and representatives of advocacy organizations.  I anticipated that stakeholder 
views would vary based on their relationship to higher education, and I sought an array of 
perspectives in order to consider each case from all angles.  
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  I selected prospective interview participants first based on my review of archival 
materials and identification of stakeholders involved in each bill.  I also reviewed the 
websites and directories of House and Senate Higher Education Committees, institutions 
and systems, state agencies, and policy/advocacy organizations for individuals in roles 
relevant to higher education, college affordability, financial aid, and government 
relations.  I developed a master spreadsheet of the names, titles, organizations, and 
contact information for these potential participants.  
Recruitment.  I sent an individual email to each potential participant using a 
formal recruitment email, as required and approved by the Institutional Review Board 
(see Appendix A).  This email included information about the study, the participant’s 
potential role, and protection of privacy.  I attached my IRB approval letter and IRB 
approved waiver of signed consent, which outlined that proceeding to schedule an 
interview represented informed consent to participate.  I assured all participants 
confidentiality in that I would not use their names, titles, organizations, or any identifying 
information in my study or outside the confines of our conversation.  I was able to 
interview 25 participants after my first round of email recruitment.  
As I conducted these interviews, participants generally offered several names in 
response to my request for suggestions.  I contacted these individuals after each 
interview, using the same email format and documents.  To maintain confidentiality, I 
mentioned the referring participant in these recruitment emails only when that participant 
indicated I should do so.  It is also worth noting my prior roles as a legislative intern for 
Texas Senator Judith Zaffirini and as student representative to the Texas Higher 
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Education Coordinating Board Financial Aid Advisory Committee allowed me to develop 
relationships with legislative and state agency staff who were helpful to me during this 
process, both by participating in interviews and by connecting me with their colleagues.   
Ultimately, snowball sampling produced an additional 25 individuals, for a total 
of 50 participants.  I used purposeful and snowball sampling (Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2014) 
to achieve this number, and I incorporated stratified sampling in order to ensure I 
represented a balanced distribution of elected officials, legislative staff, higher education 
leaders, advocacy organization staff, financial aid, and government relations.  When I did 
not receive a response from an invited participant within one week after an initial email,  
I followed up with a list of available days and times; if I was unable to schedule an 
interview after two or three such attempts, I moved on.  In the event I had difficulty 
accessing a participant who represented a stakeholder group or perspective I had not 
adequately covered, I asked previous participants if they might be willing to help make 
an introduction; this was effective in several cases and helped me to achieve a diverse 
array of organizations, institutions, and legislative districts.  
Interviews lasted an average of 45 minutes, ranging from 15 to 75 minutes 
overall; all were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim.  Case study interviews are 
often semistructured in nature, following a clear line of questioning but allowing for 
conversational fluidity (Yin, 2014). As such, I followed a semistructured interview 
protocol informed by my theoretical framework, Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams 
approach, and by my archival research (see Appendix B).  This protocol focused on the 
political environment surrounding higher education in Texas, the role of politics in 
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shaping outcomes for the bills in question, and key actors and strategies affecting each 
bill.  After introducing my study and clarifying research procedures and confidentiality,  
I asked broad questions to begin our conversation and progressed toward more specific 
issues based on each participant’s areas of expertise.  As I anticipated, participants were 
often able to offer insight into multiple cases; when they were not, I adapted my protocol 
accordingly.  All interviews were individual except for two, in which a participant 
suggested including a colleague and I met with both simultaneously.  I spoke with 39 
participants in person in Austin, conducted 10 interviews by phone, and received one 
response in writing.  Of 50 interviews, I used a professional transcription company to 
transcribe 40 and completed the remainder myself.  
Appendix E presents a list of my interview participants with identifying 
information removed.  Table 3 shows the distribution of my participants by category.2 
Table 3   
Interview Participants   
Descriptor/Category Total 
Policy Advisors/Legislative Staffers 11 
Elected Officials/State Officials 8 
State Agency Staff Members 7 
Advocacy Organization Staff Members 9 
Media Relations/Reporters 3 
Government Relations Staff Members 4 
Financial Aid Leaders 4 
Higher Education Leaders 4 
  50 
 
                                                 
2 I have intentionally combined Policy Advisors and Legislative Staffers, and Elected Officials and State 
Officials, in order to ensure individual participants are not identifiable by way of their roles.  
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Trustworthiness.  I used several strategies to promote trustworthiness, as this 
study required self-reporting from politicians and public figures who might be hesitant to 
speak freely with me.  To promote honesty and authenticity, I ensured participants 
complete confidentiality by masking all identifiable characteristics; in the presentation of 
my findings, I use only a general identifier to indicate a participant’s stakeholder group.  I 
discussed confidentiality at the start of all interviews and took care to build rapport and 
encourage participants to feel comfortable early in each conversation.  Occasionally, 
participants asked that I pause my recording device or exclude certain “off the record” 
comments; in these cases, I did so and truthfully assured them that such statements would 
only inform my own understanding and serve to corroborate other comments, but would 
not be quoted.  Participants sometimes felt more comfortable after the conclusion of an 
interview, when I turned off my recorder and prepared to leave; several elaborated more 
fully or revealed new information at this time.  In these cases, I made every effort to 
encourage the participant to speak freely, taking no notes and leaving my recorder off.  I 
made field notes after exiting these interviews in order to retain key themes or 
paraphrased quotes that might be helpful in corroborating other testimony, but as with 
“off the record” comments, I refrained from using any excerpts from these post-interview 
reflections unless I was able to ask and confirm permission.   
If participants were hesitant to speak freely due to concerns they might be 
identified, I offered them the opportunity to review any quotes I intended to use in my 
findings.  Only a few requested I do so, but this precaution eased their concerns and 
encouraged candor.  After completing my analysis and writing, I contacted those 
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participants by email and shared the excerpts from their interviews that I planned to 
include, reminding them that such quotes would not be attributed to them by name.  I 
made minor adjustments to quotations and their attribution in the text in order to respect 
the confidentiality of several participants; for example, in some cases I have excluded the 
general descriptor, such as “legislative aide” or “higher education leader,” in order to 
minimize the potential an individual might be identified.  I have indicated such instances 
in footnotes.  All participants approved of their quotes and inclusion in these findings.    
It is important to note that I do name key individuals, such as legislators and state 
officials, when their role in the case at hand was a matter of public knowledge due to 
their bill sponsorship, public statements and documents, or news coverage.  Interview 
data revealed the critical role of several such actors in the cases I studied, and because 
these political figures became central to my findings and their roles in each bill were 
public knowledge, their names are present in my analysis.  I do not, however, identify 
them as interview participants or attribute interview quotations to them directly.  In sum, 
I referred to individuals by name only to the extent that their role in each case was a 
matter of public information or knowledge.  This approach mirrors that of McLendon 
(2003a) and Ness and Mistretta (2009a; 2009b), whose qualitative work examining the 
politics of higher education maintained confidentiality of interview participants, but 
included the names of key public figures, such as governors and legislators, whose words 
and actions were general knowledge by way of media coverage and public documents.  
Yin (2014) has noted that interviews are verbal reports only and should be 
corroborated with archival records to minimize bias, poor recall, and unclear articulation.  
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I used extensive archival data to challenge and/or substantiate interview testimony, 
referring in particular to state reports and legislative records to confirm statistics, facts, 
and events.  Given the political nature of my research and the inevitability of different 
opinions and subjective positions, I intentionally included a wide array of stakeholders in 
my sample so as not to over-emphasize any one perspective.  Doing so required constant 
attention and adaptation as I listened to the overarching narratives from participants.  The 
decision to increase my target sample from 25 to 50 allowed me to include the 
perspectives of those I felt were not represented – primarily minorities and advocacy 
organizations on the left side of the political spectrum.  These voices were quieter within 
Texas’s conservative political climate, and as a result I used strategic snowball sampling 
and persistent follow-up to access participants from these groups.  I concluded my 
recruitment efforts when I reached saturation in my data and participants’ testimonies 
repeated the same narratives and themes, and when the additional participants 
recommended to me were those with whom I had already spoken. 
Finally, navigating sensitive political topics required tact, caution, and neutrality 
on my part as interviewer.  I diligently engaged in self-assessment of my performance 
and bias as an interviewer and reflected critically on my role in, and perceptions of, each 
conversation.  Maintaining neutrality was perhaps the most challenging aspect of this 
study: in many cases, participants shared opinions about higher education with which I 
vehemently disagreed.  I prepared for each interview by researching the participant’s 
background so I could anticipate where I might be likely to feel defensive or 
uncomfortable.  When I disagreed with a participant’s perspective, I focused on listening 
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and asking neutral questions based on my protocol.  In the event that a participant was 
openly antagonistic toward higher education, I simply nodded and listened; despite my 
own opinions, I needed to encourage participants to share their strong views, and in many 
cases these provided the most valuable quotations.  At the same time, I sought constantly 
to quell my impulse to defend higher education against critics or to educate participants 
who seemed misinformed.  My role was simply to ask and listen. 
In addition to the challenge of remaining neutral in these situations, it was perhaps 
even more difficult to do so in interviews with participants who shared my views.  These 
voices were refreshing and encouraging, and I often corrected or caught myself when 
impulse prompted me to interject and express agreement.  I worked to control my own 
affirmative response so participants would express their views thoroughly, rather than 
simply assuming I understood.  Ultimately, my inclination to participate in enthusiastic 
conversation about these issues was the most difficult to restrain.  This was particularly 
true when I knew or quickly connected with the participant, and our interview became 
more conversational and dynamic.  As an extrovert who enjoys political discourse,  
I learned a great deal about interviewer restraint throughout this study.  However, I 
believe my enthusiasm strengthened rather than limited my data collection and the quality 
of my findings, as I was able to build rapport and encourage participants to speak freely.  
I also believe my role and identity as a graduate student and young white woman 
reassured participants and encouraged open conversation.  While I was certainly aware of 
power and gender dynamics in many of these interviews due to the positions and 
influence of my participants, I experienced my positionality as an advantage; 
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I was generally perceived as non-threatening.  At the same time, I was careful to present 
myself as competent, professional, and prepared lest I not be taken seriously.   
Data Analysis 
As noted, all 50 interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim.  I used 
Atlas.ti as my qualitative research and analysis software and uploaded all transcripts into 
a project database in this program.  For my analytical strategy, I applied pattern matching 
(Yin, 2014) and constant comparison (Merriam, 2009) techniques to manually code each 
interview, reviewing transcripts in relation to one another in order to identify significant 
concepts and themes.  I structured this process by developing an initial codebook based 
on themes from my theoretical framework and literature review; these preliminary codes 
mirrored the subheadings included in Chapter Two and the key elements outlined as part 
of my theoretical framework.  Creswell (2009) notes that a codebook “can change and 
evolve based on close analysis of the data” (p. 187) and recommends that qualitative 
researchers permit their codebook to develop throughout data analysis, particularly when 
looking to test the applicability of a certain theory.  Accordingly, as I began the coding 
process, my codebook became an organic document – additional themes emerged from 
the data, and I added, defined, and redefined codes as I progressed in order to ensure each 
concept’s accuracy and generalizability.   
As I identified patterns in the data, I combined and consolidated duplicative or 
similar codes in order to facilitate the development of the broad overarching themes that 
would become my findings.  I also categorized codes into groups based on their original 
source: literature review, theoretical framework, emergent themes, a code for each of my 
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three policy cases, and a code for each of my three research questions.  These case and 
research question codes would later allow me to filter and query my data when 
organizing my written findings.  I ultimately developed and applied 47 codes, categorized 
into seven groups; some belonged to more than one group, due to intentional alignment 
across my literature review, theoretical framework, and research questions.  Appendix C 
presents my final codebook, which includes the prevalence with which I applied each 
code across the dataset.  Appendix D presents a summary of each code’s groundedness 
(the number of quotations to which the code was applied); density (the number of codes 
linked to a code), and groups (the number of groups to which a code is linked).  
I used Atlas.ti’s code families to group interviews by category based on 
stakeholder position: advocacy organization, elected official, legislative staff, state 
agency, higher education leader, financial aid, government relations, and media relations.  
These categories allowed me to further dissect my data by participant type and examine 
patterns across stakeholder groups.  I used Atlas.ti’s code-concurrence tool to analyze 
interaction among prevalent codes, first for individual cases and then across all three.  To 
strengthen trustworthiness, rigor, and construct validity, I ensured the codes shaping my 
findings triangulated data from multiple sources.  I used archival material to corroborate 
interview testimony and to provide greater context in the development of my findings.  
Ultimately, my coding process produced clear code patterns and themes within and 
across cases.  I queried Atlas.ti for quotations tagged with the most pervasive codes 
across my data, and used these quotations to identify the emerging political narratives in 
response to the three research questions I posed in this study.  To ensure I used quotations 
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that represented a balanced cross-section of the data, I tracked the number of times I 
quoted each participant in each chapter, and I corrected accordingly when I leaned too 
heavily on any individual voice.  I have quoted nearly all participants in my findings. 
Reliability. To address reliability, I maintained an audit trail (Guba & Lincoln, 
1982; Merriam, 2009), case study protocol, and research database (Yin, 2014).  My audit 
trail includes study records such as email correspondence, master participant spreadsheet, 
interview protocol, IRB materials, and field notes.  Located in secure online storage to 
protect participants’ privacy, these materials provide a log of my research process should 
another seek to replicate this study (Guba & Lincoln, 1982; Richards, 2005).  Second, my 
case study interview protocol outlines the consistent line of questioning I used when 
speaking with participants; this protocol served as a central resource and guide 
throughout my study, and using this framework would allow replication of my research to 
confirm results.  Lastly, as Yin (2014) recommends, I maintained a research database 
containing all my data in a form easily retrievable and accessible, both by myself as the 
researcher and by others interested in the study methodology.  This database includes 
field notes and memos as well as interview recordings, transcripts, and archival 
documents.  I used the qualitative research software Atlas.ti to organize this research 
database and facilitate data analysis, and also stored my raw data and research materials 
in secure online storage.  
Positionality.  Merriam (2009) noted that qualitative researchers should “explain 
their biases, dispositions, and assumptions regarding the research to be undertaken” (p. 
219).  I occupy multiple roles in relation to this study and bring strong opinions to this 
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topic.  First and foremost, I am a student of, and student enrolled in, Texas higher 
education.  In this capacity, I am a researcher interested in promoting college 
affordability; I seek greater understanding of what it means for college to be affordable 
and the factors contributing to increased higher education costs.  In this student and 
researcher role, it is important to note that I am not native to Texas, but have been a 
voting resident and active stakeholder in Texas higher education.  I served as the 
appointed statewide student representative to the Texas Higher Education Coordinating 
Board’s Financial Aid Advisory Committee during the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 
academic years.  In 2014 I worked as a higher education policy intern in the Texas 
Legislature.  My interest in financial aid policy stems in great part from these experiences 
in Texas.  Prior to graduate school, I worked as a fundraiser for scholarships at a private 
university out of state and developed a strong personal commitment to college 
affordability.  Given this background, I strongly support state investment in public 
universities and student financial aid.  These values naturally align me with the internal 
higher education stakeholders in this study – government relations, financial aid, and 
presidents and chancellors seeking to advocate for and advance higher education.  In 
these ways, I am an “insider” to Texas higher education, and also to Texas.  
I am also an “outsider” to Texas, growing up and completing my prior education 
in four other states and arriving in Austin with an ingrained value system based on those 
experiences.  Though I have learned the language of Texas higher education through my 
work at the University, the Coordinating Board, and the Legislature, I did not grow up 
with the Top Ten Percent Rule, the B-On-Time Program, or TEXAS Grants.  These were 
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new programs for me when I arrived in Texas – but they have become programs with 
which I engage and identify as both a member of Texas higher education, and as someone 
who brings an outsider’s perspective.  I am politically liberal, which automatically 
distances me from the opinions of many of the Texas policymakers and stakeholders I 
interviewed for this study.  I believe in generous funding for higher education 
institutions, full funding for need-based aid, and am strongly committed to equity and 
inclusion in higher education.  I identify with the views of minority Democrats (both in 
party and often in ethnicity) in the Legislature and with progressive organizations seeking 
to improve access for low-income and underrepresented students.  In these ways I am not 
only a Texas outsider, but also more aligned with the minority political view in Texas 
than with the state’s conservative political paradigm. 
As I hold my own position on these issues and my own relationship with higher 
education in the state, this study required constant critical reflection on my own personal 
lens as both an outsider and an insider and as an advocate for higher education (Merriam 
et al., 2001; Merriam, 2009).  As a member of the higher education community and a 
student of higher education itself, I am frustrated by criticism from business-minded 
policymakers and others who see academe as an ivory tower and prefer economic to 
intellectual development.  Given these beliefs, I utilized reflexivity and peer debriefing 
throughout my research process to acknowledge and challenge my own biases and 
priorities (Guba & Lincoln, 1982; Merriam, 2009).  In concluding the research and 
writing of this study, I find that I have both deepened and broadened my preexisting 
positionality.  I am more aware of and sympathetic to the forces shaping how 
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policymakers address higher education, but I am also more committed to protecting 
higher education from those who are misinformed or politically motivated.  I discuss 
these implications further in Chapter Seven, following my findings. 
Limitations 
Case study examines a specific phenomenon within a unique context (Merriam, 
2009).  Therefore, the intent of this study was not to produce findings generalizable for 
all states or periods of time.  Rather, my goal was to provide thick description of how 
politics shaped the specific cases under investigation and how politics may operate more 
broadly within current Texas financial aid policy.  This was a study of context – therefore 
it cannot be removed from the context in which it occurs.  I do, however, believe these 
findings uncover themes and questions that other studies may explore within other 
localized contexts, and I hope to expand this work to include multi-state cross-
comparative case studies.  I discuss future directions for this research in Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter Four: The Problem Stream 
This chapter addresses the first of three research questions guiding this study: 
How have policy stakeholders defined the problem of college affordability in Texas 
within the last five years?  I use quotations from interviews and documentary sources to 
present three overarching themes that emerged in response to this question: (1) ambiguity 
about the definition of affordability created political opportunities for policymakers to 
advance their own agendas; (2) views of affordability revolved around the state’s 
increasingly conservative political culture; and (3) affordability generated bipartisan 
concern, but diverging policy solutions. 
Ambiguity and Political Opportunism 
As established in Chapter One, I refer broadly to affordability as “the share of 
income required to pay the net price of college” (Delaney, 2014, p. 2014).  Rather than 
identify and advocate for a set point at which college may or may not be affordable, I use 
the term “affordability” to describe the general accessibility of college for all students, 
regardless of financial background. 
Interviews and documentary sources revealed ambiguity surrounding the concept 
of college affordability in Texas.  Despite widespread concern over the cost of college as 
an issue for the state and for students, stakeholders lacked a definition of what exactly it 
meant for college to be affordable.  Without clarity or consensus around the meaning of 
affordability, policymakers and stakeholders could frame the issue in the way that best 
aligned with their political interests.   
Defining affordability.  Almost all participants commented that they could not 
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provide a specific point at which higher education was or was not affordable because that 
amount varied based on complex factors such as family resources, institution type and 
cost, geographic region, and degree and workforce return on investment – the confluence 
of which was difficult to quantify.  A higher education leader called it “a relative thing,” 
and another advocacy organization participant shared that “it doesn’t have a number to 
it.”  A government relations leader described affordability this way: 
Affordable is the same as good or bad, you know, completely unmeasurable.  And 
anything that you come up with, it will be a reflection of personal taste.  You can 
quantitatively come up with any measure that you want to, but it's only to make 
that cohort feel good.  It's no reflection of affordable, I mean. 
 
Affordability was subjective and ambiguous by nature, and while all participants agreed 
on the importance of promoting affordability, few offered any suggestions for how to 
determine the point at which such a goal had been achieved.  Affordability was an 
ongoing, theoretical effort – an ideal focused on ensuring college access regardless of 
financial circumstances. 
The state context in Texas created a unique environment around college 
affordability.  When the Legislature deregulated tuition in 2003, institutions were forced 
to raise tuition in order to offset declining state support.  This policy shift shaped the 
political dynamics in Texas around the issue of rising cost and declining affordability, 
because the Legislature itself had contributed to tuition increases by defunding higher 
education.  A legislative aide observed: 
I don't think we define affordability, I think everything is relative.  I think 
something is viewed as unaffordable – higher ed tuition is viewed as unaffordable 
through a variety of means.  I would say it's growth over inflation.  I would say 
the growth in student debt… but it's also a very unique set of circumstances here 
in Texas that this growth in tuition occurred solely because the legislature gave 
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the keys to the car to the universities themselves, and then that combined with the 
downward investment by the state, which is as a result of the rightward trend of 
the shrinking of government. 
 
As this participant’s perspective illustrates, views of affordability in Texas were closely 
connected to the broader context of tuition deregulation and the conservative political 
climate, which prioritized limiting government spending.  While affordability has become 
a national issue, these factors in Texas created a localized political debate surrounding the 
growing cost of higher education and who was to blame for its increase: the Legislature, 
for defunding higher education; or institutions, for managing costs irresponsibly.   
Most participants described affordability as ambiguous and relative, but several 
did offer broad suggestions for how the state might define the concept.  One state official 
argued that affordability meant “not going beyond where we are now; I think we’re right 
at the tipping point.”  This view was echoed by others who viewed higher education in 
Texas as relatively affordable in cost, especially within a national comparative context.  
A participant from an advocacy organization noted: “The cost of higher education in 
Texas is not really out of line, especially for the two year schools….so you know I think 
– I think that probably that level is appropriate, the current level.”  These and other 
participants argued that being affordable meant ensuring cost and debt did not continue to 
grow in relation to families’ abilities to pay.   
This view – that college affordability in Texas meant preventing cost increase 
beyond the current climate – was also reflected in the Texas Higher Education 
Coordinating Board’s 60x30TX strategic plan for higher education, which included a goal 
to limit student debt to 60% of first-year wages for graduates of Texas public higher 
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education institutions (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2015a).  As an 
advocacy organization participant observed, the plan set a goal for maintenance, not 
improvement: “The benchmark on it is that we just don't want to get any worse.  We want 
it to stay the same through the, through every five years until we get to 2030.” According 
to an elected official, this goal was positive step toward assessing affordability: 
It is intended to be a percent of what somebody's earning power is going to be 
versus the debt burden that they have.  And they define a metric in there to say, 
this is what we mean by making sure that education is affordable… So you know, 
I don't know if that's a good metric or not, but at least it kind of gets at what, you 
know, what needs to be looked at, in terms of the affordability perspective. 
 
These statements indicate that while college cost presented a major concern in Texas, 
some stakeholders viewed the issue as warranting a preventative rather than reactive 
approach.  Those espousing this view primarily identified with higher education 
institutions in government relations and leadership roles, or in state agency roles 
supporting higher education.  These participants viewed higher education costs from an 
internal perspective; external perspectives, such as those from the Legislature, often took 
a more skeptical view. 
In contrast to those participants who described college cost in Texas as affordable 
at current levels, others viewed the affordability issue differently.  This view emerged 
primarily from external stakeholders: elected officials, legislative staffers, and advocacy 
organizations.  These voices argued that college in Texas was already too expensive.  
Rather than an issue to prevent, as most higher education affiliates argued, these voices 
described affordability – or lack thereof – as an issue at hand.  A legislative aide 
explained the political dynamics of members’ perspectives on college cost control: 
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You've got one camp that thinks that higher education is too expensive, tuition is 
too much, and that basically the reason that is the case is because universities are 
not operating efficiently, and that they're just doing the same old thing, and it's an 
arms race with faculty, and things that they could be doing it better and cheaper, 
and passing that savings onto the student…And so over the last decade, I think it's 
gotten more the – the crowd of folks that think tuition is too high, and we need to 
do something about that, but without necessarily funding more.  Instead, colleges 
should cost less and should operate more efficiently.  That kind of crowd seems to 
be growing, or at least getting louder.    
 
As this participant explained, members concerned with cost control and efficiency in 
higher education were growing more vocal, a trend that corresponded with the increasing 
conservative strength in the Legislature – a theme I will discuss later in this chapter.   
For policymakers, the affordability issue was heavily shaped by the historical 
context of tuition deregulation and, given the tuition increase in the 13 years since that 
policy change in 2003, the question of whether the Legislature or institutions’ governing 
boards could now best contain the growing cost of college.  Nearly all participants at the 
Capitol expressed bipartisan interest in reregulating tuition in order to “restrain” 
universities.  A handful of participants, primarily conservative lawmakers, their staff, and 
right-wing advocacy groups, were vehemently critical of institutions and believed poor 
financial management was the primary driver of cost increases.  As one legislative aide 
stated, “You just kind of feel like you’re getting scammed a little bit.”  Alternatively, 
higher education leaders viewed cost increases as the result of a confluence of factors 
such as state disinvestment, enrollment growth, student demands, and healthcare costs.  
One university president explained: 
We’re highly regulated.  I mean hugely regulated and it costs tens of millions of 
dollars a year to keep up with all the [legislation]…. Students demand more.  So 
it's like the cost of automobiles is up but automobiles are a lot better than they 
were.  You know a current even Chevy is a way better automobile ’57 Chevy.   
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You know it has electronic ignition and you know it will last a lot, a lot longer.  
You know so in some ways the product is – students are getting more…. The 
buildings, the facilities, the dorms, the staff support.  All that is better.   
 
Comparing this view with perspective of the legislative aide who described higher 
institutions as “out of control” reveals diverging perspectives on where responsibility lies 
for college cost.  While the most outspoken voices in the Capitol were critical of higher 
education management and efficiency, as the legislative aide quoted observed, higher 
education leaders and administrators argued that poor financial management was not the 
primary issue; cost drivers in higher education were many and complex.  Costs were 
increasing because of quality improvements and student demands, but also because of 
state and federal requirements and funding changes.  A few policymakers acknowledged 
these issues, such as more moderate legislators and those who heard the concerns of 
higher education institutions in their districts.3  One such elected official explained that 
while some “believe inefficiencies are the sole major driver of higher education cost 
increases,” others disagreed and saw tuition increase as the result of combined state 
funding reduction and greater expense to educate students. 
Ultimately, participants framed the problem of college affordability based on the 
constituents they represented or the political ideology they espoused.  Institutions sought 
to advance their educational missions; advocacy groups prioritized certain ideals, such as 
racial equity and college access, or more limited government and smarter return on 
                                                 
3 When referring to the political ideology of Texas legislators, I base my assessment on members’ 
reputations as described by interview participants and on the Texas Tribune’s analysis of political ideology 
in the 2015 Texas House and Senate, which uses Bayesian estimation (Jones, 2015a; 2015b). 
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investment; politicians aimed to serve their constituent bases, often the middle class, and 
to drive increasingly conservative agendas and limit spending.  Participants recognized 
that those involved in the affordability conversation selectively presented data to support 
their views.  An elected official observed: “So, you know, you can pick and choose what 
numbers you decide to use to present the most compelling case for your argument; that 
doesn’t necessarily make it right.”  The variety and complexity of these positions reveals 
how the issue of college affordability can be manipulated to align with different political 
and policy agendas. 
 Political opportunism.  Participants described higher education issues as 
providing political material for members of the Legislature.  Because of its malleability 
as an issue, college affordability catered to the political agendas of politicians seeking 
what one legislative aide described as “a sexy topic.”  Another legislative aide explained: 
“The tuition thing I think is getting so much attention because it’s accessible and 
everyone gets it, it’s something that everyone can point to.”  Fueled by the media and 
national attention on student debt and tuition growth, attaching themselves to the issue of 
college affordability enabled legislators to resonate with the concerns of constituents – 
particularly the key demographic of middle class voters – who were concerned about 
what these issues meant for them and their children.   
The issue of growing college costs was especially alarming to constituents and 
policymakers within a conservative political climate mindful of business outcomes and 
skeptical of the price, efficiency, and return on investment from higher education.  
Conservative legislators seized this political opportunity to leverage college affordability 
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as part of a broader concern for government spending and economic development; the 
state was spending too much with too little result, and efficient and affordable higher 
education was critical to producing a skilled workforce.  Higher education critics in the 
Legislature implied that the state had relinquished too much authority to institutions; 
disappointed in the result, they sought to influence higher education management from 
their own perspective.  This contributed to an undercurrent of power struggle over the 
role and management of higher education.  A higher education leader commented: “You 
know so there's a lot of, who’s in charge now…. there’s a lot of emotional and 
ideological and political, and even Oedipal, reactions, populist, that is, in my view 
driving this.” For policymakers and conservative organizations already skeptical of 
higher education’s administrative growth and cost increase, affordability concerns 
provided further evidence that universities were too irresponsible to manage themselves. 
Interviews and documentary sources also indicated that affordability concerns 
were easily manipulated as part of broader political debate over the value of teaching 
versus research.  An elected official observed that “the political climate surrounding the 
issue of college affordability is intertwined heavily with the debate over the purpose of 
public higher education.”  Some, generally conservatives, viewed higher education as an 
industry intended to produce graduates and drive the economy; the state should not 
subsidize degrees with unclear job outcomes or research that increased university costs.  
Others, often more moderate or liberal, saw value in research and other intangible 
intellectual benefits to society.  Participants explained that right-wing conservatives and 
Tea Party members treated college costs and outcomes as part of a larger “culture war” 
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against higher education, which they saw as liberal and irresponsible.  A legislative aide 
explained: “It's not so much about academics or the money even.  It's – how can they 
fight the culture war on campus.”  In this highly politicized environment, affordability 
lent itself to many different political agendas and provided material for policymakers and 
ideological organizations critical of higher education. 
Deregulation and tuition increases also generated media attention that escalated 
the public’s sensitivity to college affordability as an issue.  An advocacy organization 
participant explained how public attention to the rising cost of college increased concern 
over affordability: 
Because you ask people – if you ask anybody on the street, do you think college is 
expensive, they’re going to say yes.  Because that has become a narrative.  That 
has become a narrative not just in Texas but nationally.  And so once you have 
said that, okay everybody is going to think that. 
 
This participant saw media and political attention around college cost as self-generating 
and self-reinforcing, often politically motivated, and not always well informed.  Other 
participants also viewed the cost issue as part of a larger political agenda.  A higher 
education leader stated: 
Higher education – it's easy – it’s a good weapon to look at cost…They don't like 
[the university] when they can’t get in and they don't like to pay, they’d rather pay 
less.  So those are good weapons for politicians or others that have other reasons 
for disliking [universities]. 
 
While recognizing the importance of controlling costs, participants from stakeholder 
groups internal to higher education felt political and media attention had a tendency to 
simplify and exaggerate the issue – or to use it as political ammunition.  Affordability 
itself was difficult to pinpoint, but it was easy to point fingers.  In a government 
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environment wary of spending increases and budget inefficiency, tuition growth attracted 
attention to higher education and made cost and declining affordability evidence that 
something was wrong with colleges and universities.  Policymakers could use tuition 
growth and constituent concerns over declining affordability as evidence that state 
institutions were irresponsible and government costs and spending were out of control. 
Politics surrounding the issue of affordability were also complicated by a 
tendency toward shortsighted and localized views of higher education by some 
legislators.  Members were strong advocates of institutions they represented and well 
intentioned about serving their interests, but as one state agency staff member explained, 
the Legislature “often takes a very parochial view, you know their position is largely 
driven by what’s in the interest of their institutions.”  This focus meant members were not 
always well informed about higher education more broadly than within their own 
districts, and differences among institutions’ student bodies and needs were minimized.  
Elected officials’ exposure to and understanding of the complexity of higher education 
across the state subsequently shaped policymaking.  Influenced by localized views, a 
state agency staff member explained that elected officials had a tendency to create new 
initiatives to maintain voter support:  
That's what happens in those kind of things.  They listen and they're listening to 
their constituents and they're trying to get elected.  So I mean, that's just part of 
the political – it happens at the federal level, too.  I mean, I'm sure it does on a 
much larger scale.  But it does define – and then we have all these programs that 
we have to administer – oh, and by the way, you need to keep costs down and you 
need to control student loan debt. 
 
Albeit well intentioned, these new programs were rarely funded by the state and not 
necessarily well aligned with existing problems and needs.  According to another state 
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agency participant: 
And so that’s what the session usually comes down to is trying to find that 
balance of you know making sure that I'm protecting my institution, I’m helping 
students, helping taxpayers, and you know I can find a solution where I can brag 
about, you know, how I had an outcome that’s going to help X numbers to access 
higher education. 
 
This tendency to create new programs related to college affordability contributed to an 
increasingly complex and underfunded collection of financial aid programs, which some 
participants argued was counterproductive to the needs of students and families who were 
deterred by complicated eligibility requirements.  A higher education leader commented: 
“Sometimes over time you just continue to add programs, add programs, add programs, 
add complexity.  And you know, students and parents get very confused in terms of 
who’s eligible and who’s not.  And it just becomes too complicated.”  Financial aid 
leaders saw these programs as particularly difficult for low-income and first-generation 
students and families to untangle. 
While policymakers advanced pet programs to support their constituents, higher 
education administrators preferred greater flexibility over their budgets and financial aid 
dollars so they could best serve varied student bodies in a constrained fiscal environment.  
A participant from an advocacy organization explained, “You’ve probably heard this 
from financial aid directors…give me flexibility.  Give me the ability to meet the needs 
of my particular set of students.”  Participants described a disconnect between the needs 
of financial aid offices and the political interests of the Legislature when developing 
higher education policies – which several policy advisors referred to as “cocktail party 
laws” because they were popular, positive, and generally bipartisan.  Thus the issue of 
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college affordability, however defined, provided policymakers with political and policy 
opportunities to serve their voting base – even if those policies did not necessarily 
advance the needs of students and higher education institutions.  Perhaps more 
significantly, the ambiguity and malleability of what it meant for college to be 
“affordable” allowed politicians to shape and advocate for definitions that align with their 
broader political agendas: in many cases, skepticism of government entities, curbing state 
spending, strengthening the workforce, and appealing to middle class voters.   
 Affordability as a middle class concept.  Despite ambiguity around the cost at 
which college might be considered affordable, policymakers saw college affordability 
primarily as a middle class issue.  This varied to a certain extent by political orientation, 
with more liberal Democrats emphasizing the needs of lower-income communities and 
underrepresented students, but such voices were a minority in a largely conservative 
Legislature.  Political discourse surrounding the cost of college focused on the middle 
and upper middle class families often unable to qualify for financial aid programs 
available at lower income levels, and therefore likely to rely on loans to finance college.  
A higher education leader explained the broader context: 
You know we have this odd situation…that at low income levels there’s a 
considerable amount of aid, which may in fact cover a lot of the actual tuition and 
fee, books cost, but doesn’t provide a whole lot of help for room and board.  So 
it’s difficult for those students to go away to college, although if they have a 
college locally, at least there’s an opportunity for them to go to college.  Of 
course people at the higher end of the, higher income levels, can afford to go 
wherever they want to.  But for those families that are in between, it’s extremely 
difficult.  College is a big expense and they’re not eligible for aid, so you know, 
that’s, I think that’s where a lot of the rub is on affordability. 
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Policymakers were also aware of this “rub.”  As a legislative staffer explained, members 
were concerned that middle class students and families needed more access to financial 
aid, while lower income students were more likely already covered by grants:  
I think that there's a sense that there's, with Pell and other opportunities like that, 
and kind of these financial aid packages, that they [low income students] are taken 
care of in a sense.  I think that some people would like to see more money put into 
TEXAS Grants and maybe raise that EFC (Estimated Family Contribution) cap to 
where it covers more students… moving forward, I think the focus is kind of 
switching towards students who don't have that – who don't qualify, aren't the 
needy needy. 
 
Interest in increasing the Estimated Family Contribution limit for TEXAS Grants, which 
the Coordinating Board has proposed as a legislative recommendation for the 85th 
Session, demonstrates the state’s interest in expanding eligibility for financial aid to more 
middle class students.  Participants also argued that focusing on the middle class was a 
result of the budget climate, which required members of the Legislature to set priorities 
for limited funds.  A legislative aide explained: 
It really comes down to the members have to make a choice of who they want to 
help….  Because we only have so much money in any given budget cycle.  And 
so, are we going to spend that in a way that primarily helps low income, inner city 
population, or are we going to spend that in a way that helps the middle class? 
 
Given the necessity of making these decisions, elected officials were likely to choose 
based on the interests of their constituents – and those constituents, and therefore the 
voting base most likely to re-elect them next cycle, were often middle class.  A 
government relations leader noted: 
It's always been the middle income families that everyone is concerned about at 
the [Texas] Capitol.  It’s because that’s middle America, that's bipartisan.  It 
doesn't matter whether you are Republican or Democrat, they still get those 
complaints.  And it’s affordability within that range. 
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From this view, focusing on middle class affordability was politically expedient, as well 
as realistic and necessary given the limited aid available for middle income families.  The 
combination of limited financial aid available for middle class students and the robust 
voting base comprised by the middle class undoubtedly influenced this predominant view 
of affordability as a middle class issue. 
 Emphasis on middle class Texans in the affordability conversation was not the 
perspective of every participant, however.  Voices from the advocacy community and 
minority Democratic caucus articulated a second argument.  These participants felt the 
Legislature defined affordability too narrowly by focusing on the needs of middle class, 
and primarily suburban and rural student populations.  One advocacy organization 
participant expressed concerns with policymakers’ efforts to “move some of the dollars 
up the socioeconomic [ladder] – you know, from lower class to middle class students, 
because there’s less financial aid for those middle class students…that’s a problem for us, 
because that’s not our student base.”  Another explained: “we’re experiencing such 
dramatic demographic changes, but those legislators in power don’t feel accountable to 
those communities.”  Finally, a legislative staffer described the underlying political 
challenge of choosing, in the previous participant’s words, “whom to help”:  
I think there is undoubtedly a my kids versus those kids – those other kids, 
meaning brown and black kids – issue to investing in financial aid.  I don't think 
you would find any member that would state that on the record, but I think – I 
can't put aside the fact that, as Texas gets – Texas is now a majority minority 
state, it's one of four, I believe, and in the next 20 years it's going to be a majority 
Latino state, and I think you can't separate that from – I'm trying to choose my 
words carefully, I want to be precise in what I’m saying.  I think as a rule, human 
beings are probably more likely to want to help people out that are within their 
clan, that look like them, and Texas [is becoming] more brown and black but is 
still ruled by conservative white men. 
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This staffer’s candid comments reveal the political complexity of a Legislature that is 
65% white in a state that is majority-minority with a growing population of low-income 
students of color (Aaronson, 2012; Ramsey, 2015; Ura & McCullough, 2015).  
Policymakers felt most obligated to the population that had been their traditional voting 
base – but that base was changing.  As a result, while affordability was defined as 
primarily a middle class issue, the increasing demographic of lower-income students of 
color must become a critical part of the affordability conversation if the state is to meet 
its 60x30TX completion goals.  The participants quoted above expose a growing tension 
between the needs of what has become the majority of the state’s population, and the 
traditional priorities of a conservative Texas Legislature. 
Conservative Political Culture 
 As much of the above discussion indicates, conservative political culture played a 
significant role in shaping the discourse around affordability and higher education in 
Texas.  Participants also described a decades-long rightward shift in the Legislature and 
increasing influence of conservative and Tea Party voices in shaping the state’s political 
agenda around all issues. 
Rightward momentum.  Texas, as one government relations leader explained, 
“is a very, very, very conservative state.”  Similarly, a state agency participant explained: 
“Obviously, Texas is a very politically conservative state and the focus of the majority of 
the Legislature, you know, is on making sure that they are seen as supporting 
conservative positions.”  Participants also expressed that this conservative ideology was 
increasing in strength and moving further and further from the center.  Voices from all 
   
102 
stakeholder groups and political parties described a rightward shift in state politics, and 
particularly an interest in limiting government spending.  Leadership changes over the 
last several legislative sessions had contributed to this rightward momentum.  A 
legislative aide explained:  
But you've gone from a Legislature where you could – the far right did not 
dominate by any means, and now it's a competition, I would say, for the majority 
of Republicans in this state of who can be most like Ted Cruz.  And that cannot 
help but impact actual policymaking and policy decisions and the budget and bills 
that get filed. 
 
Similarly, a higher education leader explained that “The right in Texas used to be what 
I'd call kind of more by the seat of your pants conservatives.  Not the Ted Cruz 
ideological Tea Party right wing.”  Increasing conservatism meant more emphasis on 
controlling cost, greater scrutiny of higher education institutions’ spending, and aversion 
to increasing state funding – compounding the challenge of providing “affordable” higher 
education.  A government relations leader observed: 
What I am seeing at least is that the Senate, which has become more conservative 
since I've been in the state of Texas, in particular the past few years, there is this 
you need to cut costs, you need to provide affordable tuition, but you know we're 
not going to give you any more money, you're just going to have to figure out 
how to do this. 
 
This rightward shift became most pronounced around higher education with the cost and 
productivity reforms advocated by Governor Perry, primarily between 2008 and 2011.  A 
legislative aide explained how these political dynamics had affected higher education:  
I think a lot of the higher ed folks were probably caught off guard by the – what 
they would view as the politicization of higher education, beginning with 
Governor Perry's attempts at the Seven Breakthrough Solutions…and I think they 
have been playing defense ever since then.  
 
Indeed, the aftermath of these business-minded reforms provided an undercurrent 
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throughout interviews with internal higher education stakeholders and clearly colored 
university administrators’ wariness of policymakers.  
Tea Party influence.  The rise of the Tea Party in Texas was a common theme 
across interviews, and participants viewed the Tea Party as a driving force in the state’s 
rightward momentum.  The Tea Party influenced the college cost conversation because of 
the right-wing faction’s emphasis on limiting government and cutting spending, and 
through its generally antagonistic and disruptive view of higher education.  A policy 
advisor provided this context: 
You have the regular, mainstream business conservatives, then you have the Tea 
Party, a little more concerned with social issues, a little less concerned with – just, 
governance.  Or, let me put it another way.  Less concerned about governance, 
they really want, they’re not interested in the status quo, they’re interested more 
in blowin’ the house up. 
 
Participants described the Tea Party as more disruptive than substantive in their policy 
involvement.  Their general view of higher education affordability was, as a legislative 
aide paraphrased, “the tuition is too damn high.” An elected official stated: 
Those folks are very interested in cost containment.  And so the ranks of the cost 
containment coalition have grown.  And you know with more legal authority 
comes greater political resources better positioned to set the agenda to protect 
their policy ideas, to pass policy ideas. 
 
Nearly all participants were wary of this increase in political resources and its potential 
impact on higher education policy.  A legislative aide noted that the Tea Party was 
particularly dangerous because its rhetoric was simple and persuasive.  He explained: 
“You have people who want to undermine higher ed…but they do it in ways where you 
can't really be against – you know, just in a vacuum, it's hard to be against workforce 
preparedness or affordability.”  The Tea Party used relatable language that resonated with 
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average Texans who were concerned about the cost of college and availability of jobs. 
The Tea Party also influenced the agendas of traditional conservatives.  A 
government relations leader explained that Republicans were wary of the Tea Party in 
general elections, so they adapted their platforms in order to hold their ground: “The Tea 
Party finds somebody to run against them.  And because of the turnout, candidates are 
scared.  And so they run to the right.”  Republicans and Democrats alike described this 
trend as extremely concerning because of its potential policy implications across many 
issues, including higher education.  A policy advisor commented that even though the 
Tea Party’s understanding of higher education issues was limited, their potential impact 
was increasing: “This is part of the problem with the Tea Party.  They don’t understand, 
and don’t care to understand, more importantly…that you know, state funding provides, 
what was the last number, 18-19% of the operating cost of a public higher education 
institution.”  Participants from both sides of the political aisle saw the Tea Party as 
rabble-rousers focused on limiting state funding for higher education, and 
consequentially undermining institutions’ ability to keep costs low for students.   
While participants generally viewed Rick Perry’s successor, Governor Greg 
Abbott, as more open-minded toward higher education, the new Lieutenant Governor, 
Dan Patrick, was seen as a Tea Party leader and vocal higher education critic.  One 
participant4 noted that this represented a change from the previous Lieutenant Governor, 
David Dewhurst, who had been an active advocate for higher education: “the previous 
                                                 
4 The role and category of this participant have been removed upon request to protect anonymity.  
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Lieutenant Governor was…consistently pro higher ed, and now you have a Lieutenant 
Governor who has kind of taken up the mantle of higher ed’s bad and inefficient and 
totally insensitive to cost or price.”  This shift was significant, as the Lieutenant 
Governor’s influence extended far into the Senate due to his authority to appoint 
committee leadership, such as the Chair of the Senate Higher Education Committee.  As a 
legislative aide explained: “You have [Senator] Seliger, who again, is the Chair [of the 
Senate Higher Education Committee], and being Chair comes with certain requirements.  
The chair is like a leash…that the Lieutenant Governor can tug on as much as he wants.”  
Participants therefore saw Lieutenant Governor Patrick and his Tea Party agenda as a 
major force in agenda setting and the political environment surrounding the cost of higher 
education.  Stakeholders at the Capitol and state agency acknowledged that Patrick’s 
committee appointments, vocal criticism of higher education cost, and antipathy toward 
tuition seta-sides for financial aid – which I will discuss in Chapter Five – undoubtedly 
affected the state’s higher education policy stream. 
 Participants also described how the Legislature’s increasing conservatism took on a 
highly competitive tone.  One legislative aide observed:  
I clearly will not name names, but we see members who are pulled one way when 
they wish they could vote this way, because of a primary challenge, or the concern 
of that.   So it's kind of this – can you out-conservative one another, and a little bit 
of this kind of showboating and – you know, just – it's not good governing 
sometimes. 
 
Competitiveness among conservative legislators meant they drove each other further to 
the right as they sought voter support.  A policy advisor elaborated on the rising influence 
of right wing conservatives, “It happens to the best of them.  And you know, the governor 
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included.  They’ve got to pay attention to those constituencies or else they’re not going to 
win reelection.”  These dynamics created a complex and competitive environment in 
which moderate Republicans emulated Tea Party members in order to maintain support.  
As a legislative aide explained, it became difficult to determine where the Republican 
Party ended and Tea Party began.    
With limiting state spending and increasing efficiency as key tenets of the 
conservative agenda, higher education institutions felt the brunt of this rightward trend as 
politicians pointed to universities as alleged examples of poor fiscal management.  Such 
members were skeptical of subsidizing higher education because they did not like the 
results.  A legislative aide explained:  
There's lot of places where they are not using their money efficiently…I would 
say that before you come to the Legislature and say we need more money…look 
at your own budget and make sure you don't have administrative bloat, to use a 
buzz word, or make sure you're not giving out million dollar bonuses before you 
know – I would just say that make sure your budget is in line before you come to 
the Legislature. 
 
This staffer’s comments demonstrate some conservative lawmakers’ frustration and 
impatience with higher education institutions for what they viewed as poor management 
decisions that undermined financial productivity and the state’s return on investment.  
Indeed, a government relations leader observed that higher education was “probably at its 
lowest point of having the support of members of the Legislature.” 
Though participants acknowledged that there were members of the Legislature 
who advocated for increased higher education funding, these members, often Democrats, 
were in the minority with limited power.  The aforementioned government relations 
participant stated: “They don’t have the votes to do anything.”  Given conservative 
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leadership, most participants felt the budget climate surrounding higher education was 
unlikely to change.  An elected official commented: 
The reality is, under the current leadership and the current makeup of the 
legislature, it's not going to change dramatically until the composition of the 
people who are here changes dramatically…. you know, Texas has always been a 
conservative state, even when Democrats ruled the roost.  You know, I mean, it's 
been fiscally conservative, it's been socially conservative.  So, you know, that's – 
that's kind of been the DNA of Texas government.  But it used to be, though, that 
when it came to higher ed – that we made smart investments in higher ed. 
 
The political dynamics created by an increasingly conservative Legislature, particularly 
the Senate, provide important context surrounding the debate over higher education 
affordability.  As previously discussed, participants indicated that college affordability 
offered legislators political ammunition for a larger movement against cost and 
government spending.  Understanding the broader Texas political climate reveals the 
profound pressure on public higher education to demonstrate greater efficiency at a lower 
cost, with little to no additional state resources.   
While college affordability is undoubtedly a substantive issue affecting students 
and families, it is also an issue to which policymakers have to some extent contributed.  
The aforementioned elected official articulated this complex issue: 
People that are raising the most noise about the cost of college are the same 
people, a lot of the times, who have systematically advocated under-funding our 
colleges and universities.  So on the one hand, their past actions…those actions 
have indicated a general lack of interest in higher education in general, I would 
argue.  And now all of a sudden there's this outrage over – over the cost of it.  
Well, I am concerned about the cost of college, too, and the debt that students 
incur.  But I think that when you look at Texas public universities in comparison 
to the rest of the country, generally speaking, I think it's a good bargain for – for 
the student.  Now, can every student afford that good bargain still? No, absolutely 
not, and certainly every family cannot. 
 
This member acknowledges affordability as an issue, but suggests that conservative 
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views toward state funding have undermined higher education’s ability to carry out its 
mission at a lower cost to students.  This comment also suggests that the issue is hyper-
politicized as part of a broader concern for state costs.  The complexity of college 
affordability as both a real concern for students, families and the state, and a “weapon” in 
a larger agenda, to borrow the words of a previously quoted higher education leader.  
This elected official reveals that even amidst more conservative viewpoints, there are 
indeed members of the Legislature who adopt a more balanced and open-minded view 
toward higher education.  Another elected official explains this well: 
There are those who advocate for public institutions to have the resources 
necessary to compete nationally and globally and ensure excellence.  These 
advocates believe tuition is increasing because the cost of providing a valuable 
education…has been increasing while public funding has been decreasing.  
Although institutions should strive to be as efficient and innovative as possible, 
the state must invest adequately to prevent tuition increases and to preserve or 
improve upon the quality of Texas' higher education system. 
 
These two elected officials reveal the political (and to some extent partisan, which I will 
discuss later in this chapter) dynamics surrounding higher education cost and 
affordability.  Those on the defensive, however, are primarily Democrats with limited 
power to counter the rising tide of right-wing Republicans focused on cost containment 
and higher education’s financial shortcomings.  As nearly all participants observed, this 
dynamic is unlikely to shift without a change in party leadership in the Legislature – 
something the state’s rightward momentum indicates is not on the horizon.  Defining the 
problem of college affordability, then, is primarily in the hands of an increasingly 
conservative Republican Legislature interested in limiting state spending and increasing 
institutional productivity, albeit without additional fiscal resources to do so.  Without a 
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clear point at which college is “affordable,” conservative lawmakers interested in cost 
containment can generally view any price as too high.   
Business and workforce emphasis.  Given the Republican Party’s traditional 
emphasis on the market and business productivity, Texas’s conservative political 
ideology also contributed to a pervasive view of higher education as an operation that 
should return a profit by strengthening the workforce.  The political agenda around higher 
education focused on the economy, efficiency, and return on investment, and legislators’ 
views of affordability were closely entwined with whether or not the cost of a degree was 
worthwhile.  A legislative aide explained: “That’s the way to get the state leadership’s 
attention, is to tie it to economics.  But I mean, that’s really what it is.  It’s about the 
workforce.”  Similarly, a media relations participant described learning to frame 
institutional messaging around workforce issues, saying: “I can’t beat [conservative 
lawmakers] over the head with my liberal agenda…that’s the way you sort of think about 
it.  You say, okay, how’s this going to impact our economy and the business climate, and 
who are you going to hire in 10 years.”  These statements reveal the influence of 
economic outcomes and the business-minded political climate on college affordability 
discourse.  Higher education should be affordable – both to students and to the state – in 
order to produce the strongest return on investment by way of workforce development.   
Participants referenced the 60x30TX higher education plan as evidence of the 
state’s pervasive view of higher education as a vehicle for workforce and economic 
growth.  This plan revolved around the need for educational achievement in order to be 
economically competitive.  As a legislative aide explained, economic, rather than 
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intellectual, growth was the state’s goal:  
They don't necessarily see that as the state's business, investing in you to learn 
about the Revolutionary War or the Renaissance, or anything that's not going to 
totally translate in a way that they can see into outputs for the economy and for 
the state.    
 
The state prioritized economic development, not intellectual development.  This 
perspective meant that the Legislature and higher education institutions were not always 
speaking the same language about the role and cost of higher education.  A government 
relations leader explained: 
You know there’s always this push by the Legislature, we need to create this 
really strong Texas workforce and what are these kids giving back to the 
workforce, and so in my opinion, one of the things we’ve got to get better at is, 
[saying] this is why we raise tuition.  We’re providing a quality education, we 
have to retrain and recruit faculty that’s going to provide quality education and in 
order for us to do that, we’re going to have to raise tuition.  And yes these kids are 
paying more money, but essentially they’re going to stay in the state of Texas, 
they’re going to work in the state of Texas, they're going to be taxpayers, and 
they’re going to be giving back to the state of Texas.   
 
This tension between intellectual development and workforce development was 
exacerbated by the economic climate, which heightened concern about employment 
statistics for college graduates and the return on investment of their degrees.  As a higher 
education leader explained, “I think what’s happened in recent years is that…because the 
economy has not been as generous to a lot of college graduates, they’re not earning the 
levels of income they would need to pay off those loans.”  The economy, therefore, 
intensified concerns about affordability because postgraduate un- or underemployment 
painted the cost of a degree as poor investment. 
Higher education as a business.  In addition to serving an economic 
development purpose, policymakers also called for higher education institutions to 
   
111 
operate with business principles in mind in order to maximize their budgets and decrease 
costs.  A conservative advocacy organization leader stated: “I’m not sure that a lot more 
money is the answer.  I think increased productivity.”  Similarly, a state official argued:  
The attitude of higher education presidents and chancellors is give us more money 
and leave us alone.  Well, the Legislature isn’t going to give more money and 
leave the institutions alone.  They want better results.  We’re not – I don’t feel 
like giving more money to a university that has a six-year graduation rate of 82%. 
 
As in a traditional business model, policymakers were looking to see low education costs 
and high graduation and workforce outcomes.  The problem, according to higher 
education stakeholders and a few policymakers, was that despite efforts to streamline 
processes and boost efficiency, higher education was not built to be a business and its 
outcomes were difficult to quantify.  An elected official sharing this view commented:  
Well, it's not a business, you know, and government's not a business, you know, 
and – and I think we got to be very careful we don't fall in that mindset.  That, you 
know, higher education is not a – is not a corporation, and there are some things 
that are difficult to measure, and you have to be willing to have that sort of 
broader perspective, I think.   
 
This participant went on to elaborate that while accountability and outcomes were 
important, albeit difficult to measure, taking a narrow view “undercuts the value of 
higher education.”  Nonetheless, the majority of the Legislature’s emphasis on 
minimizing inputs and maximizing outputs in all areas of government contributed to the 
pervasive view among policymakers that tuition and state funding were too high in 
relation to institutional outcomes.  Their criticisms imply that affordability involved an 
anticipated return on investment, and the current cost-to-benefit ratio was unimpressive.  
Recall the legislative aide who decried higher education as “getting scammed.”  In sum, 
participants at the Capitol felt the investment the Legislature and students placed in 
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higher education should produce better graduation rates and job outcomes. 
This business mindset also shaped financial aid policy: while aid was a way to 
promote access and opportunity, it was also a tool to incentivize productivity, both for the 
state and for students.  According to a government relations leader: “What the 
Coordinating Board has done and the Legislature has done is look for mechanisms to 
ration the dollars.  You know, how do we – how can we get the best bang for our buck?” 
Consequently, the state was increasingly interested in adding merit criteria to aid 
programs in order to prioritize investing in the students most likely to graduate.  A state 
agency participant explained the political effectiveness of this approach to rationing 
dollars and emphasizing outcomes, noting the “merit component is something that 
appeals to more conservative members.”  Participants commented that the Commissioner 
of Higher Education was particularly adept at advocating for financial aid in a language 
that conservative lawmakers were more likely to support – a tactic that earned him both 
accolades from policymakers and criticism from higher education administrators. 
Impatience with higher education.  Policymakers advocating a workforce and 
business-minded perspective for higher education were increasingly frustrated when 
institutions’ operations, fiscal management, and outcomes did not align with their views.  
As a result, despite emphasis on higher education’s economic value to the state, 
participants acknowledged that the government was less and less interested in subsidizing 
its state institutions and increasingly skeptical of their ability to manage state funds 
efficiently.  A government relations leader felt the Legislature was shifting higher 
education toward a “user-based revenue collecting type of entity…you know as opposed 
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to it being a collective state good.”  Conservative members were particularly vocal about 
institutions’ irresponsible spending, and these concerns discouraged them for providing 
greater support.  Paraphrasing the concerns of many conservative policymakers, a policy 
advisor explained: “They would rather not fund it at all if isn’t well spent…[so] why are 
we doing this at all?”  While divestment in public higher education was not a new trend 
nor a trend unique to Texas, participants felt the tension between institutions’ needs and 
the state’s funding priorities was increasing.  An advocacy organization participant 
expressed concern that “ideological conservatives [want to] privatize education – when 
there’s a buck to be made, let’s make money off it.”  These comments reinforce the 
underlying debate over the role and management of public higher education. 
Participants at the Capitol also criticized university systems for raising tuition 
while simultaneously increasing expansion efforts and construction, particularly after the 
84th Legislature increased appropriations to higher education over the previous session.  
These criticisms came to a head in March 2016 when the Lieutenant Governor and Chair 
of the Senate Higher Education Committee released a public statement saying:  
We are alarmed at reoccurring reports that our state universities have increased or 
are considering proposals to raise tuition on students.  These increases, combined 
with excessive bonus programs, indicate that our state universities have lost sight 
of their primary mission to provide a high quality education at an affordable cost 
to Texas families.  It is discouraging to see Texas higher education institutions 
seek to increase the financial burden faced by students and their families rather 
than developing methods to cut institutional costs. (Patrick, 2016) 
 
This letter exemplifies state leaders’ growing impatience with higher education 
institutions’ financial decisions.  Such concerns contributed to rising interest at the 
Legislature in a variety of policies such as outcomes-based funding, which would reorient 
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appropriations to incentivize institutional performance rather than enrollment, and 
reregulating tuition by returning that authority to the Legislature from institutional 
Boards of Regents.  These policy ideas imply that the Legislature viewed institutions as 
underperforming, overpriced, and irresponsible.  Put simply by a media relations 
participant: “They think institutions can’t be trusted.”  An elected official argued: 
“[Higher education institutions] should always be restrained.  They are not exempt from 
the idea of operating efficiently and economically.”  Given the Legislature’s view that 
institutions seemed unable to adequately restrain themselves, participants indicated that 
reregulation was a likely result of the forthcoming Legislative session in 2017.   
The deregulation and reregulation debate – while a separate study in itself – offers 
a valuable example of the undercurrents at play regarding who should control the cost of 
college.  Reregulation implies that the Legislature rests blame for cost increases on higher 
education institutions and believes policymakers are better able to set affordable tuition 
rates.  Yet if the Legislature regains control of tuition, policymakers can no longer 
offload blame for rising prices to higher education institutions, and will become 
responsible themselves.  Reregulation also neglects to address cost: such a policy change 
would allow the Legislature to limit tuition, but leave institutions to struggle with the 
rising cost of providing education and services for an increasingly diverse student 
population.  As a higher education leader explained, “you have to distinguish cost from 
price – one reason price has gone up is public support is down.  But I think even then, 
cost is up.”  This tug of war over tuition control reveals the complexity of the debate over 
college affordability, what it means, how to achieve it – and who is responsible.    
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Bipartisan Concern, Ideological Differences 
 While the state political culture was unabashedly conservative and Republicans 
held increasing power, participants viewed college affordability as a bipartisan issue that 
often crossed party lines in unique ways.  Both parties expressed concern over college 
affordability, but diverged in how they proposed to address the issue.  As one elected 
official explained: “While virtually all agree that higher education should be affordable 
and that financial aid is an important tool to achieve this, Republicans and Democrats 
often disagree within their own parties about how to pursue these goals.”  Similarly, 
another elected official commented:  
There’s a general consensus that it needs to be more affordable, but there’s 
disagreements as to how to get there.  And then there’s a lot of disagreements over 
how you fund, how much to fund, and a lot of the more detailed issues…a lot of 
times these issues don’t cut along ideological or party lines. 
 
Higher education leaders offered a similar view of these political dynamics; one shared: 
“It’s on probably all members’ radar.  In terms of what to do about it – I think there’s 
differences of opinion about what to do about it and what the causes may be.”  Concern 
over college affordability was generally bipartisan, and most members acknowledged that 
while financial aid provided critical support to students, funding for these programs was 
limited and could no longer keep pace with tuition.  A legislative aide explained:  
We’ve got a lot of great [bipartisan political] support, for the most part, for 
financial aid, but one thing that is happening is a realization that it's just going to 
cost us more and more money to provide financial aid, if the tuition just keeps 
going up more and more.  And so it's not seen as a solution; it's just seen as sort of a 
Band-Aid.   
 
Recognition that the state could not, or would not, fund financial aid programs 
sufficiently to support the needs of a growing postsecondary population led members to 
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different conclusions about longer-term policy solutions to the problem of escalating 
college costs.  These solutions varied within and across parties. 
 In some ways, Democrats and Republicans did tend to diverge along party lines in 
terms of the solutions they advocated.  Nearly all participants acknowledged that these 
differences centered on money and the role of the state.  An elected official stated: “I 
think most people agree that they want to make it affordable, and so the argument then 
for a lot of folks is [whether it is] the state's responsibility to make it more affordable.” 
As an advocacy organization participant observed, “So I think the disagreement comes 
back to a very well understood appreciation for what the government should and should 
not pay for,” with Democrats more generally more interested in funding education and 
social services and Republicans more interested in limiting government spending.  
Another advocacy organization leader summarized partisan policy preferences this way: 
“Well, I think the Democrats want to put more money in it.  And the Republicans just 
want to put a lock on it.”  Democrats primarily advocated a greater state role in providing 
funding to make higher education affordable, while Republicans preferred more efficient 
use of existing resources.  Within the Republican Party, those further to the right 
emphasized containing all government spending, while moderates were more open to 
funding at greater levels – if institutions demonstrated a return on investment.  Another 
legislator elaborated:  
I think as a general principle, the Democratic Party wants to put more money into 
higher education, as a general rule.  There are some Republicans that strategically 
would want to fund – I think the Republicans would say I’m happy to put more 
money, but I want to make sure I’m getting value back, I want to make sure it’s 
efficient. 
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As these participants demonstrate, college affordability generated both bipartisan 
concern, and partisan – and sub-partisan – policy solutions. 
Shared concern for affordability produced uncommon alliances between members 
from the far left and far right, both of whom had begun to voice interest in renewed 
legislative control over tuition as a priority for the next session.  In particular, two 
legislators at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum – Democratic Senator Rodney 
Ellis and Republican Senator Charles Schwertner – both advocated for reregulation as a 
policy solution to the issue of college affordability, but for different reasons.  As a 
participant explained:5  
It's not because [left-wing lawmakers] think higher ed shouldn't have more 
money, [they] just think that the state should be giving them more money.  
Whereas – I mean, I don't think [right-wing lawmakers] are basically arguing we 
should be funding higher ed better, I think [they are] saying they have too much 
money and they need to figure out how to do it better.  And I think Lt. Gov. 
Patrick would say they need to figure out how to do it better.  So, I mean, 
completely different views on what the state should be funding or how much, but 
they arrive at somehow the same conclusion that [reregulation] is the solution. 
 
What united these legislators was their agreement that tuition should not increase; where 
they diverged was in whether or not institutions should receive more money for the state.  
Ellis, a Democrat with a diverse constituency in Houston, advocated for reregulating 
tuition and increasing appropriations.  Conservative Republicans Schwertner and Patrick 
advocated for reregulating tuition and requiring greater efficiency with existing 
resources.  As a policy advisor stated, this “interesting alliance between the far right and 
far left on tuition reregulation or freeze caps or doing something about the price of 
                                                 
5 This participant requested their category and role be excluded in order to protect privacy; by request, I 
have also removed the names of specific legislators referenced in this quote.  
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tuition…that’s just not something you normally see.”  In addition to the party dynamics 
discussed above, this bipartisan development offers evidence of college affordability as a 
complex political issue that unites and divides, both across and within party.  
 A few participants described affordability as a geographic issue, varying based on 
the locale and composition of a legislator’s district.  A state agency participant explained: 
You know the divisions are – you know there's an element of who has what school 
in their district.  There's an element of what do their constituents look like.  You 
know are their constituents having difficulty affording higher education, are their 
constituents seeing massive increases in their bills. 
 
A legislative aide also argued of college affordability: “I would say it’s more geographic 
than partisan.”  Those with lower-income districts were more likely to emphasize 
increased state support for higher education and need-based financial aid programs.  
Members with affluent districts were more likely to prioritize merit over need-based aid; 
those representing lower income, underserved and underrepresented populations would 
advocate for need-based aid; and those with higher education institutions in their districts 
would press for greater appropriations and respond to the interests of schools they 
represented.  A state official explained: 
What is the primary difference between Democrats and Republicans?  Democrats 
are inclined to want to spend more money on just about everything.  Republicans 
don't want to spend a nickel on anything more, except those things that are in their 
districts.  Since everything is in somebody's district, the result is exactly the same.    
 
Thus Republicans who represented higher education institutions might be just as likely to 
advocate for increased appropriations or other higher education policies, depending on 
the positions of greatest benefit to their home institutions.  These geographic factors 
created an additional political layer to the bipartisan and ideological dynamics around 
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college affordability.  In sum, concern for affordability was bipartisan issue, but policy 
solutions varied within and across parties and involved unique bipartisan coalitions.  
District composition played perhaps a greater role than party in shaping some legislators’ 
positions on addressing affordability.   
Summary and Discussion 
 
 Policymakers in Texas defined the problem of college affordability through the 
lens of their political culture.  Because of the state’s conservative political orientation and 
increasing rightward momentum, many participants viewed college affordability as a 
pressing issue because it aligned with Republican and Tea Party interest in limiting 
government spending and increasing efficiency.  Policymakers emphasized economic 
development and business-minded approach to higher education, and did not see higher 
education institutions as efficient and cost-effective.  As a result, tensions were high 
between the Legislature and higher education institutions regarding the use of state funds 
and governing board decisions to increase tuition.  These tensions contributed to growing 
interest in reregulating tuition, indicating that the Legislature did not trust higher 
education institutions to rein in costs and keep tuition affordable for students.    
 Without a clear definition of what “affordable” college education meant, 
politicians could mold the issue to serve their political and policy agendas.  For the Tea 
Party and right-wing Republicans, the cost of college became a symptom of larger, 
systemic issues regarding the growth and inefficiency of government; higher education 
thus became the target of severe criticism that internal stakeholders felt was misinformed 
or underinformed.  College affordability also provided policymakers with an area in 
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which they could support programs and policies that benefited their districts and 
constituencies, but might ultimately not address the root issue of rising college costs, 
growing tuition, and the declining power of financial aid.  In some cases, creating or 
amending these programs might even undermine the accessibility of financial aid by 
making programs more complicated.  The state’s budget was highly constrained, and 
without adequate funding, such programs were also limited in their impact.   
Policymakers and stakeholders viewed college affordability as a bipartisan issue 
with widespread interest from both parties.  However, Democrats and Republicans 
diverged in the policy solutions they advocated in response to the problem of increasing 
college costs.  While Democrats preferred to increase state funding to offset the cost to 
students, Republicans were skeptical of providing more funding to institutions they felt 
were poor stewards of existing resources.  Legislators from both parties expressed 
interest in tuition reregulation as a way to limit the increase in tuition price. 
The findings presented in this chapter illustrate Kingdon’s (1984) multiple 
streams approach and confirm the theory’s application to higher education policymaking 
within this context.  Without “affordable” largely undefined, politicians could mold the 
term to serve their agendas – manipulating the political and policy streams to advance 
their values.  The emergence of college affordability as a national issue provided a policy 
window for these legislators, who could then use concerns over college affordability as 
ammunition against colleges and universities that did not align with their conservative 
ideologies or businesses priorities.  The influence of the state and national media 
enhanced this policy window by expanding awareness and interest in college cost, further 
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politicizing affordability by simplifying and magnifying a complex problem.  Applying 
Kindon’s framework illuminates how the political stream and policy window surrounding 
college affordability profoundly shaped the way policymakers viewed the issue. 
In the midst of this politically charged environment, however, participants 
described bipartisan concern over the underlying issue of college cost.  Policymakers and 
stakeholders viewed college affordability as an issue of widespread interest to both 
parties, but Democrats and Republicans diverged in the policy solutions they advocated 
in response to the problem of increasing college costs.  While Democrats preferred to 
increase state funding to offset the cost to students, Republicans were skeptical of 
providing more funding to institutions they felt were poor stewards of existing resources.  
This finding on bipartisan concerns but diverging policy solutions invokes Doyle’s 
(2007) argument that Republicans and Democrats hold different ideological views of 
higher education access and affordability.  Emphasis on middle class affordability also 
reiterates Doyle’s conclusion: the conservative Legislature viewed college as accessible 
to poor students through Pell and state grants, and focused their attention on promoting 
affordability for middle class students who could not access those programs.  Democrats 
shared Republican concerns for middle class families, but conceptualized affordability 
more broadly by advocating for lower income and underrepresented students; these 
policymakers, however, were a small minority in the Legislature and less influential in 
shaping the political stream around college cost. 
While Republicans may be more likely than Democrats to believe most students 
have access to college (see Doyle, 2007), bipartisan concern for affordability in Texas 
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indicates that both parties recognize some degree of limited access to higher education.  
The ideological differences in this case arise in the priorities and solutions Democrats and 
Republicans propose to address the issue – specifically, whether or not they believe more 
state resources are the answer.  Democrats expressed more interest in state funding for 
institutions and need-based aid in order to offset tuition prices.  Republicans preferred 
cost containment measures and improved efficiency to better utilize existing resources.  
This finding supports other studies concluding that Republican legislatures fund higher 
education at lower levels (see Doyle, 2012; McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; 
Tandberg, 2008; 2010a; 2010b).  Legislators from both parties expressed interest in 
tuition reregulation as a way to limit the increase in tuition price, but came to that 
position by different paths: Democrats felt the state should reregulate and provide more 
state support to keep costs down for students, while Republicans sought reregulation 
without new funds, requiring greater fiscal responsibility with existing resources.  
Different political perspectives led to the same policy solution. 
Findings on the influence of Texas’s conservative political paradigm and 
increasing rightward ideology invoke research by Gittell and Kleiman (2000), Perna and 
Finney (2014), and Richardson and Martinez (2009) on the role of state political culture, 
values, and norms in higher education policymaking.  These studies have demonstrated 
that it is impossible, and impractical, to separate state context and culture from state 
policies and their outcomes; my findings here reinforce these conclusions.  In no small 
part due to its deeply ingrained conservative traditions, Texas viewed affordability as 
primarily about the middle class, emphasized the status quo, and was reluctant to increase 
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funding for financial aid or appropriations to offset tuition.  Recalling that researchers 
have identified Texas as individualist and traditionalist (Miller, 1991; Gittell & Kleiman, 
2000) based on Elazar’s (1966) political cultures, these political and policy preferences 
are consistent with values that prioritize individual responsibility and cost control.  As 
Miller (1991) concluded, Texas remains more likely to keep overall state expenditures 
low and resist major changes to the status quo.  Examining the problem and politics 
surrounding the issue of college affordability reveals that these broad principles apply not 
just to Texas government in general, but specifically to higher education. 
 These findings demonstrate the dynamic and interconnected nature of the 
political, policy, and problem streams.  They also reveal the potential for the political 
stream to reframe the original problem, ultimately producing a solution that may not 
address the root issue.  Higher education stakeholders argue that college affordability is a 
multifaceted issue comprised of many problems: declining state appropriations, 
increasing enrollment, facilities needs, rising healthcare costs, and greater expectations 
from students, families, and the government, among others.  These problems coalesce, 
and institutions raise tuition in order to provide their services.  Without a clear definition 
of what it means for college to be affordable, the political stream simplifies and distorts 
the issue.  Policymakers respond to their constituents’ concerns about paying for college, 
and their solutions emphasize the price of tuition – which, as several participants noted, is 
something different than the actual cost of college.  Higher education leaders and 
policymakers are to some extent talking about different problems when they discuss 
college affordability.  Higher education stakeholders see the problems driving their 
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increased costs and need for greater resources, while policymakers see the problems of 
fiscal irresponsibility and higher prices.   
Disagreement over the definition of affordability and different views of the core 
problems mean that the policy solutions that develop – such as tuition reregulation – may 
not necessarily result from an alignment between the problem and policy streams.  
Ultimately, discourse on affordability emphasizes cost to students and the state, but 
neglects to address whether educating students is affordable for higher education 
institutions.  Tuition reregulation may address prices and help lawmakers respond to the 
needs of their constituents, but it does not resolve the problems institutions face in 
advancing college affordability.  The question becomes: affordability for whom?  If for 
students and families, artificially controlling price offers one policy solution.  If the 
answer is affordability for institutions, tuition reregulation neglects to address their needs 
because it further constrains institutions’ limited resources.  Pursuing affordability by 
means of reregulation may unintentionally undermine quality and result in a disservice to 
the students and families seeking educational attainment in Texas.   
The complex interaction between the problem, political, and policy streams 
reveals that there are indeed many problem sub-streams, or many views of one problem.  
The problem stream might include the problem of rising tuition, the problem of rising 
educational delivery costs, or the problem of rising healthcare costs for institutions, 
among others.  Through policy windows and the political stream, policy entrepreneurs 
advance the problem stream of tuition, because it is most relevant to constituents; other 
problem sub-streams, such as rising costs for institutions, remain on the table. 
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This chapter has explored how policymakers view the problem of college 
affordability in Texas and is intended to provide a contextual foundation for analysis of 
specific state legislation related to the cost of college.  The following chapters will 
examine the development of three tuition assistance policies and the ways in which 
politics contributed to their outcomes.   
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Chapter Five: The Policy Stream 
While bipartisan legislative interest in reregulating tuition focused on controlling 
college costs, other policy ideas sought to address affordability by way of financial aid 
and tuition assistance programs.  To illuminate several such policy ideas, this chapter will 
examine three higher education bills proposed and considered by the Texas Legislature 
within the last five years.  My purpose is to understand how and why each issue rose to 
the surface of Kingdon’s (1984) policy stream, successfully emerging from the policy 
primordial soup within which many policy ideas remain unrealized.  These cases, 
introduced in Chapter One, are: Senate Bill 28 (82nd Legislature, 2011); House Bill 700 
(84th Legislature, 2015), and Senate Bill 1735 (84th Legislature, 2015). I use quotations 
from stakeholder interviews and primary source documents to present my findings 
regarding each case.  After considering each bill in this order, I conclude by offering a 
holistic summary and discussion of patterns and themes across all three cases. 
Senate Bill 28: The TEXAS Grants Priority Model 
  Senate Bill 28, also known as the TEXAS Grants Readiness Reform Act, was 
authored by Senator Judith Zaffirini, Democrat of Laredo, and sponsored in the House by 
Representative Dan Branch, Republican of Dallas.  SB 28 addressed the TEXAS Grants 
program established by the Legislature in 2009.  Since that time, TEXAS grants had been 
administered on a first-come, first-served basis to students meeting basic eligibility 
criteria: Texas residency; completion of the Recommended high school program or 
equivalent; enrollment in a public higher education institution within 16 months of high 
school graduation, with at least three quarters of a full course load; and financial need.  
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Students with the greatest financial need were given highest priority.  Renewal grants 
required a 2.5 cumulative grade point average, minimum of 24 semester credit hours per 
year, and completion of 75% of attempted hours (House Research Organization, 2011).   
SB 28 proposed a shift in the administration and allocation of TEXAS Grants.  
The bill required the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board and higher education 
institutions to award TEXAS Grants to financially eligible students (those with an 
Expected Family Contribution no more than 60% of average statewide tuition and fees) 
based on a priority model that would first support students who met two of four academic 
criteria.  These criteria were: (1) completing the equivalent of 12 semester credit hours of 
college level programs, such as dual credit, Advanced Placement, International 
Baccalaureate, or the Distinguished Achievement Program; (2) meeting or exempting 
from the Texas Success Initiative college readiness assessment; (3) completing high 
school with a B average on a four-point scale or graduating in the top third of the 
student’s class, and (4) successfully completing a mathematics course higher than 
Algebra II.  After students meeting two or more of these criteria were awarded funds, 
remaining TEXAS Grants allocations could be distributed to students meeting the pre-
existing financial and academic criteria (SB 28, 2011). 
Three key factors contributed to the emergence of SB 28 as a policy solution 
related to college affordability in Texas: state budget constraints, interest in refining 
metrics to improve outcomes, and the leadership of two key policy entrepreneurs.   
State budget constraints.  Participants described a tense budget environment 
leading into the 2011 Legislative session when SB 28 was proposed.  Nearly all saw the 
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program as consistently underfunded – meaning the Coordinating Board did not receive 
sufficient allocations from the Legislature to provide grants to all eligible college students 
– and foresaw greater cuts in an even tighter budget climate, when funds for discretionary 
areas such as higher education would be particularly limited.  A legislative aide 
explained: “It was that we were in a legislative environment of scarcity…In other words, 
we were all in a cutback mode going into the 2011 session, because financially the state 
was strapped.  We were in a deficit environment.”  This aide, and other participants, felt 
that awareness of the state’s economic reality influenced the Legislature’s interest in 
adding merit criteria to TEXAS Grants.  Another legislative aide shared:  
You know, the Priority Model I think was a necessity just because of limited 
funds.   I mean, we passed that in '11 coming off one of the greatest recessions of 
our lifetimes at least…we just had limited dollars, and they weren't being very 
well targeted, and it was basically you could get the TEXAS Grant by being the 
first to show up, so it was like we were rewarding who got in line first more than 
we were being smart with our money. 
 
Limited resources generated interest in determining the most efficient use of available 
funds.  If the state could not support all eligible students, developing new criteria to select 
those most qualified would allow for targeted support of those most likely to succeed.  
An elected official elaborated on factors driving the bill: 
SB 28 in 2011 was a priority for the Legislature due to the consistent inability of 
the state to fully fund the TEXAS Grant program so that all eligible students 
would receive this financial aid.  Some, like the Texas Higher Education 
Coordinating Board, began to argue that if the Legislature did not fully fund the 
program, then they should fund it in the most efficient manner possible by first 
awarding grants to the most promising students. 
 
Rather than continuing to ask for full funding of the program, the budget reality 
persuaded state agency staff that it was more realistic to focus on a narrower group of 
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eligible students.  These students would be most qualified for aid and most likely to 
graduate and enter the workforce, making investing in their education a better payoff for 
the state if resources were limited. 
 Population and enrollment growth compounded budgetary challenges.  The 
Closing the Gaps plan for 2000-2015 set goals for increasing college participation, and 
the state was making strong progress: statewide enrollment in public higher education 
increased by over 600,000 students during that 15-year period (Texas Higher Education 
Coordinating Board, 2016e).  That success meant student need was outpacing state 
resources.  The student population was growing, but the budget was not – and college 
costs were higher as well.  An advocacy organization participant reflected on the 
declining purchasing power of TEXAS Grants:  
TEXAS Grants used to pay the entire cost of attendance, right?  But as the cost of 
attendance has skyrocketed, we had to make a choice, and we dropped that back 
to say well, we'll just cover tuition and fees, and we covered tuition and fees until 
2011, and then we said we can't afford that anymore. 
 
Although the size of TEXAS Grants had shrunk over time, institutions were required to 
compensate for this decline by providing institutional aid to TEXAS Grant recipients to 
cover the balance of the statewide average for tuition and fees.  Essentially, in order to 
maintain consistent support for students, the state shifted a portion of responsibility for 
the state program over to public institutions.   
With demand increasing relative to supply, SB 28 emerged primarily because 
Legislators and the Coordinating Board sought more efficient use of limited state funds 
for TEXAS Grants.  Advocates – particularly the Commissioner, Coordinating Board, 
and bill authors Senator Zaffirini and Representative Branch – argued that the dollars 
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available should be put to use in a way that allowed the greatest impact.  This view 
aligned with the state’s conservative political culture and business mindset, as discussed 
in Chapter Four, and resonated with policymakers’ interest in limiting spending while 
maximizing benefit to the state.  A legislative aide explained: 
I think the Higher Education Coordinating Board brought it up initially, and the 
concern was, we've got this TEXAS Grants program, but you never fund it 
enough, so we can never give a TEXAS Grant to all of the students that need 
them.  Since you're not going to fund it enough, we should be as smart as possible 
with the money and try to get the best return on investment.  So therefore, we 
should set up a system where, if there's a shortage in funding for the available 
students, the eligible students, we should first give it to the students that have the 
most promise for success.  That way, we're not throwing bad money away…since 
we don't have it to throw away. 
 
Similarly, another aide commented that the state was looking to “get the best bang for the 
buck.”  A state agency participant described the process as identifying a way to “target 
the money so as to have the greatest impact on producing baccalaureate degrees in the 
state.”  As these statements demonstrate, stakeholders at the Coordinating Board and 
Legislature focused on maximizing resources and translating dollars into graduates who 
could go to work for the Texas economy.  Adjusting eligibility criteria for the state’s 
largest financial aid program offered a reasonable response to the budget environment 
and growing student population.  An elected official commented: “I thought it had an 
element of common sense.”   
Outcomes and metrics.  SB 28 also became a priority because of lackluster 
graduation outcomes for TEXAS Grants recipients.  Given budget constraints and 
concern for return on investment, policymakers were interested in increasing the success 
rate of students who received state funds.  An elected official commented, “You can’t get 
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a TEXAS Grant for six, seven-year attendance… You know, we need to give that grant to 
the next person who doesn’t have enough money.  It’s not designed to be a social stipend.  
That’s important.”  As this member expressed, the Legislature was not in the business of 
subsidizing inefficient time to degree – or of no degree.  If resources were too limited to 
fund all eligible students, then for every student who received a grant but did not 
complete, another student more likely to finish might have foregone higher education 
because of financial constraints.  If TEXAS Grants did not pay off, the opportunity cost 
affected other students.  A financial aid leader explained:  
TEXAS Grant recipients were not posting high graduation rates…there was this 
sense that we're – it's a bad investment if we invest grant money in a student who 
doesn't ever graduate, because then we don't get the college educated person we 
were trying to help create for the state….  And so what they wanted to do was 
restructure the program in such a way...that the money would first and foremost 
go to students who met certain criteria that predicted their ability to graduate. 
 
Another financial aid officer recalled that retention and graduation rates played a role in 
the evolution of SB 28: “You know on time graduation, that was a big thing…that was 
the big push.  Get them in and get them out.”  Shorter time to degree meant lower cost to 
the student, lower cost to the state, and quicker entry into the workforce.  This interest in 
efficiency aligned with the state’s business mindset discussed in Chapter Four; higher 
education students, institutions, and even the state’s need-based financial aid program 
should operate based on business principles.  A legislative aide articulated this well: 
You…had an environment where the pressure was on to show that we're using our 
tax dollars in a way that's going to target those dollars to those that are most likely 
to succeed.  And from [Commissioner] Paredes' perspective, and the Coordinating 
Board generally, there was data and research that shows that we can predict 
through high school GPA, through SAT scores, whatever other metrics were in 
the Priority Model...  these students are going to be more successful than others.  
We're not going to cut off everybody, but we're going to prioritize those students 
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that have done better on these measures.  That's what the bill is all about. 
 
As this participant expresses, the state was concerned about efficient use of resources and 
saw the opportunity to make a decision – informed by data – that would prioritize 
funding for students most likely to succeed and ensure those students would receive 
funding amidst cuts. 
 Adjusting metrics also allowed the state to present a scenario in which it met a 
greater portion of eligible students.  A few participants expressed a more cynical view of 
how this contributed to the Priority Model; while recognizing the budget climate, they 
suggested that the Coordinating Board and Legislature both preferred a situation in which 
the majority of students qualifying for aid received support from the state.  From this 
view, the Priority Model adjusted the definition of “need” to allow the state to support 
more “needy” students.  An advocacy organization participant shared: 
You know, part of the issue is the way you look at TEXAS Grant need….  people 
at the Coordinating Board started thinking, we need to show that we're meeting 
more of that need, so we're going to figure out what the TEXAS Grant need 
is…instead of what the whole universe could be.  So…that was another reason to 
kind of clamp down, I think, to ration it, is so that the need doesn't look so great, 
because there's a – there was a fear that the Legislature would be unhappy that 
they were meeting so little of the need. 
 
Similarly, a financial aid leader explained that as the purchasing power of TEXAS Grants 
declined over time and more and more students qualified by completing the 
recommended high school curriculum, the state realized it was unable to sustain the 
program’s growth.  This participant paraphrased, “[The Commissioner] said well, I think 
we can create some eligibility criteria that will cut down the number of eligible TEXAS 
Grant students…so we can still fully fund the program, but we'll just fund it for fewer 
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students.”  Another advocacy organization participant described the Coordinating 
Board’s recommendations to the Legislature: “every session seems to be, how do we 
further constrict this program so we can say we’re funding 85% of eligible students as 
opposed to saying we’ve got this problem out here, a demographic.”  Since it was 
unlikely the state could improve students’ graduation behavior through the TEXAS 
Grants program, they could “target it to students who would probably otherwise attend 
and graduate,” as another advocacy organization participant commented, in order to 
improve efficiency and outcomes.  While some viewed these tactics with skepticism and 
felt they shifted funding around to improve data points, nearly all participants described 
the emergence of the Priority Model as a practical and reasonable solution to an issue of 
supply and demand. 
Participants also commented that the addition of academic eligibility criteria to 
the state’s need-based aid program appealed to conservative legislators.  Some of these 
members heard from constituents in high-performing high school districts who expressed 
concerns about the limited availability of TEXAS Grants for their children.  An advocacy 
organization participant suggested:  
Clearly what led to it was a push amongst more conservative members to say, 
what I'm hearing from constituents from the suburbs of Dallas or the suburbs of 
Houston is, there's no financial aid for my kid.  We don't qualify for Pell.  I'm 
tired of taking loans out.  Why is this state program not more accessible to my 
students, my constituents? 
 
While SB 28 did not remove the primary requirement of demonstrating significant 
financial need, some participants argued that the priority metrics might give the upper 
hand to students from slightly more affluent communities or better-resourced schools.  
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This made the bill appealing to legislators with suburban constituencies who were closer 
to the margin of need-based aid and concerned about sending their children to college.  
The Coordinating Board, the primary force originating and advancing the idea of the 
Priority Model, recognized conservative lawmakers’ interest in merit as a political 
opportunity to increase support for the program.  A state agency participant explained 
that emphasizing merit “would help [conservative lawmakers] become more invested in 
TEXAS Grants and making sure that it is adequately funded.”  So while prioritizing 
limited funds was in part the result of a budget reality, it was also a shift that aligned with 
many members’ predispositions toward incentivizing achievement and rewarding hard 
work.  By framing the need-based TEXAS Grants program this way in a conservative 
political environment and constrained budget climate, the Coordinating Board could 
generate support for SB 28 and the Priority Model and ultimately to help preserve 
funding for the program because it aligned with members’ values.   
In addition to appealing to conservative interest in merit, the program also 
generated support from some Democrats who saw the value in narrowing eligibility to 
protect the TEXAS Grants program from further funding reductions.  One such elected 
official commented: 
I think one of our greatest challenges as a society is growing income inequality… 
I see college affordability is a way of making sure that more underrepresented 
students, minorities and lower income students have access and support complete 
their education.  I was a part of the Priority Model passage as an attempt to 
protect TEXAS Grants from further cuts.  I saw the strength in the rhetoric and 
the policy rationale for prioritizing students who were more college ready. 
 
Others on the left vehemently opposed the Priority Model out of concern that it would 
unfairly disadvantage students of color, those from underserved communities, and others 
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whose access to educational resources was more limited.  I will discuss the politics 
surrounding these concerns and the development of the bill in Chapter Six.  Ultimately, 
however, the state’s overarching interest in return on investment and graduation 
outcomes contributed to SB 28’s genesis as a policy solution to address affordability in a 
constrained budget environment.   
Policy entrepreneurship.  The leadership of two influential individuals, 
Commissioner of Higher Education Raymund Paredes and Senator Judith Zaffirini, 
played a pivotal role in moving SB 28 to the top of the higher education policy agenda.  
Their collaboration with one another, and with stakeholder groups they convened, 
allowed the Priority Model to become a policy solution that responded to the budget 
constraints of the state, the daily reality of financial aid offices and institutional needs, 
and the interests of diverse legislators and constituents. 
Commissioner Paredes.  Participants consistently mentioned Higher Education 
Commissioner Raymund Paredes’ role as the originator of the Priority Model effort.  
Paredes initiated the idea of restructuring the TEXAS Grants criteria to incorporate merit 
as well as need and established this approach as a key priority for the Coordinating 
Board.  He began advocating for a version of what became the Priority Model several 
Legislative sessions prior, in 2007, but was met with resistance from institutions 
concerned about jeopardizing the allocations they received to support students through 
the program, and from Democrats and minority caucus leaders who felt the proposals 
would disadvantage underrepresented and underserved students with more limited 
educational resources.  A legislative aide explained Paredes’ long-term commitment to 
   
136 
the “need plus merit” idea: 
In the same way that Outcomes-Based Funding…has been the top of Paredes' 
agenda for the past two Legislative sessions, Priority model was that issue back in 
2011.  Because he had tried in 2009 and went down in flames, and I think even in 
2007.  So in 2011, it was the third time to try it, and he was determined.  It was a 
big deal to Paredes, and Zaffirini and Paredes have always had a cordial 
relationship.   They respect each other, and…she made it clear…that she wanted 
to find a way to make this work if we could get a coalition on board that would 
support the bill. 
 
Paredes strategically enlisted the support of Democratic Senator Judith Zaffirini to carry 
the bill in the 2011 session, his third attempt at passing the policy.  Zaffirini was a highly 
respected legislator and advocate for higher education issues and served as Chair of the 
Senate Higher Education Committee, allowing her to influence the policy agenda in a 
direction favorable to the bill.  Zaffirini’s involvement eased some of the concerns 
institutions had expressed in 2007 and 2009.  A government relations leader recalled: 
I think initially when we heard of the changes we were concerned that it may have a 
negative impact on us, but one of the things I can say is Senator Zaffirini, who 
authored that bill, is very good about working with the institutions of higher 
education, especially in determining what the impact of her legislation is going to 
do to those institutions.  She is a big champion of higher ed; she's always been a big 
champion of higher ed. 
 
Institutional leaders trusted Zaffirini to protect their interests, and as bill author, she was 
able to mold the policy in a way institutions could support.  During the interim prior to 
the 82nd Session, Paredes and Zaffirini created working groups of various stakeholders to 
design a more palatable model and to build a coalition around the bill Zaffirini would 
carry.  An elected official recalled, “This was a priority of the Commissioner’s and…you 
know he had – he had struggled to get the first version passed, I want to say twice.  And 
so he was certainly more willing to listen.”  Listening proved critical; in this third attempt 
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to pass a “need plus merit” amendment to TEXAS Grants, collaborating with the higher 
education community strengthened the policy and increased support from legislators who 
might have heard concerns from institutions in their districts. 
 Paredes and Zaffirini also invited and responded to feedback on the policy 
proposal, including expert stakeholders in the Priority Model’s development process.  A 
financial aid officer reflected: “And so he did listen to our suggestions for changing 
it…the Priority Model was actually a result of many conversations….I think over the 
course of a year or two…and it was much better than what their original proposal was.”  
By engaging widespread stakeholder support, Paredes and Zaffirini were able to build a 
coalition around the concept of the Priority Model and to produce a proposal with wider 
support than previous attempts in 2007 and 2009.  A state agency participant commented, 
“This was something that the Commissioner just kept pushing with members in his 
speeches, and you know, his addresses to different constituency groups, different 
stakeholder groups.”  The Commissioner’s leadership, along with the invaluable support 
of a key member of the Legislature in Senator Zaffirini, generated strong momentum 
behind the policy idea that would become SB 28, and eventually law.   
 Senator Zaffirini.  Participants often credited Senator Zaffirini with leveraging 
her skills and influence to craft the best possible policy and recruit bipartisan support.  As 
a Democrat and as Senate Higher Education Chair, she held a role that obligated her both 
to her party and to the priorities of the state.  Democratic Representative Donna Howard 
carried a version of the Priority Model in 2009, and participants described how 
Representative Howard was “thrown under the bus” by her own party because of concern 
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from more liberal members that incorporating merit into the need-based program would 
disadvantage minority and lower-income communities.  Zaffirini’s role as chair, and her 
careful work adjusting the policy after its failure in 2009, allowed her to achieve greater 
success with her bill the following session.  Her authority in higher education issues and 
respect as a longtime member of the Legislature attracted attention to the policy and 
encouraged those who had been deterred by previous versions of the bill.  A state agency 
participant explained the impact of her involvement and leadership: 
I mean…to have a Zaffirini stand up in the Senate and say, I support this.  This is 
my bill, and I worked hard on this: huge.  And that was the difference.  Because 
Zaffirini I don't think was very supportive of it in 2009, but we worked very 
closely with her, what are your concerns, how can we do this? 
 
In addition to her credibility and authority as Chair, other members and stakeholders 
listened to Zaffirini because she, too, had been a critic of the previous bill and was able to 
address shared concerns during SB 28’s development.  A legislative aid described her 
important role: 
I applaud Z and her leadership.  I think she showed – she could have very easily 
taken the, I'm a Democratic Chair, I'm going to make sure I respond to these 
populations or these stakeholders that are more traditionally in line with the 
Democratic Party.  She didn't.  She said, no, she was like, we're going to take – if 
the data shows that's where it's going, then that's where we're going to go. 
 
Zaffirini saw the Commissioner and Coordinating Board’s budgetary and outcomes-
focused rationale for the policy, and was committed to developing a workable solution.  
She and her staff worked intensely with the Coordinating Board and stakeholders to make 
the policy something that met her own high expectations and satisfied the concerns of 
institutions and many Democrats.  Before and after filing her bill, Zaffirini formed a 
bipartisan workgroup of legislators, staff, and advocacy organization representatives such 
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as the Mexican and Latino Caucus and NAACP.  She worked through this group to fine 
tune and agree on metrics that would not disadvantage certain student groups.  
Ultimately, another legislative aide commented:  
It didn't have the negative impact, which was great, which was the idea…But the 
fear of it was enough that you were going to get opposition by – I mean, first of 
all, you don't want opposition from, you know, large minority groups.   It's just 
not fair to, you know, ignore their concerns, right?  Especially when they're in 
your own party. 
 
While Paredes promoted the policy statewide through the Coordinating Board, Zaffirini 
worked through channels at the Capitol to address the concerns of her Democratic 
colleagues.  As another legislative aide acknowledged: “Zafarini, she ultimately – we 
probably wouldn't have been able to pass it without Democrat buy-in, without their help.”  
Zaffirini and Paredes invoke Kingdon’s (1984) concept of policy entrepreneurs, 
channeling their political capital into promoting a policy agenda and effectively aligning 
their policy solution with the problem stream related to budget constraints and outcomes.  
Their combined influence demonstrates the power of adept and respected policy 
entrepreneurs in a political environment filled with many statewide stakeholders, 
interests, and concerns. 
 These three forces – the budget, concern for outcomes, and political leadership – 
played a key role in advancing the Priority Model.  After two unsuccessful attempts to 
gain support for previous versions of the policy, the state’s budget constraints, political 
interest in graduation outcomes, and the skillful leadership of two key policy 
entrepreneurs coalesced to bring SB 28 to the surface of the policy stream in the 2011 
82nd Legislative Session.   
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House Bill 700: The B-On-Time Loan Program 
 House Bill 700, considered by the 84th Texas Legislature in 2015, sought to repeal 
the Texas B-On-Time Loan Program previously established in 2003 alongside 
deregulation of tuition.  That program provided zero-interest student loans, forgiven if 
students graduated in four years and a B average.  Representative Helen Giddings, 
Democrat of DeSoto, authored the bill and Senate Higher Education Chairman Kel 
Seliger, Republican of Amarillo, sponsored the bill in the Senate.  HB 700 prohibited the 
Coordinating Board from providing any new B-On-Time loans beginning in the fall of 
2015, allowing only loan renewals after that time.  Rather than returning tuition setaside 
funds to the Coordinating Board to finance the program statewide, institutions would 
retain those funds to support their own financial aid efforts (HB 700, 2015).   
 House Bill 700 emerged as a result of multiple complex factors.  Three key 
themes emerged across participant interviews: (1) concerns with the program’s funding 
mechanism; (2) challenges with program utilization and promotion, and (3) 
misinformation and misunderstanding of the program’s design.   
Funding mechanism.  Most participants attributed efforts to end B-On-Time to 
concerns with the way in which the program was funded: tuition set-asides, a portion of 
tuition from students returned to the Coordinating Board to be allocated to institutions 
throughout the state.  Antipathy toward set-asides had grown in recent sessions, 
particularly as a result of former Senator, later Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick’s vocal 
opposition to the practice.  During the 81st Legislative Session in 2009, then Senator 
Patrick passed a bill requiring institutions to notify students of the amount of their tuition 
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that was set aside to support financial aid for other students.  This bill, Senate Bill 1304, 
generated more widespread concern about the use of tuition revenue to support financial 
aid.  A state agency participant explained: 
I think that the drivers of that – you know this was something that the Lieutenant 
Governor had been personally interested in, this issue of tuition set-asides, when 
he was the Senate.  There were I think members…hearing from constituents who 
were concerned that they were paying for their child's tuition and some portion of 
that was being, in their views, diverted to other students.  And so that’s where I 
think some of the baseline concern came from….  There were certainly groups out 
there that were…advocating for the repeal of set-asides. 
 
Another state agency participant shared similar reflections: 
 
I remember when the bill passed that you had to send – notify students how much 
of their tuition bill went towards paying financial aid for other students.  We 
would get angry calls …we could get nasty letters.  It was nothing compared to 
what the institutions got.  I mean, it was – and I know that was why it was done. 
 
These and most other participants viewed set-asides as among the primary issues 
generating concern with the B-On-Time program and contributing to the filing and 
movement of HB 700.  The previous participant suggested that legislation in 2009 
requiring institutions to disclose set-asides to students intentionally set the stage for 
subsequent repeal of the practice because it generated alarm from students and families, 
who communicated with their legislators.  Although this funding mechanism was 
designed to support B-On-Time at public institutions without using state appropriations, 
the redistributive principle ultimately concerned lawmakers.  Former Senator Patrick’s 
political influence as Lieutenant Governor enabled him to draw attention to set-asides and 
to establish their elimination as a priority for the state. 
Financial aid, government relations, and higher education leader participants 
commented that set-asides were far from unique to higher education, and with or without 
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the formalized practice of funding B-On-Time in this manner, tuition from some students 
would continue to offset the cost for students whose families could pay less.  Regardless, 
the interest in repealing tuition set-asides made the B-On-Time program a political target.  
A participant shared: “That was really what got Representative Giddings upset, for her 
specifically, and wanting to do this.  She did not like the fact that tuition from these 
students was going over here.  She felt like that wasn't fair.”6  Giddings was not alone in 
her views, and the bill attracted support from others who, while they might advocate for 
financial aid, did not agree with the way this particular program was designed.  An 
elected official explained:  
My biggest problem was the fact that those were financial aid dollars that [a 
specific institution’s] students were paying into through tuition, and then they 
were being used elsewhere in the state, when we have a lot of need at [this same 
institution], and the same could be said of every other – nearly every other school 
in the state. 
 
This particular concern – antagonism with tuition set-asides as a funding mechanism – 
had little to do with the program itself and its goals, benefits, and outcomes.  To many 
policymakers, this element of the program’s design outweighed the value of the financial 
aid program it supported and became a primary driver of legislation to abolish the 
program as a whole. 
Utilization and promotion.  Participants cited several key concerns regarding the 
program’s utilization and impact across the state.  Beyond fairness to the individual 
students who subsided their peers, policymakers and some institutions expressed 
concerns that the program was unfair to institutions because while all public schools 
                                                 
6 The role and category of this participant have been removed upon request to protect anonymity. 
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returned set-asides to fund the program, some institutions were better able to utilize the 
allocations they received back from the Coordinating Board.  Institutions with a larger 
proportion of full-time, first-time students were more likely to provide the loans because 
their students were more likely to earn forgiveness.  Regional schools, those with a 
greater share of part-time students, those with more effective and experienced financial 
aid offices, and schools with lower four-year graduation rates enrolled fewer students 
who could maximize the program, and therefore felt they were contributing more through 
set-asides than they and their students were benefiting in return.  A participant from an 
advocacy organization described how this frustrated institutions, and in turn the 
legislators with those schools in their districts: 
So you have some schools offsetting more tuition than they get back.…Some 
schools don’t have that many students [participating] but everybody gets their 
tuition offset.  And that’s just the way it is unless [the Legislature is] going to 
fund it through appropriations.…There are some schools that send in more money 
than get back, but that’s because they don’t have that many students eligible for 
B-On-Time loans…and those schools are angry.  They'd rather keep that 5% on 
campus to spend on their own financial aid campus based programs. 
 
This participant’s comments allude to a sentiment others also expressed: regional schools 
felt they were subsidizing loans for students at more selective institutions with more 
traditional students, and perhaps also more affluent students.  At the same time, students 
on their own campuses needed financial aid.  With constrained financial aid budgets, 
institutions that felt unable to maximize B-On-Time allocations preferred the flexibility 
to use set-aside funds for their own programs.  An elected official articulated similar 
disapproval with the design: 
It did not treat similar students similarly…so what would happen is the revenue 
that…was being derived from fees from one institution’s students was…being put 
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into a statewide pot and getting distributed to other students…They were cross 
subsidizing.  And I had a problem with that.  The cross subsidization was really 
being driven by how aggressive an administrative department was pushing the 
given program.  And I don't think that's a really good justification for taking 
money from one group of students and giving it over to another.  It also did not 
recognize that you know there were students that were making good grades, 
making high marks, but had family obligations and had to work and couldn’t 
graduate in four years. 
 
This participant expressed both concerns with fairness to individual students who 
contributed, as well as fairness to the institutions funding the program.  These concerns 
were bipartisan; Republicans and Democrats alike opposed the practice of subsidizing 
students at other campuses.  Belying the traditional theory that Democrats are more 
generous to financial aid programs, the author of HB 700 to end B-On-Time was herself a 
Democrat.  The bill’s sponsor in the Senate was Chairman Kel Seliger, a Republican, 
which demonstrates the bill’s bipartisan support. 
 Policymakers were also aware that the program was problematic to administer.  
Federal regulations on student loans made it difficult to promote; as a result, B-On-Time 
was consistently underutilized and its dedicated account accumulated sizable balances.  A 
government relations leader commented: “You really couldn’t advertise it, so students 
didn’t know it existed…. there was this big pot of money sitting there that nobody was 
able to use.”  In an environment focused on efficiency and return on investment, balances 
and unused aid funds attracted concerns.  Institutions and the Coordinating Board argued 
that promoting the program was difficult because of the broad federal preferred lending 
regulations that applied to B-On-Time, which the government categorized as a private 
loan even though it was managed by the state.  A financial aid leader explained: 
The law was written in this very broad way to say, institution cannot promote or 
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endorse or package any private loan, and private loan definition is so broad as to 
include state loans – anything that wasn't a federal loan.  Well, that law is still in 
place, and tended to act as a gag rule on institutional administrators.  And 
therefore, there were students who weren't aware of the B-On-Time program.  
Weren't aware that they could go in and ask for it by name.    
 
In order to advertise the program, institutions had to maintain a preferred lender list of 
three or more loan providers and include B-On-Time on that list.  However, many 
financial aid offices were hesitant to maintain a preferred lender list because they were 
suspicious of many private loans.  In addition, several years prior, financial aid leaders at 
UT-Austin were charged with and found guilty of accepting bribes from some of these 
private lenders – an event that ultimately contributed to the more stringent federal 
legislation.  This environment made financial aid offices in Texas wary of maintaining 
preferred lender lists, and without such a list, they were unable to include and promote  
B-On-Time among other options.   
These challenges around promoting the program exacerbated concerns about the 
program’s fairness to different institutions.  Aid offices might choose to promote the 
program in different ways depending on whether they maintained a preferred lending list, 
and schools that were more effective at promoting the program ultimately absorbed more 
of the set-aside dollars.  With limitations on promotion, awareness of the program often 
occurred by word of mouth.  Broader access schools with more first-generation or 
underrepresented students were concerned that institutions with more academically 
prepared or middle class students were more likely to know about the program through 
their peers and high school networks, further perpetuating the uneven distribution of 
borrowers across institutions.  Compounded with the fact that the program’s funds were 
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derived from an unpopular set-aside practice, these obstacles to promotion and utilization 
of B-On-Time increased momentum to discontinue the program.  As a legislative aide 
summarized: “Because it was so underutilized every year, [Legislators] would be like 
well…so why do we have this program if we're just leaving money on the table?”  
Misinformation and misunderstanding.  The rise of this bill to discontinue  
B-On-Time also resulted from confusion and inaccuracy about the program itself.  
Participants explained that this misinformation extended to many legislators, including 
the author of the bill, and to constituents and even institutions.  One advocacy 
organization participant expressed frustration with inaccuracies in data presented at 
legislative hearings on the bill: 
But I remember going to the hearing – the House Higher Ed hearing, and 
[Giddings] got up, when she presented the bill – it was funny, because there were 
some financial aid directors there….  And after the – after she gave her 
presentation, the – a couple of financial aid directors came up to me and said my 
God, she didn’t get anything right.  And I’m like I know, she didn’t get anything 
right.  She doesn’t know what she’s talking about. 
 
Participants shared that Giddings and others misunderstood the difference between how 
B-On-Time was funded at private and public institutions and were unaware of 
administrative changes that had corrected for institutions receiving more allocations than 
they contributed.  Financial aid participants argued that the Legislature’s limited 
understanding of financial aid, administration of the program, and the value of B-On-
Time to Texas students generated misplaced antagonism toward the program A financial 
aid leader explained how this lack of awareness led to interest in ending, rather than 
fixing, the program: “We could even go back to you know them…not being financial aid 
aware – awareness, you know.  They weren’t aware of the – of how [we] had a procedure 
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for doing that….”  Another financial aid leader corroborated, “I think Giddings was very 
misinformed…I was shocked at the things that she was saying and what she thought was 
what happened with B-On-Time, because it wasn’t true.”  While leaders such as these 
testified against HB 700 and sought to educate the Legislature about B-On-Time, those 
efforts met with little success in deterring the rise of the bill.  Several legislative staff 
reflected on collaborating with financial aid leaders to provide better information to the 
members, but described the momentum against the program as difficult to reverse.  A 
legislative aide recalled: 
By the time that, you know, [Giddings] was making these arguments about how 
it's not fair, I had these spreadsheets from the Coordinating Board.  [Texas 
Southern] was actually using it.  They were using all their set-aside for it.  So they 
weren't even like an odd man out.  They weren't even losing money to other 
universities.  But the myth sort of persisted.  And so between the set-aside issue, 
the, you know, inequity issue of subsidizing other schools… 
 
This participant, and others, identified misinformation about B-On-Time utilization by 
Texas Southern University, in the bill author’s district, as a catalyst for antagonism 
against the program.  A state official shared: “It was misinformation about Texas 
Southern and about the fact that Texas Southern's students were putting some 
astronomical amount of money into the program and…their students were only getting 
about 1/10 or 1/5 or I forget what the number was.”  Financial aid leaders and state 
agency participants felt the politics surrounding components of B-On-Time 
overshadowed interest in valuable elements of the program itself, such as the success of 
many of its borrowers, its value to middle class students who had limited access to other 
financial aid programs, and its potential to be improved rather than eliminated. 
 Lastly, this theme of misinformation and misunderstanding also included 
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administrative errors in the management of the program.  The participants who addressed 
this issue were vague about the details of what occurred, but indicated that the 
Coordinating Board had misappropriated allocations from one institution to another, or 
from public institutions to private institutions – which were funded separately, through 
general revenue in the state budget.  A legislative aide explained, “I think additionally 
there were some mistakes – you know kind of way deep inside baseball.  There were 
some things that occurred at the state agency that caused some problems with B-On-Time 
and its allocations to the institutions.”  Concerns about program management did not 
encourage the Legislature to look more favorably on its continuation, and also served to 
perpetuate misunderstandings about how the program actually operated.   
 HB 700, therefore, arose due to a variety of complex factors – many of which 
were political in nature and leave much to discuss in the following chapter.  An elected 
official summarized the bill’s cause this way:  
HB 700… was the unfortunate result of a confluence of circumstances, including 
misperceptions about the program's efficiency; consequences of previous budget 
decisions; and antipathy toward the funding mechanism, tuition set-asides, that 
supported it and other forms of financial aid. 
 
While this bill certainly affected college affordability by eliminating a student aid 
program, its impetus and goals were more related to policy design and politics than to 
interest in promoting financial aid as a priority for students. 
Senate Bill 1735: Hazlewood Tuition Exemption 
 Senate Bill 1735, considered during the 84th Legislative Session in 2015, sought 
to amend requirements for the Hazlewood benefit, a tuition exemption program for 
veterans that in 2009 was expanded to include veterans’ dependents through Senate Bill 
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93, the Hazlewood Legacy Act.  Authored by Senator Brian Bridwell, a decorated 
military veteran and Republican representing Waco, the bill was sponsored in the House 
by Representative John Zerwas, a Republican representing the Katy area and also the 
Chair of the House Committee on Higher Education.  Birdwell’s bill would have required 
eight years of residency by veterans prior to utilizing the benefit, in addition to those born 
in Texas; required six years of military service in order for a veteran to pass on his or her 
exempted hours to a dependent; establish a 15-year time limit on use of the benefit after 
the veteran’s end of service; and maintained the 120 credit hour maximum a veteran 
could pass on to a child, but limit use of legacy exemptions to undergraduate programs 
only.  The bill passed the Senate and a highly amended version passed the House, but the 
bill died in conference committee and ultimately did not become law. 
Of all three cases, Senate Bill 1735’s causes were perhaps the most 
straightforward to identify.  The primary drivers of this legislation, according to an 
overwhelming majority of participants from all stakeholder groups, were misinformation 
about the potential impact of the Hazlewood Legacy Act in 2009; subsequent changes in 
utilization of the benefit, and the overarching legal context of a pending federal court 
case concerning the Hazlewood program. 
 Misinformation.  When the Legislature voted to extend Hazlewood benefits to 
veterans’ dependents through Senate Bill 28 in 2009, their decision was based on data 
indicating that the policy change would have no fiscal impact.  In retrospect, participants 
acknowledged that this assessment was inaccurate and poorly reasoned.  The Hazlewood 
program was unfunded by the state, save a small endowment that provides minor support 
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for program; higher education institutions were required to absorb these veterans’ tuition 
and fees.  Prior to the passage of the legacy bill in 2009, higher education stakeholders 
described the program as manageable because participation in the benefit was modest.  
When Senator Leticia Van de Putte filed SB 28, the required fiscal note provided by the 
Legislative Budget Board was based on the status quo and did not anticipate program 
growth – or the enormous surge in utilization of these benefits by veterans’ dependents 
that ultimately followed.  A government relations participant elaborated: 
They asked the institutions what’s the impact here, what is the potential impact to 
your institution.  We all came back and said it will be minimal.  You know I think 
we now realize that we had no idea what was going to happen in terms of the 
floodgate of students who this would apply to.  But more importantly, we had no 
reason to think that it would be that large because the actual Hazelwood 
exemption that pertains to the veteran is not that large. 
 
While the institutions’ estimates proved inaccurate, higher education stakeholders argued 
that their projections were realistic based on past experience with the program; they had 
no way to anticipate what would occur.  A state agency participant recalled: 
At the time, nobody really I think anticipated or understood the numbers….  They 
asked us for projections.  How many students do you think would this – no idea.  I 
mean, well how many kids and how many – I mean, it's literally picking numbers 
out of the air.   Well, let's just assume every veteran has 1.2 kids, I don't know.  
There's just no way to project something like that.  And so our projections were 
just way off, because we're pulling numbers out of the air.  I mean, we're trying to 
make it rational, but there's, you know, just – it was just something you really 
couldn't wrap your arms around. 
 
As these reflections indicate, higher education institutions and the state agencies involved 
– the Higher Education Coordinating Board and Veterans Commission – were unable to 
assess or anticipate how expanding the program to veterans’ dependents would impact 
utilization.  The Legislature, in its eagerness to support veterans and their families, passed 
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a bill based on estimates that proved vastly incorrect.  An elected official stated: 
But in defense of the Legislature – and I voted for the particular aspects that's 
caused the Hazlewood benefit to grow – is the dollars that were purported to be 
accurate to us from the Legislative Budget Board were not accurate at all, clearly.  
And the universities have continued to bear an ever-increasing amount of tuition 
loss as a consequence of this. 
 
Participants indicated that this vote would not have proceeded as it did had the 
Legislature relied on different information, particularly given the state’s interest in cost 
containment and aversion to spending increases.  According to a legislative aide, “I think 
that the Legacy program would never have passed if somebody – I mean they were given 
the information when they made the vote that it wasn’t going to cost any more money.”  
These comments from various stakeholder perspectives demonstrate the resulting 
confusion, frustration, and difficulty of assigning or accepting responsibility for the data 
and decision that was made when the Legacy Act passed.  Regardless of how that 
assessment occurred, the outcome was a bill that ultimately cost higher education 
institutions a dramatic and unanticipated amount of money.  Participants attributed the 
rise of SB 1735 in 2015 to the Legacy Act’s passage based on poor data. 
Utilization.  The total amount of Hazlewood tuition exemptions grew from $25 
million in 2009, when SB 93 was passed, to $169 million in 2014 before the 84th 
Legislative session in which SB 1735 was filed.  Leading into the session, dependents 
comprised over half of all program beneficiaries – meaning more children of veterans 
used the benefit than veterans themselves (Legislative Budget Board, 2014).  Clearly, this 
dramatic increase did not align with the projections institutions and state agencies 
provided to the Legislative Budget Board when the Legacy Act was considered and 
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passed in 2009.  As a government relations leader explained: “We're talking about a 
number of kids the size of the University of North Texas.  We're talking about a whole 
university of students.  That's not one more.  And that whole – there is actually cost 
associated with that many more.”7  The University of North Texas enrolls over 36,000 
students; over 36,000 legacy Hazlewood students now participate in the program and are 
exempted from tuition and fees.  This participant explained how on an individual student 
basis, universities were able to manage the absorbed cost of serving one student in a 
program, or a class – but with the program’s growth, that was no longer the case.  
Another government relations participant elaborated on the need for a policy solution: 
So I think the idea behind why all of a sudden is this becoming an issue, it's 
because all of a sudden the cost has become out of control.  And so the presidents, 
the institutions, we just had to finally come forth to the Legislature and say look 
this is what the cost is and if you can't find it we’ve got to figure something out.   
 
Institutional concerns were a primary driver of SB 1735’s development as a policy 
solution because the effect on their budgets had become unmanageable.  Universities 
realized they were unable to accommodate the program’s growth without legislative 
action, and sympathetic legislators began to explore options to address the growing cost.  
As government relations, institutional, and system leaders communicated about the issue 
to their legislators, they were able to generate broader attention to the growing issue. 
Public universities in areas with higher concentrations of veterans and their 
families were particularly vocal because they absorbed the tuition and fee costs from a 
greater share of Hazlewood students.  A state official explained that the program 
                                                 
7 The role and category of this participant have been removed upon request to protect anonymity. 
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disproportionately affected “Institutions like UT-San Antonio, where you have a huge 
veteran population…the institution isn’t that lavishly funded to begin with… [and] UT-El 
Paso, because you’ve got a large population of people who were once associated with 
Fort Bliss.”  Elected officials heard and responded to institutions’ concerns, and many 
sympathized with the financial climate they had played a part in creating.  One member 
of the Legislature, in a facetious tone, summarized the impact of the unfunded Legacy 
Act on universities in this way: “[So] if you’re a university with a very large share of 
veterans or children of veterans, then you know good luck to you.  You’re going to have 
to figure it out.  And all the other students on your campus have to pay more.”  This 
member, and others, recognized that the effects of the program’s growth not only 
intensified financial pressure on institutions, but also increase the cost to other, non-
Hazlewood students.  Another elected official acknowledged: 
The ironic thing… it's an awareness that when we passed something without good 
numbers in '09, we basically imposed a mandate on the universities, which they 
had to pass on to others in terms of increased tuition and so forth, that we 
basically created a program that was not sustainable.  Whether it was an unfunded 
mandate or not, we created a program that we couldn't support anymore.    
 
Institutions were particularly constrained because the state’s wariness toward tuition 
increases made it difficult to offset the Hazlewood tuition they were absorbing.  The 
growth in utilization affected universities’ overall budgets and meant the cost to educate 
and support Hazlewood students was distributed across others paying tuition – an effect 
that worked against the state’s interest in keeping tuition costs down.  An advocacy 
organization leader commented: 
It's in many ways a very significant unfunded mandate at a time when, rightly so, 
there's a lot of pressure on the publics to justify tuition increases.  But it's 
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sometimes…tough to go to committee hearings where public university presidents 
or chancellors are being criticized for tuition increases, and yet we have all sorts 
of waivers and exemptions that have been required by the Legislature, and this is 
a significant one….Hazlewood has a very significant impact, and will have as it 
grows and becomes more known... 
 
This participant articulates the complex dynamics surrounding the rise of the Hazlewood 
cost issue and its impact on higher education institutions within the broader context of 
college affordability.  The growth in Hazlewood exemptions corresponded with growing 
pressure to keep tuition low, but works counter to that priority because the influx of 
students and forgone revenue contributes to cost increases.  As participants often noted, 
other students essentially paid Hazlewood students’ tuition; all public university system 
boards of regents voted to increase tuition for 2016-2017, many for the first time in 
several years (Watkins, 2015a; 2015b).  Hazlewood increased affordability for some 
students, but rapid growth in program utilization without funding from the state 
ultimately increased the cost for others.  With the increase in utilization, institutions and 
lawmakers mobilized to develop SB 1735 as a policy solution. 
Legal proceedings.  While inaccurate data resulted in massive program growth, a 
looming court case exacerbated concerns about the sustainability of the Hazlewood 
program.  In May 2014, a veteran University of Houston law student from out of state 
sued over the Hazlewood requirement that veterans have enlisted in Texas in order to 
receive benefits.  The U.S.  District Court ruled in his favor in 2015, but Texas appealed 
the decision (Legislative Budget Board, 2014).  Approaching and throughout the session 
in which SB 1735 was considered, the state awaited a decision from the 5th Circuit Court 
of Appeals.  A verdict upholding the lower court’s ruling would obligate Texas to extend 
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the benefit to all eligible veterans, regardless of their residency at the time of enlistment.  
With Hazlewood growth already far exceeding 2009 projections, these legal proceedings 
generated concern that the program would expand even further.  The impending legal 
decision motivated higher education institutions, the Coordinating Board, and Legislature 
to elevate Hazlewood as a priority for the 2015 Legislative session.  Participants 
speculated that the court might find the entire program unconstitutional if they concluded 
that it would not have been established without the residency requirement.  An elected 
official explained the potential impact of the case: 
It would expose every other university to a kid from Arkansas, Oklahoma, you 
name it, to file suit under the same pretense…you [would] have this new precedent 
that says the state of Texas must give free tuition to every veteran who establishes 
residency in the state of Texas, which only takes one year.  And if you're one of 
those veterans that's already done it and you don't want to use your benefit, but you 
want to give it to your kid, what does that mean?…Just with how we are currently 
structured, we're going to reach about a half a billion dollars in exempted tuition 
that the non-Hazlewood student will have to make up… I don't know of anything 
growing at that rate at the federal government, and there's nothing in state 
government growing at that rate.  Not even Medicaid is growing at that rate. 
 
As these comments demonstrate, Hazlewood was unsustainable even without a ruling 
against the residency requirement – but it would reach a crisis point if the court struck 
down the restriction to enlistment in Texas.  The court case elevated tension surrounding 
the Hazlewood program and made addressing the program’s growth and design a time-
sensitive issue.  A state agency participant commented: “The court case created I think a 
bit of an opportunity for supporters of Hazlewood reform to say hey, things are bad now 
but we have this looming crisis and if we don't do something now, this benefit is going to 
become unaffordable.”   
With this legal uncertainty in the background, Senator Birdwell and Chairman 
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Zerwas framed SB 1735 as a way to protect the program in advance of a court ruling that 
could be disastrous for the program.  An advocacy organization participant summarized: 
“The court case had changed the environment, creating sort of this impending thing, 
where there’s this fear of you have to fund all these people who come to Texas.”  In their 
own words, these participants describe what Kingdon (1984) calls a policy window – an 
opportunity for policy change as a result of a crisis or dramatic shift in the environment.  
Harris v.  Cantu (2015) created a policy window that Senator Birdwell and Chairman 
Zerwas sought to leverage with SB 1735; without it, the bill might not have risen to the 
surface because it dealt with the sensitive emotional and political issue of support for 
veterans.  A policy advisor explained: “If it’s precedent setting or if it blows the whole 
thing up or if – because we need a crisis in order to do something.  You need a crisis in 
order to make substantive change.” 
Summary and Discussion 
 These findings identify several primary themes contributing to the rise of each 
policy as a solution to the complex challenge of addressing college affordability.  Senate 
Bill 28 (2011), the TEXAS Grants Priority Model, developed due to budget constraints, 
concern for graduation outcomes and student performance metrics, and the policy 
entrepreneurship of the Commissioner of Higher Education and Chair of the Senate 
Higher Education Committee.  House Bill 700 (2015), addressing the B-On-Time Loan 
program, stemmed from issues with its funding mechanism, challenges with utilization of 
the funds set aside for the program, and misinformation and misunderstanding about the 
program’s design.  Senate Bill 1735 (2015), regarding the Hazlewood tuition exemption, 
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resulted from inaccurate data projections, massive utilization growth and unsustainable 
costs to institutions, and the uncertainty of a pending court case that could further expand 
the size and scope of the program.  For each case, interviews and documentary analysis 
pointed to clear problem streams that shaped the rise of these policies.   
 The issues contributing to these bills convene around several key areas: the 
budget, information, and utilization.  Each policy’s course through the policy stream 
resulted from policymakers’ interest in these areas.  In addition, institutional participants 
expressed concern about the effects of each program across different institutions – the 
equity or inequity with which it served different colleges and universities across the state.  
These institutional voices played an important role in elevating each policy as a solution 
to challenges with these programs. 
 The budget arose more often than any topic across all interviews; unsurprisingly, 
given that the Legislature’s primary responsibility, and in fact the only responsibility they 
must fulfill each session, is to develop and pass a biennial state budget.  With the budget 
as an overarching critical priority, policymakers generally framed their views of each 
issue around its effect on costs to the state.  These bills all rose to the surface because 
legislators identified a potential way to better utilize budget resources, or because of 
concerns for how a program’s growth might affect the state’s bottom line.  Senate Bill 28, 
addressing TEXAS Grants, proposed a more efficient use of the program’s funding in 
order to prioritize the most qualified students and maximize graduation outcomes.  Senate 
Bill 1735, addressing the Hazlewood program, sought to curtail the rapid increase in cost 
to state institutions out of concern that they, let alone the state, could not afford to sustain 
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the program’s growth.  Interestingly, only Senate Bill 28 dealt with a program for which 
the state actually appropriated funds through the budget: TEXAS Grants, though some 
saw the bill as a way to rationalize disinvestment in the program.  Hazlewood maintained 
a small and ultimately insignificant endowment, but was widely viewed as an unfunded 
mandate.  Institutions funded B-On-Time through their own tuition set-asides, although 
private institutions did receive general revenue appropriations for the program.  Indeed, 
participants suggested that institutions carried financial responsibility for B-On-Time and 
Hazlewood because the state was unwilling to make either program a priority in the 
budget.  The influence of the budget, budget constraints, and cost containment as 
priorities driving each of these bills demonstrates how cost and return on investment 
remain the primary interest of policymakers, even when the state’s own resources are not 
dedicated to the affected program. 
 Findings regarding all three bills also reveal the role of information, or 
misinformation, in driving the policy stream.  Higher education scholars such as Perna 
and Finney (2014) have recognized Texas as a data-rich and data-driven state; this 
study’s findings, however, reveal that the data driving higher education policy decisions 
may not always be accurate.  This was the case for Senate Bill 1735 and House Bill 700 
in particular: inaccurate projections of Hazlewood utilization contributed to a 
misinformed policy decision on the Legacy Act in 2009, and participants indicated that 
the author of HB 700 based her argument against the B-On-Time program on 
misinformation about its operation and utilization.  Senate Bill 28 alone presents an 
example in which the state’s use of data to design and advance a policy proved effective, 
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as the Coordinating Board and policymakers were able to identify a financial aid 
eligibility model that would not negatively affect access to students of color.  Reporting 
required by the passage of SB 28 indicated that the Priority Model did not significantly 
change the ethnic distribution of TEXAS Grants (Texas Higher Education Coordinating 
Board, 2016d).  For HB 700 and SB 1735, however, the use of inaccurate information in 
the policy process demonstrates the fallibility of data, even in a data-driven environment, 
and alludes to the potential for data to undermine rather than enhance policy decisions 
when it is inaccurate or manipulated.  I will further discuss the role of data in my analysis 
of the political stream shaping the outcomes of these bills in Chapter Six.   
 Each of these bills also responded to the need to manage program utilization in a 
way that was most efficient and effective – even if the state did not itself fund the 
program.  Senate Bill 28 developed as a way to maximize limited resources, creating an 
additional layer of eligibility requirements that would target higher-achieving students 
and increase utilization of the program by those most likely to graduate.  House Bill 700 
responded to lackluster and unequal utilization rates across the state and the resulting 
accumulation of unused funds.  Both bills sought to improve the return on investment of 
state and institutional resources, again demonstrating the pervasive business mindset and 
budget emphasis of Texas political culture.  Finally, Senate Bill 1735 resulted from 
enormous and unanticipated growth in program utilization – to the extent that institutions 
were increasingly unable to sustain the exemption on their own.   
 Perhaps the great irony of the drivers behind these three bills is the role the state 
itself played in contributing to its own problem stream.  To support B-On-Time, the 
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Legislature established a tuition set-aside funding model that avoided allocating general 
revenue through the budget.  These tuition set-asides ultimately became a divisive policy 
and political issue.  Considering Hazlewood, the Legislature expanded the program by 
extending benefits to veterans’ dependents, but provided no funding to offset the cost to 
institutions.  That program became unsustainable as financial pressure on institutions 
intensified.  Both programs struggled to fulfill their purposes of forgivable loans and 
tuition exemptions because of previous funding decisions, and ultimately returned to the 
Legislature’s table for reconsideration. 
 In the case of each bill, institutions voiced concerns that influenced the policy 
stream.  While Senate Bill 28 began with the Commissioner and Coordinating Board, 
institutional pushback and feedback in previous sessions and during the interim shaped 
the proposal that became the Priority Model.  Institutions were concerned the model 
would disadvantage those that served fewer students meeting the preferred criteria, but 
were able to help craft a model that would ensure no change to institutions’ allocations.  
House Bill 700 emerged in part due to some institutions’ argument that their students 
were not benefitting from B-On-Time to the degree that they contributed – particularly 
regional institutions with fewer students likely to graduate in four years and qualify for 
forgiveness.  Institutions voiced their concerns about the growing cost of Hazlewood 
exemptions to the Legislature, and participants attributed the issue’s rise in prominence to 
communication from institutional leaders.  While Texas law prohibits public higher 
education institutions from lobbying the Legislature, they may – and clearly do – voice 
their interests by testifying on bills and communicating with legislators.   
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 This study’s findings on the influence of higher education institutions in shaping 
the legislative agenda reinforce and expand previous research by Tandberg (2008; 2010a; 
2010b) and Tandberg and Ness (2011) on the role of higher education institutions as 
interest groups.   While Tandberg’s quantitative analyses showed a positive relationship 
between the strength of a state’s higher education lobby and increases in appropriations 
and capital expenditures, the findings discussed here show that higher education 
institutions can contribute to legislative agenda setting more broadly and without the 
formalized power to lobby.  Without the concerns institutions voiced about the growing 
cost of Hazlewood, challenges and perceived inequities of the B-On-Time program, and 
concerns with previous proposals of the TEXAS Grants Priority Model, it is arguable 
whether these issues would have reached the agenda and resulted in the proposal of SB 
1735, HB 700, and SB 28.   Even without formalized lobbying power in Texas, 
institutional concerns contributed to the momentum surrounding these three policy issues.    
It is particularly relevant to note that Tandberg (2010a) found higher education 
institutions to be more effective when multiple institutions lobbied independently.  The 
Texas higher education landscape involves many systems and institutions, each with their 
own government relations efforts and priorities.  Because of this context, Texas presents 
a valuable example of decentralized, independent advocacy efforts that in this case 
proved effective in generating attention to issues affecting many, if not all, institutions.  
Building on the quantitative foundation provided by Tandberg and colleagues, this study 
offers new, qualitative context and localized depth to the role of higher education 
institutions in voicing their concerns and shaping policy higher education policy 
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priorities.  In the chapters that follow, I examine the extent to which this early influence 
on the legislative agenda amounted to sustainable influence throughout the policymaking 
process.  Tandberg (2008; 2010a; 2010b) and Tandberg and Ness (2011) show a positive 
effect of higher education interest groups on policy outcomes for appropriations and 
capital expenditures; this study may shed light on whether institutions can, in specific 
cases, effectively move the legislature to consider and pass financial aid policies. 
The policy stream discussed in this chapter also reinforces previous research on 
the role of economic factors in shaping higher education policy.  SB 28, HB 700, and SB 
1735 all emerged in part from underlying concerns about government cost containment 
and the return on investment of state aid programs.  This common theme across all three 
bills echoes research by Lowry (2001), Doyle (2006), and Dar (2012), all of whom found 
that both economic and political factors were relevant to higher education funding.   
While financial concerns motivated all three policies, the budget constraints shaping SB 
28’s emergence in particular support work by Delaney and Doyle (2011), who tested 
Hovey’s (1999) balance wheel hypothesis and found higher education funding more 
susceptible to recession funding cuts than other state budget areas.  By strengthening 
merit requirements for TEXAS Grants in order to maximize limited resources, the 
narrative around SB 28 also supports Doyle’s (2006) conclusion that economic context is 
a strong predictor of merit aid policy adoption. 
This chapter has examined the context and dynamics contributing to the 
emergence of three policies related to college cost in Texas.  These bills addressed three 
distinct aid programs and potentially three different types of Texas college students: 
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TEXAS Grants serves low-income students with need-based aid, B-On-Time promotes 
merit and timely graduation through forgivable loans, and Hazlewood offers veterans and 
their dependents access to higher education free of tuition and fees.  Ironically, while 
each bill addressed financial aid and tuition, the goals of each policy focused as much, if 
not more, on budget management and return on investment than on college affordability.   
In the following chapter, I discuss the role of the political stream in shaping each of these 
policies and their final outcomes. 
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Chapter Six: The Political Stream 
 While budget and program concerns shaped the policy stream forming each bill, 
Kingdon’s (1984) political stream also played a significant role in the life cycle of these 
policies.  This chapter will examine how politics affected the development and outcomes 
of Senate Bill 28 (2011), House Bill 700 (2015), and Senate Bill 1735 (2015).  My 
purpose is to illuminate how the contents of the political stream interacted with the 
problem and policy streams to produce the ultimate results of each bill: successful 
passage for SB 28 and HB 700, and demise for SB 1735.  I again use quotations from 
participant interviews and primary source documents to present these findings.  
Following individual analysis of each case, I conclude with a summary and discussion of 
patterns and themes across these bills, as well as their relevance to existing literature. 
Senate Bill 28: The TEXAS Grants Priority Model 
As discussed in Chapter Five, Senate Bill 28 in 2015 rose through the policy 
stream as a result of budget constraints, concern for graduation outcomes, and the 
leadership of two effective policy entrepreneurs.  In addition to these policy catalysts, 
two key currents in the political stream influenced the bill’s trajectory: partisan concerns 
about the effects of the proposed Priority Model, and the effective coalition building of 
the bill’s author, Senator Zaffirini, as a policy entrepreneur. 
Partisanship.  Participants acknowledged that at its core, the Priority Model was 
a conservative concept resulting from, and appealing to, Republican influence in the 
Legislature.  A state official commented: “Frankly, you have to be cognizant of the 
political environment that you work in…in a Republican dominated Legislature, [you] 
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have more success getting higher levels of funding for financial aid if [you] put that merit 
component in there.”  Republicans were more likely to support the Priority Model 
because it rewarded hard work and improved return on investment, rather than 
distributing aid solely based on need.  As the Legislature grew increasingly conservative, 
views on financial aid shifted along with it.  TEXAS Grants remained the state’s largest 
aid program and was available only to students with financial need, but the state budget 
had not kept pace with enrollment growth.  The state was no longer able – or willing, in a 
conservative budget environment – to allocate funding broadly without devising a 
method of identifying some students to prioritize.  A financial aid leader explained: 
There was kind of an initial promise in the state of Texas that TEXAS Grant was 
going to cover tuition and fees for students that qualified.…And it was quickly 
realized in some respects that you can't sustain that program that way.  Unless 
you're going to really apply money into it as more of an entitlement kind of 
approach.  And while that was, I think, the idea from Democrats, that certainly 
isn't the direction that Republicans would go.  I mean, they tend to avoid 
entitlement programs.  So that conservative base I think helped shape where 
TEXAS Grant went, to where it's become a much more manageable cost program 
for the state, and not one that has increased at the same rate as tuition and fees.   
 
In this way, declining funding for TEXAS Grants relative to the eligible population and 
shrinking awards to support more students at smaller amounts were emblematic of the 
state’s rightward shift the effects of that trend on government programs like financial aid.  
Population growth and budget constraints ultimately produced a divide over the best path 
forward: Democrats would prefer to fund the program more extensively, while 
Republicans would prefer to ration funds.  The Priority Model represented the latter 
approach, and as a result appealed to Republicans and concerned Democrats.  For 
Republicans, it was a reasonable solution; for Democrats, it could too easily lead to 
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continued program cuts and too much need unmet.  An advocacy organization leader 
explained: “You saw many Republican members, particularly in the Senate, some in the 
House, argue…that if we only have so many dollars…why would we spend dollars on the 
student that we don’t think is going to complete?”  Republicans in particular wanted to 
see a return on investment for their state funds, and the Priority Model would more 
closely align funding with students more likely to graduate.   
 A few participants noted the underlying racial dynamics of the Priority Model.  
With an increasingly conservative state and growing Tea Party competition in general 
elections, Republican members had to pay attention to their most likely primary voters: 
primarily white middle class Texans.  A policy advisor explained those voter interests: 
What do they want? They want Johnny from Westlake High School to be more 
eligible for this than a kid from Mission, Texas down on the border.  Is it racist? 
Nah, I wouldn’t call it racist.  What I would call it is, you know, appealing to their 
enlightened political interests.  Just because that kid down there can’t vote for me.  
And you know, even the poor Hispanic kid in my district, whose parents are 
Democrat, they don’t vote for me either…So if we’re gonna be spending money, I 
want to be spending money on my kids.  The people who vote for me. 
 
The electoral politics of these moderate and conservative members’ districts meant that 
Republicans were more likely to support a policy that would improve their constituents’ 
chances of receiving financial aid before anyone else.  Relatedly, a legislative aide noted 
how the politics around financial aid extended beyond party and into issues of race: “So 
it's really interesting.  It's not [just] Democrat or Republican…. there's a lot of – sort of a 
racial component.”  Legislators were looking to the constituents most likely to help them 
secure reelection, and in a red state, those mostly likely to vote were often white middle 
class Texans rather than low-income Hispanic families.  The confluence of the Priority 
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Model’s conservative approach to rationing funds based on merit, combined with the 
electoral politics of Republican members in an increasingly conservative state, made SB 
28 a relatively easy sell to a Republican legislator. 
 Alternatively, many Democrats were vocally opposed to narrowing or prioritizing 
TEXAS Grants eligibility criteria.  Democrats had expressed significant concerns with 
previous iterations of the Priority Model.  These concerns emerged most visibly in 2009, 
when with the Coordinating Board’s support, Democratic Representative Donna Howard 
authored House Bill 3276, which would have awarded TEXAS Grants first to students 
(demonstrating financial need) who were most qualified based on Texas Success 
Initiative (TSI) indicators of college readiness.  After heated debate and amendment, the 
final bill required only a study of TEXAS Grants eligibility criteria by the Legislative 
Budget Board and subsequent report to the Governor.  The failure of this policy effort 
reveals the partisan dynamics at play in the Priority Model’s development, even prior to 
SB 28 and the 82nd Session.  Representative Howard was heavily criticized by colleagues 
in her own party for proposing a policy change that could negatively affect low-income 
and underrepresented students.  Howard represented an affluent, mostly white district in 
Austin, and other Democrats turned against her for betraying their party’s commitment to 
equity and broader funding of the need-based program.  Opposing Democrats argued that 
adding a merit component would disadvantage students of color in poor high schools and 
widen existing racial inequities in education.  An advocacy organization participant 
recalled the opposition spearheaded by Representative Sylvester Turner, a Black 
Democrat from Houston: “Poor Donna Howard.  She tried to do a Priority Model of her 
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own – there was a House bill…I mean [Representative Turner] had his own party in the 
House turn on Donna Howard, and it was ugly.”  
The backstory of HB 3276 reveals that debate over a Priority Model broke down 
within as well as along party lines.  Most Democrats wanted to push for more funding 
overall, and Republicans sought to prioritize the most academically eligible students – 
but some Democrats, like Howard, were more willing to support an early version of the 
Priority Model if it seemed the most realistic response to budget constraints.  Other 
Democrats felt betrayed by this view.  A state agency participant recalled: “And so 2009, 
a lot of resistance.  [Democratic Senators] Ellis, West…they were going to blow it up.  
They said, there’s no way, this will never, don’t even – but we made a push for it.”  A 
legislative aide added: “It was seen as going against poor students, minority students…it 
was tough, and it was pretty political.”  These politics were not only “R vs. D,” but also 
Democrats against themselves. 
After this divisive experience in 2009, Democrats entered the 82nd session in 2011 
concerned about the Coordinating Board’s persistence with the Priority Model.  Minority 
lawmakers in particular opposed the bill due to its potential to further disadvantage 
students of color.  The original 2011 proposal required the use of SAT scores as a metric, 
and this component attracted criticism because of data indicating students of color were 
less likely to be well prepared for standardized tests.  An elected official explained:  
As I recall, the debate there was that if you’d have prioritized the SAT score, 
there would have been a lot of pushback from the Democratic Party, certainly the 
minority community because they would see that as a metric that wasn’t fair, that 
was biased. 
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From the perspective of these Democratic legislators, efforts to narrow the criteria for 
TEXAS Grants ran counter to the program’s basic purpose to provide broad need-based 
aid.  An advocacy organization participant paraphrased similar concerns within the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund and Mexican and Latin 
American Coalition: 
You have to acknowledge…that [the Legislature is] doing this because you don't 
want to fund TEXAS Grants, because it's, you know, politically convenient for 
you to not fund TEXAS Grants… So if there's not the political will to…make sure 
that they have a fair shot when they're in college, then that leads to having to 
create all these other policy justifications and rationales…I think it was very 
concerning to MALDEF and MALC and others to hear about merit-based 
processes interjecting themselves in a need-based system.  It was concern about 
how much would that play out and exacerbate some of the existing inequities 
within the system. 
 
This participant, and others, described the Priority Model as a way for conservative 
legislators to avoid fully supporting a program they had originally created to fund 
students based on need.  It represented a lack of concern for students who were 
underserved and underrepresented, and whose backgrounds might not have prepared 
them to meet merit requirements at the same level as more privileged peers.   
 Democrats and higher education stakeholders were also concerned about the 
Priority Model because they suspected it was not Commissioner Paredes’ idea, but 
Governor Perry’s.  Perry’s reform agenda for higher education concerned many higher 
education stakeholders who felt quality would suffer under cost constraints and 
productivity measures.  Some minority members also expected Commissioner Paredes to 
advocate for need-based aid to support students of color, since the Commissioner himself 
was Hispanic from El Paso, an area in the Border region with a higher Hispanic 
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population and lower educational attainment and income relative to the rest of the state 
(Greater Texas Foundation, 2011).  Critics felt the Commissioner had betrayed that 
identity in favor of the Governor’s agenda.  A state agency participant explained:  
It was primarily the Hispanic and African American members.  Yeah.  And they 
were – they were upset.  They were really upset with the Commissioner that he 
would propose such a thing, because they – I think a lot of them thought that this 
was being driven by Governor Perry and so politically, they saw Commissioner 
Paredes as Governor Perry’s man.  What they didn’t realize was it was the 
Commissioner’s idea and Governor Perry supported it.  You know, he thought it 
was good, it was a good policy. 
 
The political currents against the bill, particularly from the left, posed an impediment to 
its progress through the Legislature – yet SB 28 unanimously passed the Senate Higher 
Education Committee, received only one vote against in the House Committee, passed 
the Senate 28 to three and the House 143 to one.  Many participants attributed its 
eventual success to Senator Zaffirini’s effective coalition building with Democrats and 
higher education stakeholders.   
Senator Zaffirini as a policy entrepreneur.  While the leadership of both 
Commissioner Paredes and Senator Zaffirini drove the emergence of the Priority Model 
as a policy proposal, participants consistently attributed the actual bill’s evolution and 
passage to the skills and political capital of Senator Zaffirini.  As the author and owner of 
the bill, Zaffirini was able to build a diverse coalition of stakeholder groups and solicit 
input around the Commissioner’s concept of the Priority Model.  Participants described 
how she used her relationships, reputation, and legislative expertise in higher education to 
facilitate the development of a bill that eased concerns from institutions and constituent 
groups.  A legislative aide described her strategy:  
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Literally there was a work group.  Z set up a work group and met on several 
occasions and I know [Senator] Royce West was in there, and there was probably 
some House members in there.  [Representative] Joaquin Castro carried it, and so 
you know, he was a good liaison to all the House caucuses, like the Mexican and 
Latin American Caucus and everything like that, to make sure we all kind of were 
in agreement, got on the same page. 
 
Senator Zaffirini was strategic in the members she invited, making sure to include key 
Senate and House voices and groups who had expressed concern about the policy.  
Rather than driving a hard line on a certain interpretation of the policy, she was clear in 
communicating that her goal was to author a bill based on input from those who had 
expressed concerns, herself included.  Another legislative aide commented on the 
Senator’s leadership of her staff as part of this effort:  
She just said, start a conversation, let them know that I'm working with the 
Commissioner, and that I'd like to see Priority Model passed, if we can get an 
agreement on how this is going to work, and if we can agree on what those 
metrics ought to be…she wanted to achieve, if at all possible, a consensus from 
stakeholders that we could do this, here's the right way to do it, and if so, then Z 
was going to carry the legislation.    
 
Participants shared that Zaffirini’s credibility with stakeholders from both parties and the 
higher education community encouraged skeptics of the initial proposal to convene and 
participate in developing a model around which consensus was feasible.  After several 
prior attempts to pass similar legislation adding a merit element to TEXAS Grants, many 
Democrats were wary of the concept – but with strong Democratic leadership, and a 
minority leader at that, concerned stakeholders took time to listen and consider.   
Participants suggested that Zaffirini chose to lead the bill because it was 
controversial, and she herself was concerned about its outcome.  A legislative aide 
commented that Zaffirini tended to adopt legislation she felt might have a negative 
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impact if handled without caution.  Her interest in this bill focused on ensuring the best 
possible version became law: 
She likes to pass good legislation…. It might have been one of those bills where it 
looked like it was going to move anyway, so she wanted to have control over it, 
so that she could make sure it wasn't harmful…She's going to listen to other 
Democratic senators, and other minority – she's a minority too.  And so it was an 
important concern. 
 
As this comment indicates, Zaffirini’s concern for the interests of higher institutions and 
students and her identity as a highly effective minority legislator inspired other 
stakeholders to participate in crafting a palatable Priority Model.  A state agency 
participant commented that “It helped to have her on our side…it really helped to have 
her I think author the legislation, to give those groups some comfort.”  Zaffirini’s 
inclusive tactics provided a voice to stakeholders concerned about the bill’s impact on 
their constituencies, such as the NAACP, Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund (MALDEF), and Mexican and Latin American Coalition (MALC).   
The language many participants used in describing Zaffirini’s strategy and role 
portrayed her as a bridge-builder.  With nearly three decades of experience in the 
Legislature and a high success rate with bills she authored, participants explained that 
Zaffirini had earned the respect of Republicans as well as of Democrats and minority 
leaders.  They felt this position allowed her to bring both groups to the table – 
figuratively as well as literally, given the work group she convened – to achieve 
bipartisan support for the bill, even when Democrats had expressed persistent and vocal 
concerns about the issue.  Her role as Chair of the Senate Higher Education Committee 
placed her in a position with the authority to establish priorities and set the agenda for the 
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committee, and her strong relationships with both Commissioner Paredes and Lieutenant 
Governor David Dewhurst strengthened her influence and credibility.  While maintaining 
the support of these key state leaders, she also remained committed to representing her 
Democratic and minority colleagues by ensuring them a voice as the Priority Model 
evolved.  A state agency participant commented: “Ultimately, you know we got some 
members who embraced it and really saw it through.”  Zaffirini led this effort, and her 
coalition building proved critical to cultivating bipartisan support.  After two previous 
attempts to amend the program to add priority criteria, her leadership in the 2011 
legislative session shifted the political dynamics of the policy stream and made it possible 
for previous opponents to participate and come to a compromise. 
 Zaffirini’s leadership facilitated several key changes to the bill that broadened its 
base of support; the bill that passed did not precisely mirror what the Coordinating Board 
had proposed, or what the Senator had filed.  First, while earlier proposals from the 
Coordinating Board, namely Howard’s HB 3276 in 2009, would have determined priority 
eligibility based on standardized test scores, SB 28 used a structure in which students 
qualified for priority by any two of four criteria.  Senator Zaffirini worked in 
collaboration with stakeholders and the Coordinating Board to develop this model during 
the interim prior to the session; it was intended to provide flexibility and avoid 
disadvantaging students who might perform less capably in certain areas due to a variety 
of preparatory and background factors.  Second, the bill – by way of amendment – 
required the Coordinating Board to issue an annual report on TEXAS Grants allocations, 
disaggregate by institution, race, ethnicity, estimated family contribution, and whether 
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they met Priority Model criteria.  These two changes sought to address Democrat and 
minority group concerns about disparate impact on students of color.  Reporting would 
identify any such effect and allow for adjustment to the policy.  An elected official 
described compromises on the bill: 
The compromise bill granted priority consideration to eligible students who met 
two of four criteria chosen to be predictive of future academic success….  We 
included a requirement that the Coordinating Board report to the Legislature 
regarding any impact the bill would have on students of a particular race, 
ethnicity, or socioeconomic status so that we could ensure the Priority Model did 
not have a negative impact or undermine the primary function of TEXAS Grants 
as a need-based financial aid program. 
 
As this participant explained, adjustments to the policy were carefully tailored to the 
concerns and interests of stakeholders involved in the process.   
Zaffirini’s coalition also emphasized the use of data to support policy decisions 
affecting students: data informed the metrics selected, and data would continue to inform 
whether the policy was effective.  Data helped to ease the concerns of those who viewed 
the proposal as uninformed and inequitable policymaking.  Another legislator reflected 
on developing consensus around the metrics as rational and well informed: 
The way we ultimately passed the metrics…we got a consensus because it made 
sense, because those students were more college ready, more likely to go to 
college, and that seemed to be a better metric than just whoever sent in their form 
first.  And there was still some pushback generally from the left, that this was 
somehow going to hurt the late bloomer, and our arguments were, wait, this just 
means that the way you put the queue in place is based on some evidence of 
readiness at the front of the line, and less evidence of readiness at the back of the 
line.   
 
The bill was also amended to prevent more selective institutions from capturing a greater 
share of TEXAS Grants allocations; institutions could only allocate TEXAS Grants in 
proportion to the number of first-year students met the financial need criteria for TEXAS 
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Grants need-based aid (an estimated family contribution of $4,000 or less).  This change 
addressed concerns from broader access institutions that felt their institutions would be 
disadvantaged because they enrolled a greater share of students who were less 
academically prepared for college.  Another elected official commented on engaging with 
the policy’s development: 
You could see an impact to – a change in the distribution of dollars across 
universities.  And potentially harming universities that have a mission of opening 
up their doors wide.  And so I always feel like it's important to understand where 
you are and how much real power you have.  And if you can't change the agenda 
of passing Priority Model, then get a part – be a part of the conversation and help 
to find the details to improve it.  And so in this way, I improved the TEXAS 
Grants model and was able to explain that policy change to other members of the 
equity coalition. 
 
Similarly, a legislative aide reflected: 
There were some things put in there that helped to mitigate some of the concerns 
of the members, the primary one being that students who would be eligible for the 
Priority Model, that wouldn’t change institutions’ allocations for TEXAS Grants.  
Meaning that the TEXAS Grant program would not be essentially swallowed up 
by UT-Austin or A&M, or Texas Tech or Dallas, where more affluent, often 
higher achieving students go.   
 
As these comments demonstrate, SB 28 ultimately represented a compromise that would 
achieve bipartisan support, adjust the program based on budget constraints, and increase 
graduation outcomes for TEXAS Grants recipients.  As a financial aid leader commented: 
“In order to get it passed, it kind of got watered down to a certain extent.”  The priority 
criteria were more flexible, and the allocations methodology protected institutions from 
losses in financial aid. 
In the end, as this financial aid leader commented, very little changed in the way 
the program was administered at the campus level; many students were already meeting 
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the Priority Model.  Republican advocates, such as House Higher Education Chairman 
Dan Branch, who sponsored the bill in the House, still saw SB 28 as a success.  
Advocacy organization leaders on the left were more measured in their enthusiasm; one 
participant reflected on the impact of minority and Democratic caucuses: 
You know, in the end we were able to alter a lot of what came through and 
improve it, but it's still not what we would have done if we were in power, right? 
If we were in power, the fundamental thing would have been how do we fund 
TEXAS Grants.  So instead of the conversation of how do we fund Texas Grants, 
which still hasn't happened, it's just a conversation of what do we do with what 
we have on the table. 
 
As this participant explains, these groups did the best they could to craft the most 
palatable option, even if a Priority Model was not their preference.  A similar perspective 
motivated Senator Zaffirini and other Democratic legislators to collaborate on the bill: 
recognition that with budget constraints and Republicans in power, it was better to 
participate in a moderate solution than agitate for goals that would seem unrealistic 
within the conservative political climate.  A news article quoted Zaffirini after the bill’s 
passage: “We had to be realistic… We prioritized to help the students who were most 
qualified to excel” (Dallas Morning News, 2013). 
House Bill 700: The B-On-Time Loan Program 
 As discussed in Chapter Five, the House Bill 700 policy stream responded to 
issues with the program’s funding mechanism, utilization, and data on its distribution 
across institutions.  In addition to these factors, participants described a political 
environment surrounding B-On-Time that increased the inertia around its demise by way 
of this bill’s passage; some suggested that the bill’s passage was more politically driven 
than policy driven.  An elected official summarized: “These political forces combined 
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were too much to overcome.”  Political currents shaping HB 700 centered around two 
key areas: conservative ideology and antipathy toward tuition set-asides, and power 
dynamics resulting from leadership changes in the Legislature.  
 Conservative politics.  B-On-Time’s funding mechanism, tuition set-asides, 
attracted vocal criticism from lawmakers who opposed the redistributive concept of one 
student’s tuition offsetting another’s.  The program was funded in this way to minimize 
cost to the state, but its policy design ultimately resulted in political backlash.  Set-asides 
were ideal model from a conservative budgeting standpoint – but not from a conservative 
perspective on individual responsibility.  As an advocacy organization participant 
explained, jokingly: “It’s a good model in this environment with a conservative 
Legislature…it’s just unfair.”  Similarly, a financial aid leader commented: “In the 
political environment that we're talking about, things like set-asides from tuition that only 
go to a subset of students automatically raise a certain concern for some legislators.”   
B-On-Time was politically handicapped by its funding structure.  A legislative aide 
explained how the politics surrounding set-asides undermined the program: 
For the publics, funding was tied to a set-aside, and set-asides have a very negative 
political connotation, particularly with the more conservative Republicans who 
have gotten elected in large numbers of the past couple of election cycles.  So, the 
fact that the funding source was a 5% set-aside on tuition bills really didn't help the 
situation. 
 
The Legislature’s rightward trajectory increased the influence of set-asides’ Republican 
critics.  The set-aside issue also provided campaign material that generated attention and 
concern, because few families wanted to pay even more for college in order to support 
another family’s student.  From a conservative perspective, these set-asides amounted to 
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a student tax – and Texas’s political culture was highly tax averse.  In a business-minded, 
merit-oriented state, many were skeptical of whether set-aside recipients had earned this 
assistance, which came at the expense of others who might be more meritorious.  An 
elected official explained the politics surrounding the set-aside practice: 
Some legislators strongly oppose tuition set-asides because they believe it forces 
wealthy students to subsidize the education of low-income students.  Because 
eliminating the B-on-Time program would eliminate 5% of existing tuition set-
asides, many members supported the move, even though they did not oppose the 
program itself. 
 
This comment reveals what many others suggested: that set-asides were unpopular 
among conservatives and those in wealthier districts because they amounted to shifting 
hard-earned resources to support lower income students.  This practice conflicted with 
the individualistic, traditionalist political culture of the state (see Gittell & Kleiman, 
2000).  A policy advisor summarized: “We don’t like tuition set-asides because 
somebody else is paying for somebody’s lunch.”  In a conservative, “pull yourself up by 
your bootstraps” – as several participants described – state political culture, paying extra 
to help another student was an unpopular concept.   
Participants recognized Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick as the most vocal critic 
of set-asides and the primary force behind a political movement to end the practice in all 
areas of government.  A participant8 explained: “I mean, Lieutenant Governor Patrick 
hates set-asides….and there are others with Lt. Gov. Patrick that think all set-asides are – 
you know, they don’t like the redistributive effect of it.”  Patrick had established set-
asides as a political priority during his time in the Senate; in 2009, his Senate Bill 1304 
                                                 
8 The role and category of this participant have been removed upon request to protect anonymity. 
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required institutions to disclose the amount of a student’s tuition set-asides on billing 
statements they received.  This policy directed attention to the issue and generated 
concern among constituents, and subsequently their representatives.  As noted in Chapter 
Five, participants credited this bill with laying the groundwork for the elimination of set-
asides.  Consequently, B-On-Time’s funding mechanism presented an opportunity for 
Patrick to further his agenda to condemn the practice.  A legislative aide noted, “Prior to 
becoming LiGuv, I think then Senator Patrick had major concerns with tuition set-asides.  
So being a tuition set-aside was one of the things that was implicitly under the 
microscope.” Another aide commented of the program: “It fell victim to the hatred of set-
asides.”  These statements, and others, reveal how B-On-Time became a politically 
charged issue because it was affiliated with another politically charged issue – tuition set-
asides – that had attracted the attention of an influential state leader.   
While the Lieutenant Governor and conservative Republican legislators offered 
the most outspoken criticism of set-asides, concern over the practice was also bipartisan.  
The bill’s author, Representative Helen Giddings, was a Democrat, as was her co-author 
Chris Turner.  The bill responded, in part, to complaints from institutions in Giddings’ 
district that their students were supporting others across the state.  Giddings and her 
bipartisan coauthors, which also included Republican co-authors Trent Ashby and John 
Zerwas, were particularly concerned about cross-institutional redistributive effects of 
these funds, since campuses, like students, differed in their needs and outcomes.  A 
legislative aide explained: 
There was the political kind of issue of it seeming to take – that the funds would 
be sweeped from other institutions…so kind of your Texas Southern…and I think 
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that that's where you had legislators and institutions say hey, this isn't 
fair…because they have different challenges than a UT or A&M student, and their 
funding is now being swept and given to these students.  That kind of got twisted 
and really politicized. 
 
This statement reveals the political dynamics of tuition set-asides at the institutional 
level, where some universities were concerned their students were supporting those at 
other, more selective institutions perceived as needing less support.  With regional 
institution Texas Southern in her district, Giddings was loyal to the needs of that 
university and concerned that students enrolled there were subsidizing students at the 
state’s flagship research universities.  The regional politics surrounding set-asides 
revealed inequities and competitive undercurrents across the state’s diverse and 
fragmented higher education system.  A government relations participant elaborated: “El 
Paso, San Antonio, and Houston…have the lowest four-year graduation rates in the 
state…Should they be charging their students to help other students on other campuses in 
other regions in other members’ districts?….It was kind of inevitable to fail.”  This 
comment underscores how set-asides were political not only at the Capitol, but also 
across institutions and campuses statewide.  Like the state’s political culture, the higher 
education culture also operated based on conservative and individualist ideals; 
institutions competed for resources and support. 
Because of the state’s ingrained political culture, legislators’ positions on set-
asides were more complicated than party lines.  Democrats, perhaps theoretically more 
likely to support redistributive social programs in a more progressive state, were also 
wary of set-asides because their constituents and institutions felt they were unfair.  
Democrats were more likely to criticize set-asides if the institutions in their districts felt 
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the system did not serve them – while Republicans generally opposed the practice of 
redistribution on principle.  The issue therefore provided common ground, as the 
bipartisan HB 700 demonstrates.  Participants also commented that despite concern over 
set-asides, the practice served an important purpose for financial aid: even if the 
mechanism itself was not ideal in design, the state was unlikely to appropriate revenue 
for B-On-Time or other aid programs funded through set-asides.  A policy advisor noted, 
“That’s a big pool of financial aid which we really, you know, don't have the money to 
replace somewhere else right now.”  While politically unpopular, set-asides were an 
established government and higher education practice that produced resources not 
available otherwise, and some policymakers found them more palatable for this reason.  
Those voices, however, paled in comparison to the force of Lieutenant Governor’s 
political agenda and the pervasive, conservative view of set-asides as unfair.   
Financial aid leaders, some of whom testified on the bill, generally supported the 
program and expressed disappointment with the overarching political ideology that 
contributed to the program’s demise.  One such participant reflected: 
It really unnerves me a little bit that we're in a place where wealthier people don't 
want to help out poorer people, which is – the tuition set asides are basically, you 
know, a portion of everybody's tuition is going towards need-based financial aid, 
and there are people out there that don't think that's right…. There are constituents 
out there that really have a hard time with their dollars going to help other 
students.   
 
Others financial aid participants commented that the Legislature could easily have 
addressed their own concerns with the program.  One explained: “It could have been very 
easy to fix…the institutions get an allocation equal to what they send in, or…don't even 
send the money in, just keep it on campus and tell us how much you have.”  Political 
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momentum against the program and strong bipartisan support prevented such an attempt 
to adjust the design.  With no political will to fund B-On-Time outright, and with 
overarching skepticism of its utilization and management, Giddings and HB 700’s 
supporters were more inclined to eliminate the program than fix its unpopular structure.  
Political antipathy toward set-asides ensured little resistance to their effort. 
 Leadership.  B-On-Time also fell victim to power dynamics resulting from 
leadership changes in the Legislature.  Dan Patrick’s rise from Senator to Lieutenant 
Governor elevated his political reach and provided him a “bully pulpit,” as one legislative 
aide described, by which to target set-asides and other pet issues.  Kingdon (1984) argued 
that leadership changes within the political stream shape the policy stream by shifting the 
distribution of power and direction of the agenda; other scholars have found policy 
change more likely after new state leadership (Tandberg & Anderson, 2012) and new 
leaders more likely to end programs associated with their predecessors (McLendon, 
Deaton, & Hearn, 2007).  B-On-Time provides a case in point of both Kingdon’s theory 
and research on the influence of such leadership changes.  The program’s demise through 
HB 700 followed a shift in gubernatorial leadership and subsequent changes in legislative 
committee appointments; as participants acknowledged, the Lieutenant Governor set a 
critical tone regarding higher education, and his committee appointments were politically 
obligated to align with his agenda in order to retain their roles.      
Following Dan Patrick’s defeat of incumbent David Dewhurst for Lieutenant 
Governor in 2014, Patrick assumed Dewhurst’s authority to appoint committee leadership 
in the Senate.  Former Lieutenant Governor Dewhurst had served in that role since 2002 
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and was seen as a positive advocate for higher education issues.  Dewhurst and Senator 
Zaffirini were close allies, as nearly all participants acknowledged, and Dewhurst had 
been a key supporter of the B-On-Time program when it was created in 2003.  Dewhurst 
appointed Zaffirini Chair of the Senate Higher Education Committee in 2011, a position 
she held until Dan Patrick gained appointment authority leading into the 84th Legislative 
session in 2015.  Prior to 2011, Zaffirini chaired the Higher Education Subcommittee 
from 2005 to 2009, before Dewhurst elevated Higher Education to full committee status 
in the Senate.  In 2015, Dan Patrick appointed Republican Senator Kel Seliger of 
Amarillo to chair the committee and removed Zaffirini from the committee entirely – a 
move many legislators and stakeholders received as a strong blow to higher education 
policymaking, given her longtime expertise and advocacy in that area.  This change 
created a dramatic shift in the power and politics surrounding higher education policy.   
With Dewhurst and Zaffirini effectively out of power, the path cleared for 
elimination of a program that had previously maintained the support of those two key 
leaders.  This power shift in the political stream created a policy window for critics of 
set-asides and those who sought to remove vestiges of prior leadership.  A state agency 
participant summarized: “I think ultimately it may have been just, you know, an internal 
political fight to get rid of a good program that Dewhurst and Zaffirini helped create.”  
Another state agency participant shared: “I’m not sure whether that would have happened 
had it not been for the shift in power…and what can be achieved during those time 
periods.”  Similarly, an elected official commented: 
And I think why – the reason why Representative Giddings' bill took off like it 
did and got a head of steam and passed is, I think, two things.  Lieutenant 
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Governor – former Lieutenant Governor Dewhurst, that was one of his babies.  
He and Senator Zaffirini, you know, were very proud of that product.  So I think 
with Dewhurst gone, I think that removed an obstacle to changing that program. 
 
As these comments demonstrate, participants openly acknowledged the influence of these 
political dynamics on the policy arena.  The new balance of power changed what the 
Legislature could accomplish.  An advocacy organization participant reflected: 
You know, on the political side…the bill sort of had an alter ego that was 
associated with Zaffirini…It was also tied to Dewhurst, who really lost political 
ground…particularly in 2012 when he lost the Senate election to…Cruz and then he 
lost the Lieutenant Governor position in…November of 2014.  So he was losing 
political ground, and B-On Time was always identified as a pet project of both 
Dewhurst and Zaffirini.  And it lost a lot of political support when the two of them 
lost their political cover.  So there was suddenly nobody with any real power 
standing up and being B-On-Time's champion.    
 
When Zaffirini sat on the committee, particularly as Chair, she was consistently able to 
support B-On-Time and shape the policy agenda around higher education.  In her 
absence, the program lacked an advocate.  One participant9 stated: 
I mean, she's still there, but she was very quiet this session.  So I think there were 
some that just saw it as a Lt. Governor Dewhurst program, and so it was easy to 
just get rid of Lt. Governor Dewhurst’s programs….  I don't think anybody was 
super attached to it to begin with, other than Lt. Governor Dewhurst and Senator 
Zaffirini, politically in that building.  I think those were the two that were attached 
to that.  Everybody else I think it was just kind of like, oh, whatever. 
 
The bill was sponsored in both houses by the new chairs of each committee – House 
Chairman John Zerwas coauthored with Representative Giddings, and Senate Chairman 
Seliger sponsored the bill in the Senate.  As with Zaffirini’s prior leadership, those 
positions imbued Seliger and Zerwas with significant political influence and agenda-
setting authority.  Zaffirini spoke on behalf of B-On-Time during deliberations on the 
                                                 
9 The role and category of this participant have been removed upon request to protect anonymity. 
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bill, but as participants shared, she understood the political environment and was realistic 
in her ability to counter the tide against the program.  A legislative aide explained the 
dramatic shift in Zaffirini’s power to support the program she had created:  
She spoke to speak, but she was not trying to mount a serious opposition, because 
she had no allies.  Nobody really cared at that point.  Yeah, if she was Chair, that 
bill would never even have gotten a hearing.  Actually, she would have gotten a 
hearing.  That's just her style…She would have made sure it didn't have the votes.  
There was really very little that [she] could have done, very little [she] could have 
done to stop it.    
 
Similarly, a policy advisor stated: 
Zaffirini used to be chair of the higher ed committee.  And now she’s not.  She’s 
not even on the committee.  She knows a lot about it.  She knows a lot about a lot 
of things, but she really knows a lot about higher ed….she’s not the chair 
anymore so you’ve got Seliger there, and leadership comes to Seliger and goes, 
let’s get rid of the B-On-Time program, and he goes, okay.  I don’t care.  And 
then Zaffirini goes, well I care, and he says, well you’re not on this committee and 
I’m the chairman and I’m gonna get this bill out and you can set yourself on fire 
on the Senate floor, that’s okay with me. 
 
The shift in power from Dewhurst to Patrick, and consequently from Zaffirini to Seliger, 
had a dramatic impact on the lifespan of B-On-Time.  Regardless of any resistance 
Zaffirini might have mounted, she lacked the political influence to counter the Chair and 
Lieutenant Governor. 
Nearly all higher education stakeholders, particularly those in financial aid, were 
openly disappointed and disillusioned by the role of politics in the program’s demise.  
They saw potential to fix B-On-Time, rather than eliminate it.  One such participant 
commented: “If [Zaffirini] had been in her position as Chair, it – I don't think it would 
have gone away.  I really don't.  I think it would have stopped, so – but we didn't have her 
there.”  With so little political strength against the bill, it progressed quickly through the 
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Legislature with minimal resistance and little testimony.  Registered witnesses and 
testimony included several students; three institutional financial aid leaders; staff from 
two progressive advocacy organizations, Young Invincibles and the Center for Public 
Policy Priorities; and a representative from the Coordinating Board.  This testimony, and 
Zaffirini’s statements on the floor, failed to slow the bill’s momentum toward a vote of 
130 to 10 in the House, and 25 to 6 in the Senate.  Zaffirini and several Democratic 
colleagues voted against.  The bill generated bipartisan support and opposition – Senator 
Schwertner, while he opposed the program, voted against the bill because it did not 
require institutions to cut tuition in the amount of the five percent set-asides they were no 
longer required to return for B-On-Time.  Ultimately, “it was a very political issue,” as a 
state agency participant summarized.  The combination of a conservative culture critical 
of its funding mechanism and power changes that removed program’s advocates from 
favor led politics to play a significant role in HB 700’s passage and B-On-Time’s demise. 
Senate Bill 1735: Hazlewood Tuition Exemptions 
 As discussed in Chapter Five, Senate Bill 1735 developed in response to massive 
growth in utilization of the Hazlewood program by veterans and their children, after 
passage of the Hazlewood Legacy Act in 2009 permitted veterans to pass on unused 
hours to their dependents.  Nearly all participants acknowledged that inaccurate data 
projections led the Legislature to pass that bill, which proved unsustainable when the 
program grew from $24.7 million in exemptions in 2009 to $169.1 million in 2014 
(Legislative Budget Board, 2014).  The problem stream shaping this bill was relatively 
straightforward: this was a program too big to sustain, and institutions voiced concerns as 
   
187 
the cost grew.  Politically, the issue was much more complicated.  One participant 
described this bill as the most contentious political issue affecting higher education in 
his/her time at the Capitol.   
Recognizing that Hazlewood had become a critical issue for the state, Governor 
Abbott asked Republican Senator Brian Birdwell of Waco, a decorated veteran disabled 
in the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon, to carry a bill that would narrow eligibility 
requirements for Hazlewood.  House Higher Education Committee Chairman John 
Zerwas would sponsor the bill.  Given the political and emotional sensitivity of veterans’ 
issues, Birdwell’s selection represented a strategic effort to position the bill carefully with 
veteran constituents.  With his leadership, SB 1735 passed the Senate and a heavily 
amended version passed the House, but the bill died when the two chambers failed to 
reconcile in conference committee.  The political stream shaping SB 1735 centered on 
two themes: the influence of the veteran lobby and the role of electoral politics.   
Influence of the veteran lobby.  SB 1735’s attempts to alter Hazlewood benefits 
attracted the vehement opposition of veterans interest groups in Texas.  Groups such as 
the Texas Association of Veteran Organizations, American Legion Department of Texas, 
and Lone Star Veterans Association rallied in full force to demonstrate their disapproval 
and the insult of taking away elements of a hard-earned benefit like Hazlewood.  
Withstanding this political opposition was difficult and risky for legislators.  As a 
government relations participant stated, “Veterans groups are very, very vocal and well 
organized.”  Similarly, a state agency participant shared: “The veterans have a very 
strong lobby…it’s a strong stance and it’s a strong lobby group, strong stakeholder 
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group….there are close ties to the leadership of the state.”  Participants described Texas 
as a proudly conservative and patriotic state and acknowledged that veterans formed a 
critical constituency for policymakers.  Along with Florida and California, Texas is home 
to one of the largest veteran populations in the country (U.S.  Department of Veterans 
Affairs, 2010), with nearly 1.6 million in 2011 (Texas Workforce Investment Council, 
2012).  Any policy change that alienated or adversely affected Texas veterans was likely 
to cause political ramifications for anyone involved.   
Compounding this challenge, in 2013 the Legislature transferred administration of 
the Hazlewood program from the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board to the 
Texas Veterans Commission.  Moving the program from an agency dedicated to higher 
education efficiency to an agency dedicated to veteran advocacy increased veteran 
groups’ authority over the issue; Hazlewood became more about veterans, and less about 
higher education.  Several participants suggested this shift was politically motivated.  The 
Coordinating Board underwent sunset review in 2013, and the Legislature limited the 
agency’s regulatory authority as a result of that process.  Shifting management of 
Hazlewood from the Coordinating Board to Veterans Commission corresponded with this 
adjustment of the higher education agency’s responsibilities, and several participants 
implied that the change also catered to the more influential veterans lobby.  A state 
agency participant explained how this shift changed the role and future of the program:  
Veterans programs are very much seen as entitlements.  So by moving that 
program over there, it almost solidifies its role as an entitlement.  And by the way, 
the Veterans Commission's whole role and purpose is to promote [veteran 
benefits].  The Coordinating Board’s role is to promote efficiency in higher 
education…when you move it over there, suddenly it's a veterans’ program. 
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With Hazelwood under the jurisdiction of the TVC, veterans were naturally even more 
protective of the program.  Under the Coordinating Board, higher education stakeholders 
supported veteran students but were mindful too of the unfunded program’s sustainability 
for institutions.  TVC was not obligated to address issues of cost for higher education; 
their goal was to maximize veterans’ utilization of their state benefits.  Participants 
recognized that this structural change made limiting the program’s scope more difficult at 
a time when the state needed to address Hazlewood’s cost.  Since TVC served a veteran 
advocacy mission, shifting Hazlewood to TVC gave the veteran lobby more authority 
over the program; it now fell under their own agency.   
In light of the veteran lobby’s influence in Texas and ingrained cultural respect 
for their service, policymakers were highly sensitive to veterans’ concerns.  A state 
agency participant commented on the difficult position in which this placed the 
Legislature: “Nobody wants to oppose our veterans.  I mean it politically is not a smart 
thing to do…if you’re patriotic too, you know you’re not going to go against, do anything 
that’s going to be detrimental toward veterans.”  Avoiding any policy position that might 
upset veterans groups meant Hazlewood was dangerous territory, even with the 
Legislature’s most decorated war veteran strategically leading the bill.  An elected 
official explained: “So there is an institutional inertia – I think inertia's the right word.  I 
wouldn't even say bias, it's inertia – that veterans come in – or veteran's groups lobby for 
something and nobody wants to tell them no.”  These dynamics were somewhat more 
manageable in the Senate, where the smaller nature of the chamber and the scope of the 
districts each Senator represented made the issue more substantive than political.  Senator 
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Birdwell was able to educate the Senate Higher Education Committee about the issue 
with data from the Legislative Budget Board, and he leveraged his personal political 
capital as a veteran to secure a vote of five to one in the Committee, and 25 to six in the 
Senate.  An elected official recalled, “It didn’t get through the Senate easily.  There was a 
lot of veteran pushback.”  Yet in his home chamber, Birdwell was able to address 
individual members’ concerns and build a coalition that acknowledged the impending 
crisis if the program continued to grow.  Even so, seven voted against the bill in the 
Senate, primarily Democrats.  One elected official explained this position: 
We who opposed it…believed that before cutting the program or redefining 
benefits, the Legislature should fund the cost of the program it created.  This view 
was heavily influenced by the military members, veterans, and associated groups 
and constituents who forcefully advocated to their legislators in defense of the 
program. 
 
As this member acknowledged, veterans groups played an important role in shaping 
policymakers’ views on the bill, and particularly those who voted against it.  Rather than 
scale back the program, these Democrats in the Senate argued that the state should fund 
the program so veterans could participate as intended. 
SB 1735 followed a different path in the House.  The bill’s genesis in the Senate 
gave veteran organizations more time to organize for debate in the larger House chamber, 
where representation was much more local and many members represented districts with 
significant veteran populations.  A government relations leader reflected: 
Between the time that bill passed the Senate and the time we were able to get it out 
of committee in the House, the veterans that were working the Capitol and working 
through their interest groups were able to convince enough members, particularly 
representative Blanco from El Paso, and Menendez and a couple of the others who 
were very vocal…that they were taking away an entitlement.    
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Any success Birdwell achieved in the Senate by presenting the issue as substantive and 
essential for preservation of the program disappeared in the House.  Rather than a 
pragmatic solution advocated by a respected veteran legislator, SB 1735 became an 
affront to veterans’ rights and benefits.  An elected official commented: “It was 
characterized as something that was compromising the veteran, and taking the benefit 
away from them.”  Similarly, a government relations leader noted: “It’s a very emotional 
issue…when you can wrap yourself in the flag and say, somebody’s taking away an 
entitlement I earned.”  The nature of smaller House districts, compared to larger Senate 
districts, meant that Representatives might be more attuned to veterans groups based on 
their constituent base.  An elected official explained: “You have smaller districts in the 
House that are more sensitive to a veterans issue – because a House guy in Austin may 
have more veterans in the density of this district than what [Austin Senator] Kirk Watson 
does.”  Consequently, while the issue was more substantive in the Senate, it became 
personal and political in the House.  As the same legislative participant summarized: 
“The Senate acted like statesmen…but [the House members] were being politicians.”  
 As SB 1735 devolved into a political battle over who could best protect veterans, 
the House stripped the bill of all its substance and left only one change from current law: 
requiring veterans to live in Texas for eight years in order to qualify for benefits.  
Birdwell’s version would also have required a minimum of six years of service in order 
to pass benefits on to a legacy, and would end legacy benefits fifteen years after the 
veteran’s service.  These proposed limitations prompted an emotional revolt in the House.  
A policy advisor explained: 
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So, they get up and they start screaming about how...these people who fought for 
you in 9/11 and Iraq, their widows and orphans deserve – it wasn’t any more about 
the merits of that bill than it was about anything else….I mean I watched it, it was 
remarkable… they basically took Birdwell’s bill and cut it into pieces. 
 
Adding fuel to the fire, the final House vote on the bill was scheduled for Memorial Day 
– timing that many participants acknowledged could not have been worse.  The bill 
passed 140 in favor, none against, but the amended version lacked the eligibility changes 
Birdwell had designed to scale back the program.  In conference committee, House and 
Senate members were unable to resolve their two drastically different bills, and bill 
leaders tabled the issue rather than pass a policy that no longer reflected its original goals.  
The same policy advisor explained:  
So they discharged conferees and let the bill die, and so you’re back to current 
law….I mean the politics of this…if you don’t pay attention to those, you’re gonna 
miss the whole thing….I remember we were having this conversation…saying is it 
worth the eggs you’re gonna break to make the omelet to jam this through.  And 
everybody looked around going, no.  It’s not.  Not this time, not in this climate. 
 
The issue became so divisive that the Governor and Senate leadership chose to withdraw 
the bill rather than cause more political damage.  Despite the backing of a prominent 
veteran legislator and well-reasoned data to support it, SB 1735 was laid to rest.   
Electoral politics.  The political issues undermining SB 1735 in the House were 
driven by the electoral politics of members’ local districts and by the strategic efforts of 
bill opponents to place members in positions where a vote for the bill would affect their 
reelection prospects.  Between the Senate and House hearings, veterans groups had time 
to organize and meet personally with representatives about their concerns, elevating the 
personal and political stakes on the issue.  An elected official explained: 
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So I think that's really what it was, is that the veterans' groups and the champions 
that they had in the House were better organized, better prepared to challenge the 
bill.  Because they already saw what the bill was going to look like, you know, so 
they had a better way to challenge it and let the politics work in their favor. 
 
Both the veteran lobby and the House members had the advantage of watching the bill in 
the Senate and using that time to prepare a strategy to stop its progress.  By the time it 
arrived to the House, the strong veteran lobby and emotional, sensitive nature of veterans 
issue had dramatically heightened the intensity of debate over the Hazlewood proposal. 
The structure of the House also made SB 1735 more difficult to manage and 
electoral politics more significant.  Because of smaller districts and two-year election 
cycles (the Senate ran every four years), House members were constantly concerned with 
maintaining positions that would not alienate constituents.  This was particularly 
important for members with military bases in their districts, such as Fort Bliss, Fort Hood 
in Killeen, and San Antonio; Texas is home to 16 state military installations (U.S.  
Department of Defense, 2016).  A policy advisor commented, “The politics were all 
local.  You had guys from El Paso with Fort Bliss.  You had guys from San Antonio with 
all the five or six different military bases.”  Smaller and more homogeneous House 
districts made the issue more politically divisive than in the Senate, where districts were 
larger and more heterogeneous.  Two-year terms meant House members were already 
looking ahead to their next campaign and could not afford to take a vote that portrayed 
them as unpatriotic; voting records were too easily manipulated by opponents.  A state 
agency participant elaborated, “Any time you’re voting…your votes are what are going 
to be used for or against you in your subsequent elections.”  Even a vote intended to 
protect Hazlewood by improving its sustainability could easily be portrayed or perceived 
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as a vote to limit veteran benefits.  A policy advisor commented: “It’s just a really, really 
tough vote to take…these guys, they are just worried about what looks good on their 
voting record.”  Limiting veteran benefits did not look good on a voting record, 
especially in a conservative state.  Responding to their constituencies and mindful of who 
would vote in their reelection, Representatives with higher veteran density in their 
districts, such as Cesar Blanco of El Paso and Joe Farias of San Antonio, both veterans 
themselves, spoke out in favor of protecting the program and led a series of amendments 
that stripped away the contents of Birdwell’s bill so it did little to change existing law. 
 The size of the House also meant it was more difficult than in the Senate to educate 
members and build consensus around the cost and need for.  The financial issues 
motivating Birdwell’s bill fell into the background, and local politics dominated 
members’ attention.  A state agency participant explained how in the large – and as some 
described, unruly – House, “it’s tougher for [the members] to organize and also 
particularly with issues involving veterans…they’re afraid of being tarred as anti-
veteran.”  Similarly, a legislative aide reflected: 
It was politicized in a way where there were just a lot of cooks in the kitchen, and I 
think that's really what led to its demise.  And no clear leadership, because it was a 
sensitive issue, and nobody wants to be seen as taking away a promise to veterans.  
 
The issue became local, political, and divisive.  While the Senate had Birdwell to 
generate understanding and support, the House sponsor, Higher Education Chairman 
John Zerwas, carried less clout with veterans and was unable to keep the bill intact.  
Instead, strong veteran leadership in the House emerged from Democrats – veterans 
Blanco and Farias.  Even with his decorated status, when the bill reached the House, 
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Birdwell was vehemently and decried by veterans groups and legislators who saw 
protecting and funding the program as a better solution than narrowing eligibility.   
This combination of chamber size, term length, and the opportunity for the 
veteran lobby to mobilize between chamber debates created major impediments for the 
bill’s progress in the House.  In addition, another critical political development sealed the 
bill’s fate: in the House, Democrats rose up against the bill in an interesting reversal of 
traditional party lines.  Participants explained how Democrats, in a weaker position of 
power in the Capitol, saw an opportunity to generate support in an area often dominated 
by Republicans: veterans and the military.  A government relations leader shared: 
So Hazelwood broke down very interestingly this last session because the 
Democrats stepped forward and decided to be the protectors of veterans.  And 
they said hey, this is a meat and potato issue, we can hit them on their own spot, 
right? Because that’s a – historically a more conservative appeal, the protection of 
veterans….  So in the House, there were a few kind of, the loudest barking 
members, but the Democratic Caucus took it on.  They said, okay, you know, 
we're going to…hit them where it hurts. 
 
The Texas Democratic Party capitalized on the opportunity to appear more pro-veteran 
than Republicans and ultimately turned the tide against the bill.  The Party issued emails 
strategically portraying the Republicans as failing to support veterans and threatened to 
use an anti-veteran vote against any member who took one – elevating the electoral 
politics around the issue.  An April 23, 2015 article on the Texas Democratic Party’s 
website, titled “Texas Republicans Set to Break Promise to Veterans,” exemplifies this 
strategy (Texas Democrats, 2015).  An advocacy organization participant shared: 
When it sailed through the Senate it was looking pretty bleak for us to be able to 
change anything, but we knew that there was Republicans that were working with 
[Representative] Joe Farias [of San Antonio] that were very concerned about what 
could happen.  We politically started putting out messages that, you know, we will 
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make this a TV commercial and a mailer any day on any of these House members 
in tough seats, and I think that message was received. 
 
On an already sensitive issue, this political strategy was highly effective at reorienting the 
bill’s direction and watering down any policy changes it originally included.  Democrats 
and Republicans alike were open and honest about the intentionality and success of this 
approach by the Democratic Party.  A legislative aide commented:  
They put up all these bad amendments to make Republicans take bad votes…you 
know, never waste a crisis, so they saw opportunities and they took them…we 
would have done the same thing to them if it was the other way around, I'm 
sure….Democrats just sensed a partisan opportunity, and you had a couple of 
members who had upcoming elections, like Menendez, who knew he was going to 
get challenged again….  he knew he had to run on something, right? And San 
Antonio is military town, USA. 
 
By proposing amendments that members could not support, Democrats forced 
Republicans either to take a vote that would hurt their careers, or to withdraw the issue.  
An elected official shared: “This became basically a Republican versus a Democrat issue 
– the Democrats were very effective in crafting questions…that required votes that would 
make the opposing vote look like they're very anti-veteran, and nobody wanted to take 
those votes.”  The bill saw a total of 14 amendments in the House (after eight in the 
Senate); eight of these were adopted, and six were tabled or withdrawn.  As the 
aforementioned legislative aide explained, “I think that helped kill the bill… there were 
so many members like, you know, we want to get this over with.”  Extending a divisive 
and emotional debate became politically risky for all involved, and Republican leadership 
realized the simplified proposal on the table no longer reflected Birdwell’s bill.   
Democrats praised the leadership of key members, such as Representatives Farias 
and Blanco, for swaying the House against the original bill and ultimately returning a 
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version to the Senate that no longer achieved the purpose Birdwell and his supporters 
intended.  An elected official commented on this perceived victory: 
You know, [Representatives] Joe Farias and Cesar Blanco both deserve all the 
credit, in my opinion, for being incredibly staunch and effective advocates – not 
just that day, but leading up to it…and you know, the Speaker and his team and 
Chairman Zerwas, all of whom are very decent people, just saw that this thing 
was going south and it probably wouldn't pass, and if they went forward with the 
vote they were going to put their Republican members in an awful position, either 
voting against the leadership or voting against veterans on Memorial Day…so 
they wisely pulled the plug. 
 
While Republicans who supported Birdwell’s proposal saw the outcome as an 
irresponsible decision that failed to preempt a court decision that could further expand the 
program, Democrats viewed the result as upholding a promise to veterans.  Opponents of 
SB 1735 argued that a better solution was to fund the program, not limit it to make it 
more sustainable.  The issue became highly controversial and politicized; Republican 
House members were reluctant to mar pro-veteran voting records, and Democrats seized 
an opportunity to gain credibility with influential veteran constituents.  Higher education 
issues and institutional concerns slid out of focus as the debate focused on veterans and 
political power.  A legislative aide commented:  
A lot of things went wrong for Hazelwood, and I think members…kind of go into 
it thinking, well, the leadership wants this, the Chairman of Higher Ed wants this, 
Republicans are going to get in line and vote for it, and that was not the case…I 
think so many members just thought if you're making me choose between 
universities and veterans, universities are never going to win.   
 
Because members naturally prioritized veterans over higher education, amending the 
Hazlewood program shifted from an issue that responded to unsustainable costs to 
universities to a matter of protecting benefits veterans had earned.  Protecting veterans 
was politically popular – and perhaps politically necessary for reelection.  Supporting 
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higher education was important, but the emotional and electoral value of doing so was 
marginal.  A legislative aide commented, “You can make a political ad about veterans 
issues.  You're not going to make a political ad about higher ed funding.  It's the 
definition of unsexy.”  Given the influence of the veteran lobby and electoral politics at 
the Capitol, an elected official summarized SB 1735 this way: “Politics played an 
outsized role in the development and eventual failure of this bill.” 
Summary and Discussion  
 The influence of the political stream on these three policies reveals how much of 
the policymaking process emerges from the contextual dynamics and culture within the 
immediate political environment.  SB 28 developed out of budget constraints and interest 
in outcomes, but the politics of party, race, and equity complicated the bill’s progress 
through the Legislature.  To succeed, the Priority Model required the political capital and 
policy entrepreneurship of Senator Zaffirini, who effectively integrated the policy and 
political streams by addressing stakeholder concerns and forming a coalition that would 
support her bill.  In HB 700, the policy stream generated rapid momentum and the bill 
easily passed because its priorities aligned with the political stream; conservative leaders 
disapproved of tuition set-asides, and Senator Zaffirini’s absence from a leadership role 
created a policy window to end the program.  Lastly, SB 1735 resulted from 
unsustainable cost and Hazlewood program growth – but the political stream took priority 
once the bill entered the public arena, and the lobbying power of veterans and electoral 
politics of veteran issues prevented a policy solution.  In each case, politics shifted the 
outcome of the bill by altering the policy design (SB 28), fueling its progress and passage 
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(HB 700), and rendering a policy solution untenable (SB 1735).  The interaction of 
problems, policies, and politics produced a very different result for each bill.   
 These cases reveal two overarching political themes: the influence of policy 
entrepreneurs and political leadership in shaping the policy agenda, and the role of higher 
education institutions in bringing issues to the legislature.  First, each bill demonstrates 
the need for key leaders to serve as advocates and coalition builders in order for a policy 
to succeed.  Without such leadership from Senator Zaffirini, SB 28 might never have 
evolved in a way that invited the participation and support of concerned policymakers 
and higher education stakeholders.  As a policy entrepreneur, Zaffirini deftly manipulated 
the political and policy streams so they addressed the problems of a constrained budget 
and lackluster graduation outcomes – without alienating constituents concerned with 
equity and access for students of color.  Alternatively, when HB 700 emerged several 
years later, Zaffirini no longer held the political power necessary to function as a policy 
entrepreneur and build a coalition in defense of B-On-Time. Lieutenant Governor 
Patrick’s political agenda against tuition set-asides took precedence and dominated the 
political stream, which overtook the program.   
Though the Governor and Senate leadership strategically aligned SB 1735 with a 
decorated veteran leader in Senator Birdwell, Birdwell’s political capital and coalition in 
the Senate faltered when the bill reached the House.  Veterans organizations, the 
Democratic Party, and veteran Democratic Representatives Cesar Blanco and Joe Farias 
took control of the political stream and manipulated the issue to present Birdwell and his 
Republican colleagues as anti-veteran.  SB 28 succeeded through Zaffirini’s policy 
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entrepreneurship; HB 700 succeeded because of a larger political agenda from the 
Lieutenant Governor, and SB 1735 failed because legislators and interest groups turned 
on leadership advocating for the bill.  In each bill, differences in political leadership and 
power dynamics produced a unique outcome.   
 These cases also reveal the variety of ways in which institutional advocacy can 
affect the policy process – as well as the policy agenda, as discussed in Chapter Five. 
Institutions’ voices proved influential in the outcome of SB 28, as higher education 
stakeholders participated in shaping a Priority Model that would not affect their 
allocations or disadvantage broader access schools.  In HB 700, institutions in Giddings’ 
district brought the issue to her attention, but other institutions were largely quiet.  While 
some financial aid officers testified on the bill and expressed support of the B-On-Time 
program, government relations and higher education leaders were mixed in their views of 
whether the program’s effectiveness and administrative challenges.  Several participants 
suggested that institutions preferred the flexibility to use B-On-Time set-asides for 
general financial aid, and therefore were less vocal about the bill.  Finally, Hazlewood 
emerged primarily because institutions voiced their concerns to the Legislature, and 
members responded.  Institutions were successful in elevating the Hazlewood issue to the 
state’s policy agenda, but as the resulting bill progressed, higher education’s political 
clout paled in comparison to the strength of the veteran lobby.  Each case shows a 
different degree to which institutions engaged with and affected the policy outcome: 
institutions shaped SB 28, disengaged from HB 700, and were both effective and 
ineffective in their advocacy for HB 1735.   
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Building on Chapter Five, these institutional roles and outcomes continue to 
reinforce and expand on research by Tandberg (2008; 2010a; 2010b) and Tandberg and 
Ness (2011) on the role of the higher education lobby in the policymaking process.  The 
outcomes of each bill provide evidence that higher education institutions can effectively 
influence the policy process.  Tandberg and colleagues have primarily examined the 
influence of lobbying on appropriations, and these findings reveal the potential for 
additional research on the effectiveness of institutions’ advocacy efforts related to 
affordability and aid.  Institutions generally share a common goal when advocating for 
greater appropriations, but tuition and aid policies may affect institutions differently due 
to their diverse student bodies.  In the cases of B-On-Time and TEXAS Grants, 
institutions’ diverging responses to the proposed policies reveal the challenge of 
coordinating positions and presenting a unified voice on complex issues that may affect 
institutions in different ways.  Texas Southern University, for example, brought concerns 
to Representative Giddings about the equity and utilization of the B-On-Time Program 
because they felt it did not effectively serve their needs as a regional institution.  
Alternatively, financial aid and government relations leaders at more selective 
institutions, such as UT-Austin, supported the program because their students were more 
likely to qualify for its forgivable loans.  Similarly, early versions of the TEXAS Grants 
Priority Model might have disadvantaged broader-access institutions that enrolled fewer 
students meeting the model’s merit requirements, while the most selective institutions 
were likely to enroll the state’s highest-achieving students and therefore expressed less 
concern about the policy.  This study extends Tandberg’s findings on the influence of 
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institutions as interest groups, but suggests the need for more research on the ways in 
which institutional advocacy efforts may interact, and even negate one another, in cases 
of more divisive policies with the potential for differential impact on institutions. 
 The role of the political stream in shaping these three bills also expands existing 
literature on the role of partisanship in higher education policymaking.  Research on these 
factors’ influence in the higher education arena is mixed, suggesting that party politics 
may shape some higher education policy issues more than others.  This study specifically 
illuminates the partisan dynamics surrounding the issue of college affordability: findings 
reveal bipartisan concern over college costs, but indicate that Democrats and Republicans 
advocated different policy positions in response to the problem of cost.  Consistent with 
findings by Doyle (2007a), both parties were critical of tuition increases, but differed in 
the policy responses they proposed.  As discussed in Chapter Four, Democrats and 
Republicans expressed interest in reregulating tuition, but diverged in their views on 
corresponding state funding.  Supporting research indicating liberal legislatures are more 
generous to higher education (McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Doyle, 2012), 
Democrats in this study were stronger proponents of simultaneously reregulating tuition 
and increasing appropriations, while Republicans advocated reregulation with cost 
containment and no new funding.  In addition, partisan differences over SB 28 invoke 
previous research demonstrating that Democrats are more likely to be concerned about 
access and opportunity for low-income students.  Doyle (2007a) concluded that 
Democrats and Republicans held different views on whether college is accessible to all; 
his study found strong Republicans to be 10% more likely than strong Democrats to see 
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low-income students as having the same level of college opportunity as other students.  
Democrats’ and progressive advocacy organizations’ concerns over the addition of merit 
criteria to need-based TEXAS Grants demonstrate this difference of perspective, as do 
conservative lawmakers’ emphasis on middle class affordability due to perceptions that 
low-income students were adequately covered by Pell and other need-based aid.   
 The political stream surrounding these three cases also contributes to existing 
research on the role of electoral politics in higher education policymaking.  The HB 1735 
case in particular offers support for Erikson, Wright, and McIver’s (1989) argument that 
elected officials position themselves in the ways most likely to preserve their positions.  
Small districts and more frequent elections in the Texas House meant that 
Representatives could not afford to support a policy that would alienate them from their 
constituents and undermine their reelection prospects.  House Democrats were highly 
effective in defeating the bill by exploiting these electoral politics and positioning 
supporters in competitive districts to take votes their constituents would oppose.  While 
research on the influence of electoral politics in higher education is mixed – McLendon, 
Hearn, and Mokher (2009) and McLendon, Mokher, and Flores (2011) found no effects 
for electoral competition, partisanship, or ideology on state appropriations or 
consideration of in-state resident tuition bills, while Doyle, McLendon, and Hearn (2010) 
found states with more competitive elections less likely to adopt prepaid tuition and 
savings plans – this study offers evidence that electoral politics does in some cases 
influence higher education.  As with the influence of partisanship on higher education 
policy, it appears the role of electoral politics may vary based on the issue in question.  
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The relevance of partisanship and electoral politics to this study’s findings, however, 
supports Doyle’s (2007a) argument that higher education is becoming increasingly 
partisan and political.  While other higher education policies may have a narrower 
impact, rising college costs are widely relevant to voters and taxpayers.  The accessibility 
and broad impact of this issue may make affordability more political, more divisive, and 
perhaps, as argued in Chapter Four, more easily malleable by politicians than other 
higher education issues.   
 This study offers evidence that policy entrepreneurs and political leadership play 
a key role in shaping higher education policy.  In particular, SB 28 demonstrates the 
value and effectiveness of policy entrepreneurs in building alliances and navigating the 
policy process.  These findings on the role of policy entrepreneurs strengthen the growing 
body of literature on their influence in higher education (see Dougherty et al., 2013; 
Doyle, 2006; McLendon, 2003a; Ness, 2010; Tandberg & Anderson, 2012).  In addition, 
HB 700 reveals how changes in state leadership – such as a new Lieutenant Governor, his 
appointment of new committee chairs, and Senator Zaffirini’s removal from power – can 
shift power dynamics, open policy windows, and enable legislation to pass that previous 
political environments would not have permitted.  These findings are consistent with 
previous research on elected officials and state leadership as higher education policy 
entrepreneurs (Gittell & Kleiman, 2000; Leslie & Novak, 2003; Tandberg & Anderson, 
2012), and with McLendon, Deaton, and Hearn (2007)’s conclusion that higher education 
policy change is more likely after a change in governorship.   
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In sum, the findings of this study situate policy entrepreneurs and state leadership 
as central to the policy process, shaping the agenda and heavily coloring what the 
Legislature can and does accomplish.  Previous work in this area has focused primarily 
on the role of governors in higher education agenda setting and policymaking (see 
McLendon, Deaton, & Hearn, 2007; McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Christakis, 
2009); given the influence of Texas Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick on the political 
stream shaping HB 700 in particular, and on broader concerns over rising college costs in 
general, this work indicates that lieutenant governors also play an influential role in 
setting the higher education agenda.  Christakis (2009) noted that formal and informal 
gubernatorial authority varies across the 50 states; according to his analysis, the Texas 
governor wields relatively weak statutory authority.  This study’s finding suggest the 
need for further research on the influence of Lieutenant Governors and other key state 
leaders on states’ higher education policy agendas and political climates. 
 Finally, the overarching influence of Texas’s ingrained conservative political 
ideology supports previous research by Gittell and Kleiman (2000), Richardson and 
Martinez (2009), and Perna and Finney (2014) on the role of political culture and context 
in state higher education policymaking.  This study’s findings regarding Texas’s 
conservative paradigm, preference for cost containment, small government, and 
individual responsibility reinforce Koven and Mausolff’s (2002) analysis of Texas as a 
traditionalistic state that focuses budget priorities on the status quo, rather than 
redistributive functions like education and welfare.  Based on Elazar’s (1966) political 
typology of individualistic, traditionalistic, and moralistic states, Miller (1991) 
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categorized Texas as both traditionalistic and individualistic – prioritizing low state 
expenditures, local investment, and maintaining the status quo.  The three bills studied 
here support these previous findings, as each bill sought to ration resources and control 
costs without providing additional funding for institutions or aid.  The influence of the 
state political context on the emergence and outcomes of these bills also reinforces Perna 
and Finney’s (2014) argument that state-specific context profoundly shapes policy 
development and higher education performance, as well as Richardon and Martinez’s 
(2009) conclusion that states’ underlying, even unspoken “rules in use” about areas such 
as information, access and achievement, fiscal policies, and leadership shape their policy 
decisions and educational outcomes.    
Viewed in tandem with analysis of the policy stream in Chapter Five, the findings 
discussed in Chapter Six demonstrate the substantial role of political factors in shaping 
higher education policymaking concerning college affordability in Texas.  The influence 
of these political themes across the three policies in question suggests that political forces 
cannot be underestimated or neglected within the study of higher education policy. 
Chapter Seven will summarize and synthesize this study’s overarching themes and 
examine its theoretical contributions to Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams approach.  In 
closing, I will suggest implications for higher education leaders and policymakers and 
offer avenues for future research. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Implications 
Summary 
Given the importance of state financial aid in offsetting rising tuition costs and the 
influence of a state’s political context on the development of such policies, this study 
sought to provide in-depth analysis of how the political environment contributed to three 
policies related to college affordability in Texas.  As noted in Chapter One, I have relied 
on a broad definition of affordability as “the share of income required to pay the net price 
of college” (Delaney, 2014, p. 2014), rather than offering a ratio or point at which college 
is or is not affordable.  By examining how Texas policymakers defined the problem of 
college affordability, the emergence of three state policies between 2011 and 2015, and 
the political forces shaping their evolution, this study offered an illustration of the 
complex environment surrounding the issue of college affordability and shaping higher 
education policymaking at the state level.   
 I selected the three bills considered in this multiple case study (Yin, 2014) 
because they represent three unique types of financial aid: a need-based grant, a 
forgivable loan, and a tuition exemption.  The differences among these programs 
provided an opportunity to assess how politics may shape different aid policies in 
different ways.  SB 28 in 2011 established a Priority Model by which students meeting 
merit criteria would be first to receive aid through the state’s need-based grant program.  
HB 700 discontinued the B-On-Time program, which offered zero-interest loans forgiven 
if students graduated in four years with a B average.  SB 1735 sought unsuccessfully to 
curtail rapid growth in utilization of the Hazlewood Tuition Exemption by dependents of 
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military veterans.  The case study method allowed me to examine in-depth the context 
and process shaping these three bills.  All three occurred within the recent five-year 
period from 2011-2015, a timeframe I selected in order to increase the likelihood I could 
gain access to direct participants and stakeholders involved with each policy.   
I applied Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams approach to this multiple case study 
because it emphasizes the dynamic, complex, and interrelated nature of the problem, 
policy, and political streams shaping the legislative process.  Informed by this 
framework, I addressed three research questions: (1) How have policy stakeholders 
defined the problem of college affordability in Texas within the last five years; (2) Why 
did SB 28 (2011), HB 700 (2015), and SB 1735 (2015) emerge as policy solutions to the 
problem of college affordability in Texas during this time, and (3) How did politics in 
Texas affect the development and outcomes of these bills?  I conducted 50 stakeholder 
interviews with elected officials, legislative aides and policy advisors, state agency and 
advocacy organization staff, government relations and financial aid administrators, media 
relations and reporters, and higher education leaders.  These interviews were recorded 
and transcribed verbatim.  I also reviewed 135 archival documents, including news 
articles and government, state agency, and policy organization reports, in order to provide 
contextual background on each case and corroborate interview testimony.  Using pattern 
matching and constant comparison methods (Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2014), I coded this 
data in Atlas.ti using a priori codes from my literature review and theoretical framework, 
as well as emergent coding based on themes arising from interviews and documents.   
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I analyzed and condensed the resulting 47 codes into categorically rich and meaningful 
themes, which I have presented in the preceding chapters. 
 In Chapter Four, I discussed how policy stakeholders defined the problem of 
college affordability in Texas within the five years under consideration by this study.  
Three overarching themes emerged.  First, lacking a clear or shared definition of what it 
meant for college to be “affordable,” the term lent itself to malleability and manipulation 
in the service of legislators’ agendas.  An increasingly conservative Legislature used the 
issue of college affordability as political ammunition against higher education.  Second, 
the state’s conservative political paradigm fostered criticism of higher education as an 
example of irresponsible and inefficient use of state resources.  This conservative 
ideology contributed to the state’s business-minded approach to higher education, which 
emphasized productivity and return on investment and criticized institutions for failing to 
operate based on corporate principles.  Lastly, policymakers expressed bipartisan concern 
over the issue of affordability, but diverged in the solutions they proposed to address the 
problem of college costs.  Democrats advocated for greater appropriations and aid, while 
Republicans preferred cost control and fiscal responsibility; both parties, however, 
indicated support for reinstating Legislative regulation of tuition.  Together, these three 
themes revealed how the political stream surrounding college affordability shaped the 
problem stream by coloring how policymakers viewed and framed the issue.  Interest 
from both parties in reregulating tuition also demonstrated that the problem stream and 
policy stream do not always align: controlling tuition would limit the price of college, but 
does not ultimately address the root issue of rising costs to institutions.   
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 In Chapter Five, I described the emergence of SB 28, HB 700, and SB 1735 as 
policy solutions to the problem of college affordability discussed in Chapter Four.  SB 
28, the TEXAS Grants Priority Model, developed in response to state budget constraints, 
growing interest in aligning student metrics with desired graduation outcomes, and the 
influence of Commissioner Raymund Paredes and Senator Judith Zaffirini as policy 
entrepreneurs who advocated for the proposal and built a strategic, bipartisan coalition to 
support its passage.  HB 700, which discontinued the B-On-Time Loan program, 
emerged due to political antipathy toward its funding mechanism, which relied on set-
asides from student tuition and was seen as inequitable to some institutions and students; 
challenges with utilization of the program, which federal preferred lending laws 
categorized as a private loan, and misinformation and misunderstanding regarding the 
program’s structure and administration.  SB 1735, which sought to amend the Hazlewood 
Legacy Program to curtail growing costs to institutions, arose due to misinformation that 
resulted in the passage of a bill dramatically expanding the program in 2009; massive 
increase in utilization of the program by dependents of veterans, who could access 
unused credit hour exemptions from their guardians, and federal legal proceedings that 
threatened to further expand eligibility for Hazlewood, creating a policy window for 
amending the program in advance of a court ruling.  Together, these three cases revealed 
the role of information in shaping the policy stream, the effectiveness of institutions as 
policy actors and advocates, and overarching concerns for equity across institutions, 
which was exacerbated by a diverse and fragmented state system of higher education. 
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 Finally, in Chapter Six, I examined how politics in Texas affected the 
development and outcomes of SB 28, HB 700, and SB 1735.  I found that politics shaped 
SB 28 by way of partisanship and policy entrepreneurship.  Minority lawmakers and the 
Democratic caucus were effective in voicing concerns about the proposal’s impact on 
underrepresented students.  The leadership of Senator Zaffirini, as bill author and policy 
entrepreneur, adeptly incorporated these concerns and ultimately created a bipartisan 
coalition around a bill that was more palatable to all stakeholders.  Considering HB 700, I 
suggested that the state’s conservative political paradigm and aversion to redistributive 
practices, such as the B-On-Time program’s tuition set-aside funding mechanism, 
contributed to the program’s eventual demise.  In addition, I argued that changes in 
political leadership in the Legislature created a policy window in which B-On-Time’s 
creators were no longer in positions of power, enabling opponents to dismantle the 
program.  Lastly, I concluded that SB 1735 was heavily influenced by the role of interest 
groups such as the veteran lobby, a constituency that held strong support in the 
conservative and patriotic state of Texas.  As a result of this constituency’s power, 
electoral politics played a significant role in impeding the bill’s passage because 
lawmakers were ultimately unwilling to take votes that would limit veteran benefits and 
hinder their reelection prospects.  In sum, the political dynamics shaping these three cases 
revealed how policy entrepreneurs, leadership changes, and the state’s conservative 
political culture influence Texas higher education policymaking. 
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Summary of Key Findings  
In conclusion, I offer three overarching findings that emerged across these policy 
cases.  First, data revealed that the three primary stakeholder groups in this study – 
policymakers, higher education leaders, and state agency staff – all blame one another for 
the growing cost of higher education.  I refer to this finding as “finger-pointing,” 
paraphrasing a comment from a participant.  Second, participants described an 
environment in which these stakeholder groups disagreed about who should ultimately 
control the price of higher education; this power struggle also extended to disagreement 
over whose data was accurate and reliable.  Third, although each of these bills was 
categorized by the Legislature as a financial aid or higher education cost issue, none 
actually addressed affordability.  Each bill ultimately responded to underlying issues of 
budget, politics, and power; financial aid was an afterthought in a broader ideological 
debate over who should control tuition.   
Key finding #1: Finger-pointing.  The Legislature, Higher Education 
Coordinating Board, and higher education institutions disagreed over who was to blame 
for rising tuition, and each was quick to assign fault to the others for contributing to the 
problem.  Finger-pointing and scapegoating created and perpetuated a tense and political 
environment surrounding the issue of college cost, as well as its potential solutions. 
Higher education leaders felt the state was driving tuition costs up by defunding 
public universities.  While some policymakers recognized a relationship between these 
two trends, most were highly critical of institutions for managing their money poorly and 
creating their own cost crisis.  As a legislative aide explained, “there’s not a lot of owning 
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the fact that the state has decreased their share.  It’s more, why are you raising tuition?” 
Another legislative aide observed, “we blame the institutions for their increasing 
costs…but the state has failed to invest in them at a rate that would keep that down.”  As 
a state agency responsive to both institutions and the Legislature, the Coordinating Board 
occupied a unique and tenuous role in this environment; state agency participants 
recognized the effect of declining appropriations on tuition prices, but also saw the need 
for institutions to operate more efficiently.  Higher education staff and leaders criticized 
the Coordinating Board for its reluctance to press the Legislature for more generous 
appropriations and greater funding for financial aid; state agency staff expressed that their 
role was to be realistic in light of the conservative Legislature.  Institutions perceived this 
approach as complacency, seeing the agency as catering to the Legislature and failing to 
advocate for their needs.  In sum, the relationships among these three key stakeholder 
groups were fraught with distrust and skepticism, quick to blame and slow to accept 
responsibility for the role each played in contributing to the issue of rising college costs.   
The lack of a definition for affordability and consequent malleability of that term 
added fuel to the fire among these stakeholders.  Policymakers critical of higher 
education for fiscal irresponsibility and lackluster outcomes could mold the issue of 
rising tuition prices to serve their agendas, advocating for more limited government 
spending, greater efficiency, and more affordable college for their constituents – however 
undefined that amount might be.  Finger-pointing catered to the interests of those in the 
political arena who spoke most loudly, such as Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick and 
members of the Tea Party who were critical of higher education as inefficient and out of 
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touch.  Amidst this cycle of blame and political manipulation, policies arose that did not 
necessarily address the root causes of rising college costs.  This phenomenon invokes 
Kingdon’s (1984) concept of policy primordial soup, or the murky process by which 
solutions look for problems and attach themselves to the most visible issues most likely 
to capture attention and support.  Reregulating tuition, eliminating B-On-Time and its 
tuition set-aside funding stream, and increasing merit criteria for TEXAS Grants in order 
to ration dollars without providing more aid can all be seen as policy solutions to other 
issues that coupled with the more visible problem of college costs by way of the political 
stream, facilitated by each stakeholder group’s tendency to blame the others for the 
growing cost of higher education.   
Key finding #2: Power struggle over tuition control.  In an environment 
heavily shaped by the history of tuition deregulation in 2003, political disagreement over 
who was to blame for rising costs led to a power struggle over who should be responsible 
for controlling tuition in the future.  Institutions and the Legislature disagreed over 
whether the Legislature had more effectively managed tuition prior to 2003 than 
institutions had since deregulation; participants commented that it was relatively easy to 
provide or manipulate data to support either side’s claim.  Naturally, the balance of power 
in this debate between the state and higher education institutions weighed heavily in 
favor of the government.  The Legislature expressed strong interest in reregulating tuition 
during and following the 2015 session, when HB 700 and SB 1735 were considered.  
Higher education stakeholders were increasingly wary of the growing potential 
they would lose tuition authority, and many expressed concern about their ability to 
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deliver high-quality education if the Legislature were to limit tuition and provide no new 
resources for public institutions.  Alternatively, influential policymakers, such as the 
Lieutenant Governor and higher education committee leadership, argued that higher 
education institutions could not capably manage their own costs; consequently, they 
“should always be restrained,” as one elected official commented.  This power struggle – 
however unequal, given the Legislature’s authority – shaped the context surrounding the 
2015 bills in particular, though was undoubtedly growing in 2011 when SB 28 was 
passed as well.  Concerned they would lose their primary revenue source, institutions 
were highly sensitive to issues affecting their financial aid and general budgets; HB 700 
eliminated a financial aid source, while SB 1735 would have limited the financial 
pressure created by a growing share of students who paid no tuition.  Due to institutions’ 
collaboration with Senator Zaffirini on the Priority Model, SB 28 ultimately did not affect 
institutions’ allocations for TEXAS Grants – but concern that it might had undermined 
previous attempts to pass the bill. 
This power and governance struggle also manifest in more subtle ways.  The shift 
in management of the Hazlewood Exemption from the Higher Education Coordinating 
Board to the Veterans Commission meant a loss of influence over the growing program 
by higher education institutions, the stakeholders most significantly affected by 
Hazlewood’s structure and cost.  Participants suggested this change in authority was 
politically motivated, part of an effort by the Legislature to strip the Coordinating Board 
of regulatory authority and refocus the agency on statewide coordination.  As discussed 
in Chapter Six, the veteran lobby also saw the Hazlewood Exemption as a veteran 
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entitlement and held considerable sway with the Legislature.  Moving the program to 
TVC aligned with political interest in limiting the Coordinating Board’s power in relation 
to the Legislature, and in maintaining the goodwill of veteran groups and constituents.  
Disagreement over Hazlewood data from different sources – particularly the 
Veterans Commission, Coordinating Board, and institutions – and misunderstanding and 
misinformation about B-On-Time also underscored this tension over ownership and 
oversight.  Institutions indicated it was difficult to provide accurate data on Hazlewood 
utilization and cost, as students could enroll, stop out, return, and even claim benefits 
retroactively – making the population difficult to track and causing cost and utilization to 
fluctuate.  Participants indicated that B-On-Time’s administration was widely 
misunderstood, an issue compounded by assertions that the Coordinating Board had 
incorrectly appropriated funds for the program.  Ultimately, disaccord over data 
undermined both of these programs by raising skepticism and questions of credibility.  
This finding illustrates Kingdon’s (1984) framework by alluding to MSA’s definition of a 
“problem” as a “change in an indicator” (p.  97), often presented by way of a data point 
or set.  If stakeholders cannot agree on data indicators, they are unlikely to agree on the 
definition or scope of a problem.  Without the necessary data available, an information 
vacuum can facilitate the manipulation of whatever tangential data does exist, and use of 
that data can result in a policy based on inaccurate or incomplete information.  
Disagreement over data and oversight across these three cases demonstrates how 
different information can lead to different definitions of a problem.   
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Key finding #3: Financial aid as an afterthought.  Although the intent of this 
study was to examine policies related to college affordability, findings revealed that these 
bills were largely the result of budget constraints and political dynamics rather than 
efforts to increase college affordability.  All stakeholders agreed financial aid was 
important in principle, but tuition dominated the discourse surrounding college cost and 
left little room for policies truly focused on improving aid programs and college access.  
Financial aid fell to the background in an environment consumed by assigning 
blame for cost increases and by the debate over who should control tuition.  As a 
legislative aide explained, “financial aid is seen as a band-aid, not a solution.”  Despite 
support for financial aid as a concept, policymakers generally felt the best financial aid 
was simply lower tuition.  Institutions, for their part, needed flexible general revenue that 
they could use to offset costs where needs were greatest; consequently, participants 
suggested that institutions were more likely to advocate for greater appropriations than 
funding for state financial aid programs.  With the Legislature and institutions focusing 
their attention on appropriations and tuition, financial aid ultimately became an 
afterthought – even though at face value, each of these bills dealt with that exact issue.  
The political stream effectively dominated the conversation around college cost, and the 
politically malleable issue of affordability became interchangeable with tuition and 
regulation.  The result was an over-simplistic view of affordability, the problems 
contributing to rising costs, and the solutions that might ensure students could afford 
college and institutions could afford to educate them. 
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Ironically, “none of these bills are really about affordability” – as a government 
relations participant succinctly stated.  HB 700 was about doing away with redistributive 
tuition set-asides and ending a program key policymakers saw as mismanaged and 
representative of past leadership; the discontinuance of this program ultimately made 
college less affordable for students who could have qualified for its forgivable loans.  SB 
28 was about rationing resources and increasing return on investment – not about making 
college more affordable for all students.  SB 1735 was about crisis aversion due to 
Hazlewood’s burgeoning and unsustainable growth.  Of all three cases, however, this 
unsuccessful bill was most relevant to college affordability because of the potential for 
Hazlewood Legacy exemptions to increase costs on non-Hazlewood students.  
Alternatively, the potential restriction of those benefits would also have made college less 
affordable for Hazlewood Legacy beneficiaries.  Despite being the only one of three bills 
to address a program not categorized as financial aid – Hazlewood is a veteran benefit 
and exemption, administered by the Veterans Commission – SB 1735 was arguably the 
most relevant to college affordability and best aligned with the state’s avowed interest in 
lowering college costs.  Of all three cases, this bill alone failed to pass due to an active 
political stream driven by the veteran lobby, House Democrats, and electoral politics.   
Implications for Policy, Practice, and Theory 
 This study offers significant implications for policy and practice, as well as for the 
use of theory to understand the higher education policymaking process.  Here, I offer 
several key ways in which this study can inform policymakers and higher education 
leaders.  I also discuss the ways in which Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams approach 
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proved useful to this study, offer my own model of Kingdon’s multiple streams as 
applied to college affordability policymaking, and discuss how other theoretical 
approaches might provide similar or different insights.  Finally, I reflect on how these 
implications have both challenged and reinforced my perspective on the role of politics in 
higher education policymaking.   
 Implications for policy and practice.  This study’s implications for 
policymakers and higher education leaders focus on three areas: the role of data, 
institutions as legislative constituents and policy advocates, and relationship-building 
between higher education leaders and legislators.   
The role of data.  Each of these cases reveals how data can help or hinder the 
policymaking process.  In Texas, policy actors rely regularly on statewide higher 
education data collected and reported by the Higher Education Coordinating Board 
related to enrollment, demographics, transfer and graduation outcomes, revenue and 
expenditures, facilities use, and faculty and staff salaries, among other topics.  This study 
underscores the importance of ensuring these data collection efforts include the most 
relevant and precise information, and that policymakers base their legislative proposals 
on accurate, credible data upon which all stakeholders can agree.   
In SB 28, the use of demographic data assuaged concerns from critics of the 
Priority Model who believed the proposal would negatively impact underrepresented 
students.  In HB 700 and SB 1735, disagreement over data and concerns about its 
accuracy ultimately made higher education less affordable for students who could have 
benefited from the discontinued B-On-Time program, as well as for students who 
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continued to absorb the exempted tuition of Hazlewood Legacy beneficiaries when the 
latter bill did not pass.  Participants also attributed the passage of the Legacy Act itself in 
2009 to inaccurate data about the fiscal implications of that bill.   
Scholars have described Texas as a data-rich and data-driven state (Perna & 
Finney, 2014); certainly, the Coordinating Board collects and makes available a wide 
array of metrics and indicators for higher education statewide.  This commitment to data, 
however, does not prevent policymakers from falling victim to inaccurate, incomplete, or 
misrepresented data that may be selectively used to advance the agenda of any given 
stakeholder group.  The challenge of providing and navigating “good” data calls for 
trained researchers as part of legislative, state agency, and institutional staffs who are 
equipped and committed to ensure data-driven decisions are driven not just by data, but 
by accurate data.  Policymakers and higher education leaders alike must be diligent and 
cautious in vetting data, considering multiple sources, and ensuring careful consideration 
of all information – despite the time constraints of their fast-paced work environments.  It 
is particularly important to establish who “owns” data in a certain area in order to prevent 
duplication of data collection efforts and disagreement over conflicting sets of numbers.  
The Legislative Budget Board serves this fiscal oversight role in Texas, but also relies on 
state agencies and institutions to provide relevant data when preparing fiscal notes for 
proposed legislation.  So while the LBB serves as the state’s fiscal authority, all agencies 
shoulder the responsibility of collecting and maintaining data related to their missions.  
States should regularly assess whether the data collected by higher education 
institutions and the state agency or governing board can meet ever-evolving policy needs.  
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Participants indicated, for example, that data on the graduation and career outcomes of 
Hazlewood beneficiaries was limited.  Particularly given Texas’s interest in return on 
investment and economic development, tracking these students into the workforce could 
strengthen the case for funding Hazlewood.  Similarly, understanding not only the 
graduation outcomes, but also the career outcomes of graduates receiving aid through 
programs such as TEXAS Grants and B-On-Time could help provide broader context and 
rationale around the value of supporting those programs.  While remaining mindful of 
placing unnecessary reporting requirements on institutions, the Coordinating Board, in 
conjunction with the Legislature and Legislative Budget Board, should regularly assess 
whether available data meets the needs of policymakers and analysts.  The legislative 
interim provides a key opportunity to collect and assess this information as needs evolve.    
Institutions as political constituents.  These cases also reveal the potential for 
institutions to affect the policy process by voicing their priorities and concerns – even if 
they are restricted from direct “lobbying” activities.  Statue prohibits the use of 
appropriated funds “to influence the passage or defeat of a legislative measure” (Texas 
Government Code, 1997).  However, statute also calls the Coordinating Board to 
“advocate” for the resources and authority to allow institutions and students to fulfill their 
missions and potential (Texas Education Code, 1971).  Consequently, the Legislature 
invites the Coordinating Board and institutions to testify “on,” rather than “for” or 
“against” bills and issues by providing relevant information to support the policy process.   
The bills in this study illustrate that institutions can and do engage successfully in 
such activities.  SB 28 demonstrates the effectiveness of institutional agents in 
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contributing to a more palatable policy outcome for universities; government relations 
and financial aid leaders were engaged in critical conversations as part of developing the 
Priority Model, and their involvement made the result something they could support.  HB 
700 shows how individual institutions, as legislative constituents, can be successful in 
moving their legislators to address certain issues and concerns.  SB 1735 again reveals 
the effectiveness of institutional advocacy on critical issues; however, given the eventual 
dominance of the veteran lobby, this bill also serves to reinforce where higher education 
stands in the power dynamics of electoral politics.   
These three cases should serve to encourage higher education leaders to foster 
greater engagement with state policymaking in order to ensure their views are considered.  
These bills demonstrate that college and university presidents and chancellors can and do 
contribute to policy outcomes for higher education.  Given their impact on the cases 
examined here, a key takeaway from this study is the need for these executive college and 
university leaders to maintain their advocacy efforts.  This is particularly critical as 
higher education becomes increasingly politicized around issues of cost and affordability.  
The presence, expertise, and advocacy of higher education leaders at the Legislature 
during the interim and session can serve as a check and balance on the role of politics, 
which, as this study shows, can too easily dominate higher education policy.  Given the 
diverse array of institutions in Texas, colleges and universities may not always agree on 
their positions or priorities – but it is imperative that they continue communicating their 
interests to the Legislature in order to facilitate a more informed and nuanced view of 
higher education by policymakers.  This study also reveals the potential to increase 
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engagement of specialized, mid-level administrators such as financial aid directors; these 
staff members are closest to the front lines serving students and can speak authoritatively 
on the role and impact of aid programs, tuition changes, and other cost concerns.  
Presidents and chancellors should leverage the expertise of these administrators and 
encourage their engagement with the Legislature on issues of import to their institutions.     
Be indispensable.  Each of these bills demonstrates the critical role of developing 
and maintaining relationships between higher education leaders and policymakers.  As an 
example, Senator Zaffirini’s relationships and credibility with presidents, government 
relations staff, and financial aid leaders enabled her to build an effective coalition around 
improving and passing the Priority Model with SB 28.  Institutional representatives 
leveraged their relationships with legislators in voicing their concerns about the 
unsustainability of the Hazlewood program, leading to SB 1735; institutions such as 
Texas Southern University addressed Representative Giddings about their concerns with 
the B-On-Time program, resulting in HB 700.  Pre-existing relationships between higher 
education leaders and the elected officials representing their districts make this process of 
convening and sharing information easier by creating a sense of shared interests and 
understanding.  Policymakers should proactively seek out input and perspectives from 
higher education leaders in their districts; similarly, higher education leaders should 
communicate regularly with their legislators in order to ensure they are included in 
conversations about key issues.   
Legislators and their staff often have “go-to” higher education stakeholders they 
consult on relevant issues, and higher education leaders should endeavor to become 
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indispensable and reliable advisors on the issues affecting their institutions.  However, 
policymakers must be mindful that such relationships can also contribute to narrow-
minded policy views if legislators rely too heavily on any individual higher education 
representative.  Institutions vary widely, and legislators and their staff should solicit a 
wide array of higher education stakeholders when examining policy problems and vetting 
potential solutions.  Relying only on the most visible institutions and leaders can produce 
insular policy ideas that discount the experiences of other student bodies, institution 
types, and regions – particularly when the views of flagship institutions with close ties to 
the Capitol may tend to dominate policy discourse.  Policymakers and their staff should 
seek to build a “cabinet” of diverse and experienced higher education leaders, rather than 
referring continually to one or two.  As new presidents, chancellors, and mid-level 
experts such as financial aid directors take office, legislators and their staff should initiate 
new relationships with those individuals; vice-versa for higher education leaders new to 
office, who should promptly seek out opportunities to meet key legislators in order to 
include their voice in the policy process. 
As this study clearly demonstrates, the elected officials influencing higher 
education may quickly change as power and politics fluctuate.  This reality underscores 
the ongoing, dynamic nature of relationship building with the Legislature.  Higher 
education stakeholders must stay abreast of political developments in order to understand 
how best to position themselves for involvement and influence.  This is not to suggest 
that advocacy efforts should focus solely on who holds power and abandon relationships 
with leaders whose influence may decline – the cyclical and dynamic nature of this 
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environment means those relationships, too, may again prove critical.  In this complex 
and capricious environment, higher education leaders must continually observe and 
assess political dynamics around the Legislature and higher education, ensuring they are 
acting strategically by building relationships with previous, new, and emerging legislative 
leaders shaping issues of interest.  As part of this ongoing effort, the work of government 
relations and financial aid leaders cannot be overstated – presidents and chancellors will 
be well served to counsel those in their employ with expertise in financial aid, 
affordability, and the policy process so they can best advocate for institutional issues.   
Align policies with problems.  Lastly, each of these cases reveals how legislation 
may develop under the auspices of financial aid or affordability, but in reality address 
deeper underlying issues of a more political nature.  Kingdon’s (1984) framework 
suggests that policies rarely follow problems in a linear fashion; rather, policies often 
attach themselves to the problems that are most convenient, visible, and most likely to 
produce legislative outcomes.  This study’s findings demonstrate that higher education 
leaders and policymakers must hold themselves, and each other, accountable for ensuring 
policies related to college affordability do indeed seek to address that problem.     
Though a financial aid policy, SB 28 rationed funds and increased return on 
investment; its goal was not to enhance affordability.  HB 700 ended a financial aid 
program that key leaders found politically unpalatable due to its funding mechanism and 
administration.  SB 1735 was perhaps the most straightforward of these three cases; it 
sought to narrow Hazlewood eligibility in order to curtail unsustainable costs.  
Ultimately, the agenda driving each policy was more about the budget and political 
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priorities than about broadening financial aid and increasing affordability.  At the risk of 
encouraging a cynical perspective on higher education policymaking around college cost, 
this reality suggests that higher education stakeholders must carefully consider the 
content, motives, and implications of these policies and ensure they identify the 
underlying issues that such bills may not immediately present.  These cases demonstrate 
that the political stream can easily dominate and subsume important policy problems in 
higher education.  To ensure legislation truly addressing college affordability reaches the 
surface of the policy stream, higher education leaders and policymakers must work 
together to craft bills that directly address and contribute to this critical issue.  
Particularly by including financial aid administrators and other relevant experts in 
policy conversations, higher education leaders can help refocus the affordability 
conversation on its most important stakeholders: students.  Financial aid participants 
expressed concerns that state policy and affordability discourse largely ignored the needs 
and experiences of students.  Indeed, interviews with state actors largely focused on the 
needs of the state, constraints of the budget, and politics of blame and power struggle.  
By virtue of their educational missions, higher education stakeholders have a 
responsibility to infiltrate this conversation by offering data and professional experience 
working with the families and students most affected by higher education cost.  
Institutions should encourage student testimony on bills related to tuition and aid, and 
student organizations should engage with the Legislature on these critical issues.  The 
involvement of financial aid directors and students can help refocus the college 
affordability discourse around student success, rather than political agendas.  
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Implications for theory.  Kingdon’s (1984) multiple stream approach carried 
extensive explanatory power as the theoretical framework guiding this study.  Others 
have used MSA to underpin their research on higher education policymaking (see 
McLendon, 2003a; Ness, 2010); this study reiterates the framework’s relevance to higher 
education policy and offers three cases in which MSA specifically illuminates the politics 
and policies surrounding college affordability.  Within this study, Kingdon’s approach is 
particularly insightful in its illustration of the role of power and leadership and the 
nonlinear nature of policymaking.  This study also suggests, however, that in some cases 
Kingdon’s three streams are indistinguishable from one another.  In such a case, the 
streams become jumbled and Kingdon’s model may require further development and 
illustration in order to explain how and why policy efforts succeed or fail. 
Power and leadership.  MSA is particularly valuable here in its emphasis on 
power dynamics and policy entrepreneurs as key components of the political stream.  
Viewing SB 28 through Kingdon’s (1984) lens illuminates Senator Zaffirini’s skillful 
policy entrepreneurship in building a coalition around the Priority Model during the 82nd 
Legislature in 2011.  Changes in political power prior to the 2015 session, however – a 
new Governor and Lieutenant Governor, new committee leadership, and exclusion of 
Senator Zaffirini from the Senate Higher Education Committee – created a very different 
political environment for the 84th Session than SB 28 encountered four years prior.  In 
2011, Zaffirni’s influence contributed to SB 28’s successful passage; in 2015, after 
gubernatorial leadership changes curtailed Zaffirini’s political influence, HB 700 quickly 
eliminated the B-On-Time program she had created 12 years earlier.  Changes in the 
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political stream therefore created a policy window for HB 700 that would likely not have 
occurred if Zaffirini still held significant power in the Legislature.  These developments 
illustrate MSA’s emphasis on the role of policy entrepreneurs, policy windows, and the 
political stream in shaping legislative outcomes.  MSA’s attention to shifts in power and 
political agendas allows for a more nuanced understanding of the intangible factors 
shaping higher education policymaking.   
Policymaking is not linear.  This study’s findings also reinforce Kingdon’s 
(1984) depiction of the policymaking process as nonlinear and ambiguous.  Legislative 
outcomes do not result from a sequential process of problem definition and policy 
development; rather, Kingdon argues, policy change results from a complex interaction 
between and among the problem, policy, and political streams.  The cases discussed in 
this study lend further credibility to Kingdon’s framework.  SB 1735 responded to a 
problem (unsustainable growth in foregone tuition revenue) – but that problem might also 
be traced back to a political decision to extend Hazlewood benefits to veterans’ 
dependents in 2009, a vote participants explained was based on inadequate data and 
ultimately represented a political favor from Senator Leticia Van de Putte to her veteran 
constituent base.  In HB 700, Representative Giddings responded to concerns from 
constituent institutions about utilization of the B-On-Time program, but participants 
attributed the bill’s momentum and passage to political antipathy toward tuition set-
asides and changes in leadership at the Capitol.  On its surface, SB 28 responded to 
budget constraints with a model for prioritizing state aid resources – but participants 
identified a subliminal political agenda aimed at diverting aid to more deserving students, 
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rather than expanding access to all.  These bills offer examples of politics disguised as 
problems, resulting in policies that often addressed political agendas rather than state 
needs.  In prioritizing analysis of politics as well as problems and policies, Kingdon’s 
framework draws attention to the less visible forces shaping these policies.  
Consequently, these three cases demonstrate the cyclical nature of policymaking – rather 
than progressing from problems to solutions, policies may emerge from the political 
stream and attach themselves to the problems they are most likely to appear to solve.    
Intermingled streams.  Finally, Kingdon’s (1984) depiction of these three 
interconnected streams is both insightful and insufficient.  The process of applying MSA 
through my interview protocol, coding procedures, and the organization of findings in 
response to questions intentionally aligned with each stream revealed how difficult it can 
be to disconnect and differentiate policies, problems, and politics – particularly the latter 
two.  Kingdon describes these forces as dynamic, interdependent, and interconnected; 
indeed, it is nearly impossible to identify where one stream ends and another begins.  
Such is the point of Kingdon’s approach – but also its primary limitation.  MSA is highly 
effective in illustrating the policymaking context when taking all three streams as an 
interconnected whole.  When attempting to view the problem or political streams 
independently of one another, for example, Kingdon’s MSA offers less explanatory 
power and reveals an opportunity to fine-tune or supplement his model. 
Untangling the three streams shaping these bills is particularly difficult because in 
effect, the political stream absorbs the policy and problem streams across the cases in this 
study.  Each case shows that politics heavily colors problem definition: Texas’s 
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conservative ideology and political leadership shaped the way policymakers viewed 
tuition set-asides, return on investment of state aid programs, and veteran benefits.  These 
issues emerged as problems because of the political values influencing the state’s agenda.  
Perhaps the political stream simply played an “over-sized role” (to quote one elected 
official) in these cases.  Consequently, this study points to a need for additional definition 
and examination of the role of the political stream in shaping problems and policies.  
Kingdon describes policies emerging from a “policy primordial soup” in which ideas 
slowly evolve or die out within murky depths of policy subsystems.  In these cases, I 
suggest that Kingdon’s primordial soup may contain more politics than policies.  Rather 
than policy primordial soup, this study depicts a political primordial soup.  Problems and 
policies emerge as products of this political primordial soup, adapting and evolving as the 
three streams carry them toward a legislative outcome, or lack thereof.   
Following the examples of McLendon (2003a) and Ness (2010), I offer Figure 1 
as a visual model of the application of Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams approach to 
higher education policymaking related to college affordability in Texas.  For context and 
comparison, Figures 2 and 3 present previous models of Kingdon’s application to higher 
education governance reform and lottery scholarship eligibility by McLendon (2003a) 
and Ness (2010). 
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Figure 1.  Multiple Streams Model of College Affordability Policymaking in Texas.   
This model is intended to communicate the dominance of the political stream 
across the three cases included in this study.  Rather than three independent streams, I 
depict the state problem and state policy streams as contained within the state political 
stream, situated within the broader context of national college affordability discourse and 
federal policy.  The “outside” environment depicted beyond the streams attracted 
attention and visibility to the issue of affordability, while federal issues such as preferred 
lending laws and the pending University of Houston court case compounded the 
challenges facing B-On-Time and the Hazlewood program.  According to this model, the 
problem and policy streams are a product of the overarching political stream, which 
shapes problem definition and the policies that reach the state agenda.  Rather than 
streams, one might even view problems and policies as currents within the overarching 
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political stream.  The currents in this stream progress to a policy window, where they are 
captured by a policy entrepreneur and maneuvered through the legislative process.   
Figure 1 differs from Figures 2 and 3 in its treatment of the problem and policy 
streams as elements of the political stream, rather than presenting each stream 
independently.  While McLendon (2003b) examined state higher education governance 
reform and Ness (2010) studied the process of determining merit aid eligibility criteria, I 
have focused my multiple streams analysis on policies related to college affordability.  
On this issue, I find that politics dominates the policy process and the political stream 
absorbs the policy and problem streams.  McLendon and Ness also include more 
extensive governance, regional, and national context in their models, while I focus on the 
political context in Texas immediately surrounding SB 28, HB 700, and SB 1735.  
Despite these variations, each model incorporates Kingdon’s (1984) three streams, the 
role of policy entrepreneurs (which McLendon calls “policy opportunists”), and the 
presence of policy windows.  The structural similarities and differences across these 
adapted models underscore the relevance and versatility of Kingdon’s multiple streams 
approach to the study of higher education policymaking.  These frameworks also 
reinforce the importance of conducting qualitative research to illustrate and expand 
theories of the policy process.   
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Figure 2.  Revised Garbage Can Model by McLendon.  Source: McLendon, M.  K.  
(2003).  Setting the governmental agenda for state decentralization of higher education.  
The Journal of Higher Education, 74(5), 479-515. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Revised Multiple Streams Model of Lottery Beneficiary Decision by Ness.  
Source: Ness, E.  C.  (2010).  The politics of determining merit aid eligibility criteria: An 
analysis of the policy process.  The Journal of Higher Education, 81(1), 33-60. 
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Additional and alternative theories.  While Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams 
approach clearly illuminates the dynamic and complex environment shaping college 
affordability legislation in Texas, other theories may supplement and deepen these 
findings.  Theories that focus on the forces contained in Kingdon’s political stream – 
particularly power, policy entrepreneurs, and policy windows – may be especially useful 
given the political stream’s dominant role in these cases.  Sabatier’s (1991) advocacy 
coalition framework describes the work of interest groups and policy communities 
focused on advancing a certain agenda.  Coalitions form around shared values and 
beliefs; multiple such groups compete and compromise with one another to produce 
policy change on key issues.  Viewed through this framework, policymakers opposed to 
tuition set-asides, veterans groups opposed to changes to Hazlewood, and Democrats and 
higher education stakeholders concerned about the effects of the Priority Model each 
played a role as coalitions shaping the legislative outcomes of the cases in this study.  
Considering Sabatier’s approach may provide further insight into the work of institutions 
as legislative constituents seeking to communicate their concerns to the Legislature. 
 Additionally, Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) punctuated equilibrium theory may 
offer valuable insight into the cases considered in this study.  Baumgartner and Jones 
describe long periods of policy stability, interrupted by sudden changes in awareness, 
information, or power.  Such shifts enable more dramatic policy change than might occur 
during periods of stability; this approach is not unlike Kingdon’s (1984) concept of a 
policy window.  In particular, viewing the three cases in this study through the lens of 
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punctuated equilibrium theory could further illuminate the role of changes in leadership 
and power in the Legislature and Governor’s Office. 
 Researcher perspective.  I approached this study expecting to find that politics 
heavily influenced the development and outcomes of my three selected cases.  Indeed, I 
selected my cases for their potential to illustrate these political dynamics.  In retrospect, 
conducting this research has both reinforced and evolved my perspective on the role of 
politics in these three cases and in higher education policymaking more broadly.  I found 
these bills, and the issue of college affordability, to be even more political than I 
anticipated.  During the course of this study, I also realized that the three cases I 
originally viewed as independent policies were in reality deeply interconnected.  
Politics was even more central to the outcomes of these bills than I expected.  
While problems and policies certainly played a role in each case, I was surprised to find 
that these problems and policies more often reflected the state’s budget constraints and 
competing priorities than the specific issue of higher education cost.  I selected these 
cases to illustrate the politics surrounding college affordability, and while they did indeed 
allow me to explore these dynamics, they also addressed broader underlying issues that I 
did not anticipate would play such a significant role.  As a result, I expect many of this 
study’s findings may speak not only to the politics of higher education policymaking, but 
also to the politics of policymaking in general.  The politics of higher education are 
perhaps not so different from the politics shaping the role of government more broadly: 
stakeholders and policymakers must wrestle with how to pay for state programs, who 
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should pay and how they should qualify, and how best to distribute limited resources for 
the greatest outcome.  Politics boils down to the allocation of values and money. 
As a consequence of this work, I view the politics of higher education as 
something that is perhaps less unique to higher education than I anticipated.  I believe this 
study demonstrates that politics affects higher education in many of the ways we expect 
and acknowledge politics to affect other policy arenas: power, budget constraints, and 
policymakers’ and states’ underlying values and ideologies heavily shape the way 
problems are viewed and which policies are proposed and considered.  This conclusion is 
significant because higher education has traditionally received less political attention than 
other, more broad-based policy issues, such as public education or healthcare.  With 
growth in higher education enrollment, it seems policies in this arena are increasingly 
relevant to constituents and therefore to their representatives, making higher education 
issues more visible and controversial.  As Doyle (2007a) and Sabloff (1997) have noted, 
higher education is becoming increasingly politicized.  The dynamics surrounding 
college affordability illustrate this ongoing shift in higher education as a political issue.   
I also conclude this research with a distinct awareness of the interconnectedness 
among state higher education policies.  I selected three independent bills affecting 
different programs and originally viewed them as separate, unique cases.  While they are 
indeed unique and separate, the issues they address are ultimately intertwined.  This 
realization underscores the importance of acknowledging context and considering the 
broader landscape when conducting higher education policy research.  SB 28 in 2011 
dealt with rationing funds for TEXAS Grants, the state’s largest financial aid program.  
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Over time, as the recommended award size for these need-based grants has shrunk in 
order to support more students, the Legislature has required institutions to use their own 
resources to provide the balance of TEXAS Grants recipients’ tuition and fees.  
Institutions meet this matching requirement primarily through tuition set-asides.  Tuition 
set-asides were also used to fund the B-On-Time program, which HB 700 in 2015 
discontinued due in great part to political opposition to set-asides themselves.  Lastly, the 
Hazlewood program exempts veterans and their dependents from tuition and fees in 
public higher education.  However, the growing number of legacy beneficiaries 
ultimately places additional financial pressure on institutions to compensate for lost 
revenue, further limiting the resources they might use to provide need-based financial aid, 
and increases the cost of tuition for non-Hazlewood students.  I am struck that despite the 
interconnectedness of these policies, participants indicated that policymakers rarely 
viewed them in concert.  I complete this study more acutely aware of the danger posed by 
looking at one policy in isolation, when in reality any change to one will likely affect the 
other – potentially producing unintended consequences that hinder, rather than help, the 
state’s avowed interests.  None of these policies actually improved college affordability, 
and their interplay may even compound the cost issue.   
Future Research 
 This study reveals a variety of opportunities for future research on the politics of 
higher education policymaking.  First and foremost, as this work has focused specifically 
on the political context in Texas during the time period surrounding these bills, other 
studies should examine how politics shapes policies related to college affordability in 
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other states.  Additional case study research examining how politics shapes policy 
outcomes in other contexts can illuminate the diverse policy environments affecting 
higher education across the U.S.  The politics surrounding college cost and affordability 
provide timely, critical issues to examine, and researchers should capitalize on the 
opportunity to investigate this area in order to contribute both to theory, and to the 
policymaking process itself.  Policy insights and recommendations from higher education 
scholars can and should play an important role in the policy process. 
 Subsequent research should also consider how changes in leadership and political 
capital influence both the broader higher education policy agenda and specific bills 
addressing higher education.  This study has demonstrated that key legislators and elected 
officials can play a pivotal role in generating support for – or opposition to – higher 
education policies.  Changes in power dynamics and political authority can also create 
policy windows for legislative changes that previous leadership might not have permitted.  
Future research should examine other examples of changes in state political leadership 
and its effects on policy agendas and outcomes for higher education.  Investigating these 
dynamics in other states through single and multi-state case studies can contribute to the 
emergent and valuable literature on higher education politics.  Such research will also 
equip higher education stakeholders with a deeper understanding of the political forces 
they must navigate in order to support institutions and students.   
 This study also points to the need for further research on the role of institutions as 
legislative constituents and interest groups, and particularly their potential to impact 
policy outcomes through advocacy, governmental relations, and lobbying efforts.  The 
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cases in this study offer examples of institutions engaging in the policy process – 
contributing to policy design (SB 28), voicing both concerns and support for financial aid 
programs (HB 700), and communicating about financial challenges due to legislative 
mandates (SB 1735).  Further research should examine the strategies institutions use to 
engage most effectively in the policy process; the types of bills and issues in which they 
most frequently engage, and with the most success; and how these findings vary across 
states, institution types, and issue areas.  In addition, given Texas’s complex higher 
education landscape comprised of seven public university systems, public institutions 
unaffiliated with systems, 50 community colleges, and private institutions (Education 
Commission of the States, 2016), research should also investigate how government 
relations activity varies across different higher education governance and structural 
contexts.  Studies might examine the contexts and issues most likely to unite or divide 
institutions and systems, and the postsecondary governance structures that best facilitate 
effective policy engagements on behalf of institutions and students. 
 Given the explanatory power of Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams approach to 
this study of higher education politics and policymaking in Texas, future higher 
education policy research should also consider applying this and other frameworks from 
the field of political science. Sabatier’s (1988) advocacy coalition framework and 
Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) punctuated equilibrium theory may also illuminate the 
role of interest groups, political coalitions, and policy windows.  As noted earlier, deeper 
examination of the political stream may benefit from supplementing MSA with the 
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contributions of these and other frameworks that focus more specifically on political 
agendas and changes in the political environment. 
Concluding Remarks 
 This study examined how politics shapes legislation related to college 
affordability in Texas.  Considering three bills affecting three different types of tuition 
assistance – a need-based grant, forgivable loan, and tuition exemption – I reviewed 
archival data and conducted stakeholder interviews in order to analyze how policymakers 
defined the problem of college affordability, why these three bills emerged onto the 
policy agenda, and how politics shaped their development and outcomes.  I found that 
affordability was largely undefined and politically malleable, that these three bills 
primarily emerged due to budget constraints rather than concerns over affordability for 
students, and that politics dominated the lifecycle of each bill through policy 
entrepreneurs, leadership changes, and electoral politics.  While each case offers a 
valuable and unique illustration of the political forces shaping higher education 
policymaking, these policies ultimately addressed concerns other than college 
affordability – despite the declining ability of students and families to finance higher 
education (Delaney, 2014; Perna & Li, 2006). 
 The growing state and national discourse over college affordability invokes many 
questions: what it means for college to be affordable; how to make college affordable, 
and for whom college is or is not affordable, to name a few.  In considering these three 
bills, their political dynamics, and their policy implications, I suggest in closing that there 
are two separate, but intertwined debates at hand: whether college is affordable and how 
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to make it so, and the issue of making college affordable for whom.  For low-income 
students; for middle class students?  For all students, or for meritorious students?  In 
considering these questions and related policies, researchers, analysts, and higher 
education stakeholders – myself included – must be mindful of the differences, politics, 
and interplay between these two debates.   
College affordability represents a major national issue that policymakers and 
higher education leaders must address in substance, not just in rhetoric.  Policies 
addressing college affordability should, in fact, address and improve college affordability 
– and they must focus on the needs of students and the fiscal challenges facing 
institutions, not just the needs of the state.  I present this study in an effort to contribute to 
the college affordability discourse by calling attention to the role of politics surrounding 
this issue, and to demonstrate the need for policies that directly address the needs of 
students and institutions in order to make college more affordable. 
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Appendix A 
Participant Recruitment Email 
Subject Line: Dissertation Interview Request 
Dear <Title, Last Name>: 
I am a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Educational Administration at the 
University of Texas at Austin, and my dissertation focuses on the politics surrounding 
college affordability in Texas. I am studying three financial aid bills considered by the 
Legislature during the last 5 years: SB 28, 82nd Legislature, creating the Texas Grants 
Priority Model; HB 700, 84th Legislature, discontinuing the B-On-Time Loan Program; 
and SB 1735, 84th Legislature, seeking to amend the Hazlewood Legacy Program.  
 
I am conducting interviews with stakeholders who have special insight into one or more 
of these bills. <If their name has been suggested by another contact, state that here.> I 
would be grateful for the opportunity to speak with you about your perspective. 
Interviews are approximately 45-60 minutes in length, scheduled at your convenience in 
March and April 2016, and will be audio-recorded for transcription and analysis. While 
in-person interviews are preferable, I can also arrange to speak with you by phone.  
 
Your participation in this study is confidential and anonymous; you will be assigned a 
pseudonym and a general descriptor for the purpose of my findings, and I will make no 
reference to your name or position. I have attached my study’s UT-Austin Institutional 
Review Board approval letter for more information. 
 
Please reply to this email or contact me by phone at (803) 603-7302 to schedule an 
interview. Thank you for your efforts on behalf of higher education in Texas. I hope to 
speak soon. 
 
Best regards, 
 
Anna Drake, M.S. 
Doctoral Candidate 
The University of Texas at Austin 
annapdrake@austin.utexas.edu  
803.603.7302 
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Appendix B 
Interview Protocol 
Warm-Up 
Introduce myself, background, and briefly describe study – this research examines how 
politics affects financial aid policy in Texas, specifically studying three bills within the 
last five years. 
1. Can you tell me a little bit about your role and work with Texas higher 
education? 
Policy Context 
2. Can you describe the political climate in Texas over the last decade or so?  
3. What about the political climate surrounding college affordability in Texas? 
4. What role do you think state financial aid plays in promoting college 
affordability? 
5. To what extent do you think affordability and financial aid are partisan issues? 
6. Who are the key stakeholders and interest groups with a voice in these issues? 
Policy Agenda 
7. What made each of these bills a priority for the Legislature to consider? 
8. Who were the key leaders of these policy initiatives?  
a. How did these policies align with their/their constituents’ interests? 
9. Who were the key critics or opponents of these efforts? 
b. How did opposing these policies align with their/their constituents’ 
interests? 
Policy Development 
10. What do you recall about the debate over these bills? 
c. What were the contentious issues? 
d. What were the key positions/arguments, and from whom? 
11. How did each bill change throughout the session? 
12. What strategies did the authors and supporters use to promote each bill? 
13. What strategies did opponents use to counter each bill? 
Policy Outcomes 
14. What role do you think politics played in the outcome of each bill? 
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15. How might different factors have produced different outcomes?  
e. Components of the bills themselves? 
f. Factors related to political leadership? 
g. Factors related to the broader political and economic environment? 
16. Is there anything else you would like to share or that would be helpful for me to 
know?  
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Appendix C 
Codebook 
ATLAS.ti Report 
Dissertation 
Codes grouped by Code groups 
Report created by Anna Drake on Oct 6, 2016 
 CASES 
3 Codes: 
● HB 700, B-On-Time Loan Program 
Groups: 
 Cases 
Comment: 
Related to HB 700 case, addressing the B-On-Time Loan program. 
● SB 28, Texas Grants Priority Model 
Groups: 
 Cases 
Comment: 
Related to SB 28 case, addressing TEXAS Grants program. 
● SB 1735, Hazlewood Exemption 
Groups: 
 Cases 
Comment: 
Related to SB 1735 case, addressing Hazlewood Legacy Program. 
 EMERGENT THEMES 
33 Codes: 
● Anti-Intellectualism 
Groups: 
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 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
Related to or indicating the presence of anti-intellectual forces or factions, critical of 
higher education as elitist and intangible ideas as unnecessary. 
● Bipartisanship 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ1: Problem Definition 
Comment: 
Both sides are concerned about cost, but diverge on why and how to address the issue. 
Democrats tend to see affordability based on an interest in promoting equity and 
access, and want to provide more appropriations and aid. Republicans tend to see 
affordability as a way to ensure cost containment, and want to cut back on funding and 
see institutions be more efficient. 
● Budget Climate/Constraints 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Economic and budget reality of the state, supply and demand - for Texas Grants in 
particular, the state wasn’t able to meet the needs of all eligible students as the 
population and number of students with financial need grew. 
● Business Mindset 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
Related to or indicating the influence of the business community in Texas politics; 
viewing higher education as a business enterprise with students as consumers and 
degrees as products. A view of government focused on return on investment. 
● Coalition Building 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
Related to policy entrepreneurship; intentional efforts to convene a broad group of 
stakeholders and supporters, particularly around the Texas Grant Priority Model and led 
by Commissioner Paredes and Senator Zaffirini as a strategy to increase support in the 
face of Democrat and minority caucus concerns. 
● Commissioner Leadership 
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Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Comissioner Paredes’s interest in expanding the use of “need plus merit” criteria in the 
state’s financial aid programs, in order to increase achievement, outcomes, and reward 
hard working students. 
● Conservative Political Paradigm 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ1: Problem Definition 
Comment: 
Texas’s ingrained political culture and ideology, critical of taxes, redistribution, and 
heavily populist and interest in hard work and merit. Increasing right-wing conservatism 
since the 1990s and political competition, showboating, and emulation of Rick Perry and 
Ted Cruz. Increasing influence of the Tea Party, particularly on social issues. 
● Cost of Higher Education 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
Pertaining to cost changes, drivers of cost increases, and views of the cost of public 
higher education. 
● Defining Affordability 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ1: Problem Definition 
Comment: 
Policymakers have not defined what it means for college to be affordable - although they 
hav established affordability as a broad issue of concern affecting state and students. 
Malleability of the term enables defining and manipulating the issue to serve political 
interests. Affordability is part of a bigger debate in which cost and inefficiency in higher 
education are symptoms and weapons in a larger attack on higher education. 
● Economy and Demography 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   Literature Review   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
The state’s population growth, particularly among nonwhite students and many with 
greater financial need, and the ways this affects the state budget and higher education 
pipeline. 
   
248 
● Fingerpointing 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
Legislature unwilling to take responsibility for funding levels, institutions blaming 
legislature for lack of funding, coordinating board “stuck in between.” Institutions seen as 
hypocritical for raising tuition and expanding campuses, administrative bloat. Skeptism 
and impatience from the legislature, disillusionment with legislature from institutions for 
inability to understand and respond to their needs. Lack of owning on the cost issue 
from all sides. 
● Graduation Outcomes 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Concern for the state’s return on investment and the extent to which students receiving 
state aid (and state subsidies through appropriations to offset tuition) are graduating in a 
timely manner and entering the workforce to contribute to the economy. 
● Influence of Veteran Lobby 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
Aversion to taking anything away from veterans or voting against veterans’ rights or 
benefits. Closely connected to conservative political paradigm. 
● Institutional Concerns 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
For B on Time, institutions unable to maximize the program because of federal 
limitations on promotion of the program as a private loan. For Hazlewood, concerns 
about the burgeoning cost and the state’s unfunded mandate that they absorb the cost 
of veteran students and legacy. For Texas Grants, concern that metrics would prevent 
individual institutions from receiving aid for their students depending on their campus 
composition. 
● Institutions as Interest Groups 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
   
249 
Related to institutional concerns; institutions’ voicing of their concerns and the 
Legislature’s response to institutions as a constituency and interest group. Institutions’ 
ability, or inability, to speak collectively for broader impact on state policy. 
● Lack of Advocacy 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
Bill or policy idea lacking support, due to factors such as change in political leadership 
or environment; for HB 700 in particular, Zaffirini and Dewhurst’s transitions out of power 
leaving the BOT program without an influential ally. 
● Leadership Changes 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Elections, transitions, and the resulting shifts in priorities and agendas related to higher 
education. At the governor level, Perry to Abbott; and the lieutenant governor level, 
Dewhurst to Patrick. A role reversal in many ways for higher education, moving from a 
more conservative governor and more moderate lieutenant governor, to the opposite - a 
more moderate governor and tea party lieutenant governor. These elected officials 
appoint committee chairs and therefore heavily shape the policy agenda around key 
issues. 
Merged comment from Past Political Leadership on 8/8/16, 11:47 AM 
The influence of past political leaders, primarily elected officials, who created certain 
programs - such as B-On-Time and the Hazlewood Legacy benefit - but left power and 
are no longer in a position to advocate for or defend their programs, potentially leaving 
those programs disadvantaged when bills affecting them are on the table. 
● Limitations on Promotion 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
For B-On-Time, institutions were unable to promote the program to students because of 
federal regulations that categorized it as a private loan and required them to meet 
preferred lendor requirements. These limitations undermined the program’s utilization. 
● Misinformation/Ignorance 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Incorrect information, misunderstanding, lack of understanding or blatant ignorance, and 
poor communication - resulting in some cases in poor management of programs or 
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policies. For B-On-Time, a misunderstanding about how the program was funded; for 
Hazlewood, inaccurate and incomplete data projections on the program’s utilization and 
budgetary impact on institutions. 
● Mistrust/Skepticism of Higher Education 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ1: Problem Definition 
Comment: 
The legislature (and other groups’) skepticism of higher education’s fiscal responsibility, 
efficiency, outcomes, and transparency. A low point in trust of higher education by the 
legislature and public. Sentiment that funding higher education was not well spent, and 
therefore not a good use of state funds. 
● Need for Financial Flexibility 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Institutions’ interest in greater financial flexibility due to budget pressures from 
Hazlewood exemptions, Texas Grants’ requirement that aid offices make up the 
difference between state funding of the program and students’ cost of attendance, and 
the growing need of students and cost of higher education. Need for flexibility influenced 
institutions’ positions on aid programs, criteria, and end of the B-On-Time program. 
● Partisan Ideological Differences 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
Shared interest in affordability, but more party-line views on higher education’s role and 
the state’s role in it. Greater republican interest in merit and workforce outcomes, and 
democratic interest in need and access. Republicans may tend to view higher education 
opportunity as more naturally equitable based on hard work, while democrats may be 
more likely to see opportunity as related to class and race and inequitable based on 
those factors. 
● Political Manipulation 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
Political leaders’ manipulation of data, issues, rhetoric, and other opportunities in order 
to advance their own agendas. Closely related to Kingdon’s definition of the political 
stream and elected officials’ manipulation of situations for their interests. For 
affordability, the lack of a clear definition for this term allows politicans to define it in the 
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way that best serves their agents. The democrats also leveraged the Hazlewood issue 
to advance their position on veterans. 
● Program Equity/Inequity 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Concerns about the inequitable utilization and distribution of benefits related to higher 
education aid and exemption programs. For Texas Grants, concerns that the 
priority  model would disadvantage students of color; for B-On-Time, concerns that the 
program was unequally distributed and involved cross-subsidization across campuses; 
and for Hazlewood, campuses with larger veteran populations were required to absorb 
greater costs. 
● Program Utilization 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Utilization of aid programs by students and institutions, related to return on investment 
and the state’s interest in efficient use of resources, graduation rates, and workforce 
outcomes. For B-On-Time, difficulty accessing the program due to promotion 
regulations, and also unequal utilization across campuses due to student body 
characteristics. For Hazlewood, dramatic increase in utilization, particularly on some 
campuses with higher veteran communities. 
● Role of Financial Aid 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
The role of financial aid in addresing affordability concerns and the relationship(s) 
between and among appropriations, tuition, and aid. Ideological and party views of 
financial aid priorities and how the state should fund them. 
● Role of Higher Education 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
How the state and different stakeholders understand the role of public higher education 
in relation to students, the workforce, and taxpayers. 
● Student Aid Eligibility Metrics 
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Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
The metrics and criteria affecting eligibility for aid programs. For Texas Grants, the 
priority model debate involved fine-tuning these metrics so they were not seen to 
disadvantage lower-income and minority students. Due to budget constraints, changing 
metrics also allowed the state to claim to fund more of the students who qualified for aid. 
● Tea Party Influence 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
Related to the influence of the ultraconservative Tea Party in Texas and their political 
rhetoric, particularly around social issues. 
● Timing 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
The influence of timing on bill development and outcomes. For Hazlewood, the House 
had time to mobilize after the Senate voted, and the bill was scheduled for a vote on 
Memorial Day; for B-On-Time, the bill was heard later in the session, which may have 
increased its momentum and limited debate. 
● Tuition Setasides 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Political campaign against tuition setasides, led by the Lieutenant Governor. Related to 
the state’s conservative political culture and aversion to taxes and redistribution. 
Setasides funded the B-On-Time program and made the program a political target as 
part of a larger policy issue. 
● Use of Data 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes 
Comment: 
Use of data and research to inform decisions and the manipulation of that data to serve 
political or policy ageanas. 
● Workforce Emphasis 
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Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ1: Problem Definition 
Comment: 
Higher education and affordability seen as primarily about the economy; legislators 
concerned about money and the budget and think in terms of return on investment. 
60x30 state higher education plan and its focus on workforce outcomes. Business-
minded view of higher education with students as consumers and degrees as products 
for workforce. Higher education’s engagement with this view and use of its rhetoric in 
order to increase funding and speak in a way the legislature understands. 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
9 Codes: 
● Economy and Demography 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   Literature Review   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
The state’s population growth, particularly among nonwhite students and many with 
greater financial need, and the ways this affects the state budget and higher education 
pipeline. 
● Elected Officials 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence 
Comment: 
The role and influence of elected officials in shaping higher education policy. 
● Electoral Politics 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence 
Comment: 
Politicians’ sensitivity to constituents, interest groups, and competition due to their 
interest in securing re-election; the effects this sensitivity may have on their statements, 
behaviors, and policy decisions. 
● Governance Structure 
Groups: 
 Literature Review 
Comment: 
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The structure of state higher education governance and other related state agencies, 
and the influence of these structural characteristics on higher education policymaking 
and politics. 
● Interest Groups 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence 
Comment: 
Role and influence of interest groups in relation to legislators and their policy priorities; 
participation of these groups in the policy and political process. 
● Policy Entrepreneurs 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence   Theoretical Framework 
Comment: 
Based on Kingdon’s framework, “advocates for proposals or for the prominence of an 
idea” who are adept at manipulating the policy, problem, and political streams in order to 
bring their ideas to fruition. 
● Political Culture 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence 
Comment: 
The state's values, traditions, and ideological undercurrents and context, and how these 
dynamics may influence politics and policy. 
● Political Party 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence 
Comment: 
Political party and partisanship; how these identities and ideologies influence views on 
higher education and shape the outcomes of the case bills. 
● Political Stream 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence   Theoretical Framework 
Comment: 
Based on Kingdon’s framework, “such things as public mood, pressure group 
campaigns, eletion results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and 
changes of administration...politicians’ attention to voter reactions, their skewering of 
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members of the opposite political party, and their efforts to obtain the support of 
important interest group leaders…" 
 RQ1: PROBLEM DEFINITION 
6 Codes: 
● Bipartisanship 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ1: Problem Definition 
Comment: 
Both sides are concerned about cost, but diverge on why and how to address the issue. 
Democrats tend to see affordability based on an interest in promoting equity and 
access, and want to provide more appropriations and aid. Republicans tend to see 
affordability as a way to ensure cost containment, and want to cut back on funding and 
see institutions be more efficient. 
● Conservative Political Paradigm 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ1: Problem Definition 
Comment: 
Texas’s ingrained political culture and ideology, critical of taxes, redistribution, and 
heavily populist and interest in hard work and merit. Increasing right-wing conservatism 
since the 1990s and political competition, showboating, and emulation of Rick Perry and 
Ted Cruz. Increasing influence of the Tea Party, particularly on social issues. 
● Defining Affordability 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ1: Problem Definition 
Comment: 
Policymakers have not defined what it means for college to be affordable - although they 
hav established affordability as a broad issue of concern affecting state and students. 
Malleability of the term enables defining and manipulating the issue to serve political 
interests. Affordability is part of a bigger debate in which cost and inefficiency in higher 
education are symptoms and weapons in a larger attack on higher education. 
● Mistrust/Skepticism of Higher Education 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ1: Problem Definition 
Comment: 
The legislature (and other groups’) skepticism of higher education’s fiscal responsibility, 
efficiency, outcomes, and transparency. A low point in trust of higher education by the 
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legislature and public. Sentiment that funding higher education was not well spent, and 
therefore not a good use of state funds. 
● Problem Stream 
Groups: 
 RQ1: Problem Definition   Theoretical Framework 
Comment: 
Problems are changes in indicators that rise to the surface through focusing events or 
information; they become problems when policymakers decide it is necessary to do 
something about them. 
● Workforce Emphasis 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ1: Problem Definition 
Comment: 
Higher education and affordability seen as primarily about the economy; legislators 
concerned about money and the budget and think in terms of return on investment. 
60x30 state higher education plan and its focus on workforce outcomes. Business-
minded view of higher education with students as consumers and degrees as products 
for workforce. Higher education’s engagement with this view and use of its rhetoric in 
order to increase funding and speak in a way the legislature understands. 
 RQ2: POLICY SOLUTIONS 
14 Codes: 
● Budget Climate/Constraints 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Economic and budget reality of the state, supply and demand - for Texas Grants in 
particular, the state wasn’t able to meet the needs of all eligible students as the 
population and number of students with financial need grew. 
● Commissioner Leadership 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Comissioner Paredes’s interest in expanding the use of “need plus merit” criteria in the 
state’s financial aid programs, in order to increase achievement, outcomes, and reward 
hard working students. 
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● Economy and Demography 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   Literature Review   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
The state’s population growth, particularly among nonwhite students and many with 
greater financial need, and the ways this affects the state budget and higher education 
pipeline. 
● Graduation Outcomes 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Concern for the state’s return on investment and the extent to which students receiving 
state aid (and state subsidies through appropriations to offset tuition) are graduating in a 
timely manner and entering the workforce to contribute to the economy. 
● Institutional Concerns 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
For B on Time, institutions unable to maximize the program because of federal 
limitations on promotion of the program as a private loan. For Hazlewood, concerns 
about the burgeoning cost and the state’s unfunded mandate that they absorb the cost 
of veteran students and legacy. For Texas Grants, concern that metrics would prevent 
individual institutions from receiving aid for their students depending on their campus 
composition. 
● Leadership Changes 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Elections, transitions, and the resulting shifts in priorities and agendas related to higher 
education. At the governor level, Perry to Abbott; and the lieutenant governor level, 
Dewhurst to Patrick. A role reversal in many ways for higher education, moving from a 
more conservative governor and more moderate lieutenant governor, to the opposite - a 
more moderate governor and tea party lieutenant governor. These elected officials 
appoint committee chairs and therefore heavily shape the policy agenda around key 
issues. 
Merged comment from Past Political Leadership on 8/8/16, 11:47 AM 
The influence of past political leaders, primarily elected officials, who created certain 
programs - such as B-On-Time and the Hazlewood Legacy benefit - but left power and 
are no longer in a position to advocate for or defend their programs, potentially leaving 
those programs disadvantaged when bills affecting them are on the table. 
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● Limitations on Promotion 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
For B-On-Time, institutions were unable to promote the program to students because of 
federal regulations that categorized it as a private loan and required them to meet 
preferred lendor requirements. These limitations undermined the program’s utilization. 
● Misinformation/Ignorance 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Incorrect information, misunderstanding, lack of understanding or blatant ignorance, and 
poor communication - resulting in some cases in poor management of programs or 
policies. For B-On-Time, a misunderstanding about how the program was funded; for 
Hazlewood, inaccurate and incomplete data projections on the program’s utilization and 
budgetary impact on institutions. 
● Need for Financial Flexibility 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Institutions’ interest in greater financial flexibility due to budget pressures from 
Hazlewood exemptions, Texas Grants’ requirement that aid offices make up the 
difference between state funding of the program and students’ cost of attendance, and 
the growing need of students and cost of higher education. Need for flexibility influenced 
institutions’ positions on aid programs, criteria, and end of the B-On-Time program. 
● Policy Stream 
Groups: 
 RQ2: Policy Solutions   Theoretical Framework 
Comment: 
Based on Kingdon’s framework, the stream of policies developing independently and 
interactively in relation to the political and problem streams; the evolution of these 
policies and their relationship to problems and politics. 
● Program Equity/Inequity 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
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Concerns about the inequitable utilization and distribution of benefits related to higher 
education aid and exemption programs. For Texas Grants, concerns that the 
priority  model would disadvantage students of color; for B-On-Time, concerns that the 
program was unequally distributed and involved cross-subsidization across campuses; 
and for Hazlewood, campuses with larger veteran populations were required to absorb 
greater costs. 
● Program Utilization 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Utilization of aid programs by students and institutions, related to return on investment 
and the state’s interest in efficient use of resources, graduation rates, and workforce 
outcomes. For B-On-Time, difficulty accessing the program due to promotion 
regulations, and also unequal utilization across campuses due to student body 
characteristics. For Hazlewood, dramatic increase in utilization, particularly on some 
campuses with higher veteran communities. 
● Student Aid Eligibility Metrics 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
The metrics and criteria affecting eligibility for aid programs. For Texas Grants, the 
priority model debate involved fine-tuning these metrics so they were not seen to 
disadvantage lower-income and minority students. Due to budget constraints, changing 
metrics also allowed the state to claim to fund more of the students who qualified for aid. 
● Tuition Setasides 
Groups: 
 Emergent Themes   RQ2: Policy Solutions 
Comment: 
Political campaign against tuition setasides, led by the Lieutenant Governor. Related to 
the state’s conservative political culture and aversion to taxes and redistribution. 
Setasides funded the B-On-Time program and made the program a political target as 
part of a larger policy issue. 
 RQ3: POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
8 Codes: 
● Elected Officials 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence 
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Comment: 
The role and influence of elected officials in shaping higher education policy. 
● Electoral Politics 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence 
Comment: 
Politicians’ sensitivity to constituents, interest groups, and competition due to their 
interest in securing re-election; the effects this sensitivity may have on their statements, 
behaviors, and policy decisions. 
● Interest Groups 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence 
Comment: 
Role and influence of interest groups in relation to legislators and their policy priorities; 
participation of these groups in the policy and political process. 
● Policy Entrepreneurs 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence   Theoretical Framework 
Comment: 
Based on Kingdon’s framework, “advocates for proposals or for the prominence of an 
idea” who are adept at manipulating the policy, problem, and political streams in order to 
bring their ideas to fruition. 
● Policy Windows 
Groups: 
 RQ3: Political Influence   Theoretical Framework 
Comment: 
Based on Kingdon’s framework, opportunities for policy change that arise as a result of 
shifts in the political stream, events in the environment, or new information drawing 
attention to a problem. 
● Political Culture 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence 
Comment: 
The state's values, traditions, and ideological undercurrents and context, and how these 
dynamics may influence politics and policy. 
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● Political Party 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence 
Comment: 
Political party and partisanship; how these identities and ideologies influence views on 
higher education and shape the outcomes of the case bills. 
● Political Stream 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence   Theoretical Framework 
Comment: 
Based on Kingdon’s framework, “such things as public mood, pressure group 
campaigns, eletion results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and 
changes of administration...politicians’ attention to voter reactions, their skewering of 
members of the opposite political party, and their efforts to obtain the support of 
important interest group leaders…" 
 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
5 Codes: 
● Policy Entrepreneurs 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence   Theoretical Framework 
Comment: 
Based on Kingdon’s framework, “advocates for proposals or for the prominence of an 
idea” who are adept at manipulating the policy, problem, and political streams in order to 
bring their ideas to fruition. 
● Policy Stream 
Groups: 
 RQ2: Policy Solutions   Theoretical Framework 
Comment: 
Based on Kingdon’s framework, the stream of policies developing independently and 
interactively in relation to the political and problem streams; the evolution of these 
policies and their relationship to problems and politics. 
● Policy Windows 
Groups: 
 RQ3: Political Influence   Theoretical Framework 
Comment: 
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Based on Kingdon’s framework, opportunities for policy change that arise as a result of 
shifts in the political stream, events in the environment, or new information drawing 
attention to a problem. 
● Political Stream 
Groups: 
 Literature Review   RQ3: Political Influence   Theoretical Framework 
Comment: 
Based on Kingdon’s framework, “such things as public mood, pressure group 
campaigns, eletion results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and 
changes of administration...politicians’ attention to voter reactions, their skewering of 
members of the opposite political party, and their efforts to obtain the support of 
important interest group leaders…" 
● Problem Stream 
Groups: 
 RQ1: Problem Definition   Theoretical Framework 
Comment: 
Problems are changes in indicators that rise to the surface through focusing events or 
information; they become problems when policymakers decide it is necessary to do 
something about them. 
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Appendix D 
Code Frequency 
Code Name Groundedness Density  Groups Code Description 
Political Stream 327 4 3 
Based on Kingdon’s 
framework, “such things as 
public mood, pressure 
group campaigns, election 
results, partisan or 
ideological distributions in 
Congress, and changes of 
administration...politicians’ 
attention to voter reactions, 
their skewering of 
members of the opposite 
political party, and their 
efforts to obtain the 
support of important 
interest group leaders…" 
SB 1735, Hazlewood 
Exemption 278 1 1 
Related to SB 1735 case, 
addressing Hazlewood 
Legacy Program. 
Cost of Higher 
Education 261 1 1 
Pertaining to cost changes, 
drivers of cost increases, 
and views of the cost of 
public higher education. 
SB 28, Texas Grants 
Priority Model 182 1 1 
Related to SB 28 case, 
addressing TEXAS Grants 
program. 
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Elected Officials 181 0 2 
The role and influence of 
elected officials in shaping 
higher education policy. 
Budget 
Climate/Constraints 173 0 2 
Economic and budget 
reality of the state, supply 
and demand - for Texas 
Grants in particular, the 
state wasn’t able to meet 
the needs of all eligible 
students as the population 
and number of students 
with financial need grew. 
HB 700, B-On-Time 
Loan Program 171 1 1 
Related to HB 700 case, 
addressing the B-On-Time 
Loan program. 
Role of Financial Aid 158 0 1 
The role of financial aid in 
addresing affordability 
concerns and the 
relationship(s) between 
and among appropriations, 
tuition, and aid. Ideological 
and party views of financial 
aid priorities and how the 
state should fund them. 
Political Party 136 2 2 
Political party and 
partisanship; how these 
identities and ideologies 
influence views on higher 
education and shape the 
outcomes of the case bills. 
Program 
Equity/Inequity 125 0 2 
Concerns about the 
inequitable utilization and 
distribution of benefits 
related to higher education 
aid and exemption 
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programs. For Texas 
Grants, concerns that the 
priority  model would 
disadvantage students of 
color; for B-On-Time, 
concerns that the program 
was unequally distributed 
and involved cross-
subsidization across 
campuses; and for 
Hazlewood, campuses with 
larger veteran populations 
were required to absorb 
greater costs. 
Role of Higher 
Education 124 0 1 
How the state and different 
stakeholders understand 
the role of public higher 
education in relation to 
students, the workforce, 
and taxpayers. 
Student Aid Eligibility 
Metrics 112 0 2 
The metrics and criteria 
affecting eligibility for aid 
programs. For Texas 
Grants, the priority model 
debate involved fine-tuning 
these metrics so they were 
not seen to disadvantage 
lower-income and minority 
students. Due to budget 
constraints, changing 
metrics also allowed the 
state to claim to fund more 
of the students who 
qualified for aid. 
Political Culture 104 1 2 
The state's values, 
traditions, and ideological 
undercurrents and context, 
and how these dynamics 
may influence politics and 
policy. 
Interest Groups 98 1 2 
Role and influence of 
interest groups in relation 
to legislators and their 
policy priorities; 
participation of these 
groups in the policy and 
political process. 
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Leadership Changes 97 0 2 
Elections, transitions, and 
the resulting shifts in 
priorities and agendas 
related to higher education. 
At the governor level, Perry 
to Abbott; and the 
lieutenant governor level, 
Dewhurst to Patrick. A role 
reversal in many ways for 
higher education, moving 
from a more conservative 
governor and more 
moderate lieutenant 
governor, to the opposite - 
a more moderate governor 
and tea party lieutenant 
governor. These elected 
officials appoint committee 
chairs and therefore 
heavily shape the policy 
agenda around key 
issues.Merged comment 
from Past Political 
Leadership on 8/8/16, 
11:47 AMThe influence of 
past political leaders, 
primarily elected officials, 
who created certain 
programs - such as B-On-
Time and the Hazlewood 
Legacy benefit - but left 
power and are no longer in 
a position to advocate for 
or defend their programs, 
potentially leaving those 
programs disadvantaged 
when bills affecting them 
are on the table. 
Problem Stream 97 2 2 
Problems are changes in 
indicators that rise to the 
surface through focusing 
events or information; they 
become problems when 
policymakers decide it is 
necessary to do something 
about them. 
Conservative Political 
Paradigm 95 0 2 
Texas’s ingrained political 
culture and ideology, 
critical of taxes, 
redistribution, and heavily 
populist and interest in 
hard work and merit. 
Increasing right-wing 
   
267 
conservatism since the 
1990s and political 
competition, showboating, 
and emulation of Rick 
Perry and Ted Cruz. 
Increasing influence of the 
Tea Party, particularly on 
social issues. 
Influence of Veteran 
Lobby 95 0 1 
Aversion to taking anything 
away from veterans or 
voting against veterans’ 
rights or benefits. Closely 
connected to conservative 
political paradigm.  
Electoral Politics 94 1 2 
Politicians’ sensitivity to 
constituents, interest 
groups, and competition 
due to their interest in 
securing re-election; the 
effects this sensitivity may 
have on their statements, 
behaviors, and policy 
decisions. 
Graduation Outcomes 84 0 2 
Concern for the state’s 
return on investment and 
the extent to which 
students receiving state aid 
(and state subsidies 
through appropriations to 
offset tuition) are 
graduating in a timely 
manner and entering the 
workforce to contribute to 
the economy. 
Governance Structure 77 0 1 
The structure of state 
higher education 
governance and other 
related state agencies, and 
the influence of these 
structural characteristics 
on higher education 
policymaking and politics. 
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Policy Stream 76 3 2 
Based on Kingdon’s 
framework, the stream of 
policies developing 
independently and 
interactively in relation to 
the political and problem 
streams; the evolution of 
these policies and their 
relationship to problems 
and politics. 
Political Manipulation 74 0 1 
Political leaders’ 
manipulation of data, 
issues, rhetoric, and other 
opportunities in order to 
advance their own 
agendas. Closely related to 
Kingdon’s definition of the 
political stream and elected 
officials’ manipulation of 
situations for their 
interests. For affordability, 
the lack of a clear definition 
for this term allows 
politicans to define it in the 
way that best serves their 
agents. The democrats 
also leveraged the 
Hazlewood issue to 
advance their position on 
veterans. 
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Misinformation/Ignoran
ce 72 0 2 
Incorrect information, 
misunderstanding, lack of 
understanding or blatant 
ignorance, and poor 
communication - resulting 
in some cases in poor 
management of programs 
or policies. For B-On-Time, 
a misunderstanding about 
how the program was 
funded; for Hazlewood, 
inaccurate and incomplete 
data projections on the 
program’s utilization and 
budgetary impact on 
institutions.  
Mistrust/Skepticism of 
Higher Education 70 0 2 
The legislature (and other 
groups’) skepticism of 
higher education’s fiscal 
responsibility, efficiency, 
outcomes, and 
transparency. A low point 
in trust of higher education 
by the legislature and 
public. Sentiment that 
funding higher education 
was not well spent, and 
therefore not a good use of 
state funds. 
Institutional Concerns 69 0 2 
For B on Time, institutions 
unable to maximize the 
program because of 
federal limitations on 
promotion of the program 
as a private loan. For 
Hazlewood, concerns 
about the burgeoning cost 
and the state’s unfunded 
mandate that they absorb 
the cost of veteran 
students and legacy. For 
Texas Grants, concern that 
metrics would prevent 
individual institutions from 
receiving aid for their 
students depending on 
their campus composition. 
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Business Mindset 68 0 1 
Related to or indicating the 
influence of the business 
community in Texas 
politics; viewing higher 
education as a business 
enterprise with students as 
consumers and degrees as 
products. A view of 
government focused on 
return on investment. 
Fingerpointing 66 0 1 
Legislature unwilling to 
take responsibility for 
funding levels, institutions 
blaming legislature for lack 
of funding, coordinating 
board “stuck in between.” 
Institutions seen as 
hypocritical for raising 
tuition and expanding 
campuses, administrative 
bloat. Skeptism and 
impatience from the 
legislature, disillusionment 
with legislature from 
institutions for inability to 
understand and respond to 
their needs. Lack of 
owning on the cost issue 
from all sides. 
Defining Affordability 65 0 2 
Policymakers have not 
defined what it means for 
college to be affordable - 
although they hav 
established affordability as 
a broad issue of concern 
affecting state and 
students. Malleability of the 
term enables defining and 
manipulating the issue to 
serve political interests. 
Affordability is part of a 
bigger debate in which cost 
and inefficiency in higher 
education are symptoms 
and weapons in a larger 
attack on higher 
education.  
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Tuition Setasides 61 1 2 
Political campaign against 
tuition setasides, led by the 
Lieutenant Governor. 
Related to the state’s 
conservative political 
culture and aversion to 
taxes and redistribution. 
Setasides funded the B-
On-Time program and 
made the program a 
political target as part of a 
larger policy issue. 
Partisan Ideological 
Differences 58 1 1 
Shared interest in 
affordability, but more 
party-line views on higher 
education’s role and the 
state’s role in it. Greater 
republican interest in merit 
and workforce outcomes, 
and democratic interest in 
need and access. 
Republicans may tend to 
view higher education 
opportunity as more 
naturally equitable based 
on hard work, while 
democrats may be more 
likely to see opportunity as 
related to class and race 
and inequitable based on 
those factors. 
Tea Party Influence 58 0 1 
Related to the influence of 
the ultraconservative Tea 
Party in Texas and their 
political rhetoric, 
particularly around social 
issues. 
Institutions as Interest 
Groups 53 0 1 
Related to institutional 
concerns; institutions’ 
voicing of their concerns 
and the Legislature’s 
response to institutions as 
a constituency and interest 
group. Institutions’ ability, 
or inability, to speak 
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collectively for broader 
impact on state policy. 
Bipartisanship 51 0 2 
Both sides are concerned 
about cost, but diverge on 
why and how to address 
the issue. Democrats tend 
to see affordability based 
on an interest in promoting 
equity and access, and 
want to provide more 
appropriations and aid. 
Republicans tend to see 
affordability as a way to 
ensure cost containment, 
and want to cut back on 
funding and see institutions 
be more efficient. 
Policy Entrepreneurs 50 0 3 
Based on Kingdon’s 
framework, “advocates for 
proposals or for the 
prominence of an idea” 
who are adept at 
manipulating the policy, 
problem, and political 
streams in order to bring 
their ideas to fruition.  
Program Utilization 46 0 2 
Utilization of aid programs 
by students and 
institutions, related to 
return on investment and 
the state’s interest in 
efficient use of resources, 
graduation rates, and 
workforce outcomes. For 
B-On-Time, difficulty 
accessing the program due 
to promotion regulations, 
and also unequal utilization 
across campuses due to 
student body 
characteristics. For 
Hazlewood, dramatic 
increase in utilization, 
particularly on some 
campuses with higher 
veteran communities.  
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Coalition Building 45 0 1 
Related to policy 
entrepreneurship; 
intentional efforts to 
convene a broad group of 
stakeholders and 
supporters, particularly 
around the Texas Grant 
Priority Model and led by 
Commissioner Paredes 
and Senator Zaffirini as a 
strategy to increase 
support in the face of 
Democrat and minority 
caucus concerns.  
Economy and 
Demography 41 0 3 
The state’s population 
growth, particularly among 
nonwhite students and 
many with greater financial 
need, and the ways this 
affects the state budget 
and higher education 
pipeline.  
Anti-Intellectualism 40 0 1 
Related to or indicating the 
presence of anti-
intellectual forces or 
factions, critical of higher 
education as elitist and 
intangible ideas as 
unnecessary. 
Workforce Emphasis 40 0 2 
Higher education and 
affordability seen as 
primarily about the 
economy; legislators 
concerned about money 
and the budget and think in 
terms of return on 
investment. 60x30 state 
higher education plan and 
its focus on workforce 
outcomes. Business-
minded view of higher 
education with students as 
consumers and degrees as 
products for workforce. 
Higher education’s 
engagement with this view 
and use of its rhetoric in 
order to increase funding 
and speak in a way the 
legislature understands.  
Commissioner 
Leadership 35 0 2 
Comissioner Paredes’s 
interest in expanding the 
use of “need plus merit” 
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criteria in the state’s 
financial aid programs, in 
order to increase 
achievement, outcomes, 
and reward hard working 
students. 
Use of Data 33 0 1 
Use of data and research 
to inform decisions and the 
manipulation of that data to 
serve political or policy 
ageanas. 
Policy Windows 26 0 2 
Based on Kingdon’s 
framework, opportunities 
for policy change that arise 
as a result of shifts in the 
political stream, events in 
the environment, or new 
information drawing 
attention to a problem. 
Lack of Advocacy 19 0 1 
Bill or policy idea lacking 
support, due to factors 
such as change in political 
leadership or environment; 
for HB 700 in particular, 
Zaffirini and Dewhurst’s 
transitions out of power 
leaving the BOT program 
without an influential ally. 
Timing 17 0 1 
The influence of timing on 
bill development and 
outcomes. For Hazlewood, 
the House had time to 
mobilize after the Senate 
voted, and the bill was 
scheduled for a vote on 
Memorial Day; for B-On-
Time, the bill was heard 
later in the session, which 
may have increased its 
momentum and limited 
debate. 
Need for Financial 
Flexibility 16 0 2 
Institutions’ interest in 
greater financial flexibility 
due to budget pressures 
from Hazlewood 
exemptions, Texas Grants’ 
requirement that aid offices 
make up the difference 
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between state funding of 
the program and students’ 
cost of attendance, and the 
growing need of students 
and cost of higher 
education. Need for 
flexibility influenced 
institutions’ positions on 
aid programs, criteria, and 
end of the B-On-Time 
program. 
Limitations on 
Promotion 14 0 2 
For B-On-Time, institutions 
were unable to promote 
the program to students 
because of federal 
regulations that 
categorized it as a private 
loan and required them to 
meet preferred lendor 
requirements. These 
limitations undermined the 
program’s utilization. 
     
Groundedness = The number of quotations connected to a code, or the number of applications 
of a code 
Density = The number of codes linked to a code    
Groups = The number of groups to which a code is linked   
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Appendix E 
Interview Participants 
# Descriptor/Category # Descriptor/Category 
1 Media Relations 26 Financial Aid Leader 
2 Government Relations Staff Member 27 Policy Advisor 
3 State Agency Staff Member 28 Advocacy Organization Staff Member 
4 Legislative Staffer 29 Government Relations Staff Member 
5 State Agency Staff Member 30 Legislative Staffer 
6 Advocacy Organization Staff Member 31 Higher Education Leader 
7 Financial Aid Leader 32 Higher Education Leader 
8 Policy Advisor 33 Advocacy Organization Staff Member 
9 Media Relations 34 Advocacy Organization Staff Member 
10 Media Relations 35 Elected Official 
11 Legislative Staffer 36 Government Relations Staff Member 
12 State Official 37 Advocacy Organization Staff Member 
13 Legislative Staffer  38 Elected Official 
14 State Agency Staff Member 39 Government Relations Staff Member 
15 State Agency Staff Member 40 Advocacy Organization Staff Member 
16 Legislative Staffer 41 Legislative Staffer 
17 Advocacy Organization Staff Member 42 Elected Official 
18 State Agency Staff Member 43 Advocacy Organization Staff Member 
19 Legislative Staffer 44 Elected Official 
20 Financial Aid Leader 45 Elected Official 
21 Legislative Staffer 46 Financial Aid Leader 
22 Elected Official 47 Legislative Staffer 
23 Higher Education Leader 48 Elected Official 
24 Higher Education Leader 49 Advocacy Organization Staff Member 
25 State Agency Staff Member 50 Advocacy Organization Staff Member 
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